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
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THE CONCEPT OF MĀYĀ



THE CONCEPT OF MĀYĀ

From the Vedas to the 20th Century

RUTH REYNA

M.A., PH.D.

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
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TO
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PREFACE

MĀYĀ is a philosophical concept employed by Hindu Idealism in its traditional literature and in its various avenues of expression—the Brahmanical Schools and their subdivisions—as the basic and common explanation of the relationship of Appearance to Reality.

Māyā means different things to different men in the respective eras of Indian history. Despite its diversity of application within the numerous schools of Indian philosophy, *māyāvāda* has a unity of result,—that of contributing a fundamentally acceptable intellectual and metaphysical approach to the Eternal Real from which the Hindu mind derives serenity and detachment through the vicissitudes of life, in the assurance that the underlying reality remains unchanged.

In general, the concept of *māyā* basically implies that the world of sense-and-intellect is the sphere of relativity which is neither unreal, illusory, or void, nor ultimately real in self-existence, but is a form of manifestation of the absolute Spirit which is in essence logically indeterminable. It is the key to the reconciliation of the timeless perfection of pure Being with the perceptual becoming of the phenomenal world.

The "Introduction" of the present work provides the background for an understanding of the concepts and comparisons embodied in the main chapters. It follows the evolution of the term *māyā* from its first appearance in the early Vedic literature, through the Brahmanic period, its first popular acceptance in Buddhism, and its meaning to individual Vedāntic philosophers. It indicates the changes in application of *māyāvāda* after the Śāṅkaran founding of the Advaita Vedānta as a philosophical system; and the rival Śāṅkhyan School is examined in comparative treatment. The "Introduction" is not a comprehensive literary work, but rather, it is a cursory survey meant to serve as a preparation to the reader for an easier assimilation of the contemporary applications of *māyāvāda* that are discussed in the remainder of the work.

The entire work especially aims to clarify the erroneous notion held by Western and by some Eastern writers that *māyā* means

"illusion" in the sense of "imagination," or "hallucination." It presents *māyā* as a legitimate philosophical concept, as the explanation of the phenomenal world, and the relationship of existence to the real. Since *māyāvāda* is a theory, and the Indian Philosophies are primarily points of view, none can be considered prescriptive in the casuistical sense; therefore, this work is written from the viewpoints and premises of *philosophy* to the exclusion of the *religious* (popular connotation) analysis, except where the latter can correctly be included in the category of philosophy.

The explications of *māyā* and its allied concepts are treated in a comparative manner within the Indian philosophical systems, and especially in contrast or in agreement with the traditional Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkarācārya, India's greatest of philosophers and 8th Century scholastic. Śaṅkara is accorded the position of honour, in that his view is interwoven throughout this entire work; for it is recognized by all students of Indian thought, that one can expound *māyā* with Śaṅkara or against Śaṅkara, but none can expound *māyā* without Śaṅkara; and doubtless there are few who will dispute the merit of the honour or the truth of the observation.

I have in no wise intended this writing to be in the character of an East-West comparative study, pointedly omitting any mention of a Western philosopher or of a particular Western philosophical system; for it is my dedicated aim to produce a work in proof of my conviction that the Indian philosophical viewpoint can be exhibited in its autonomous completeness without recourse to comparison with alien philosophical ideologies for clarity.

In translating the ancient texts into a language that is not indigenous to the ideology, there is danger of course, of employing misleading terminology. The word "soul," while carrying a Western connotation, is used in this work exclusively to mean the embodied individual self. "God" and "creation" have philosophical meanings peculiar to the Absolute Idealism of Vedānta, and are explained in their Eastern usage as they appear in the text. The reader is earnestly requested to bear in mind the inadequacies of translation and to avoid as far as possible misinterpreting the Eastern meanings in terms of traditional Western thought. Frequent use of the "Notes" section will serve to keep misunderstandings at a minimum. Numerous translations of the Vedic and other works have

been used in order to give the reader the advantage of many scholarly minds.

The spelling of both English and Sanskrit terms (except bibliographical titles) has been adjusted to uniformity for better comprehension in reading. This adjustment, however, has not been made at the expense of accuracy, since diverse spellings are equally acceptable as correct, e.g. *Sāṅkhya* and *Sāṃkhya*, *prakṛiti* and *prakṛti*. Capitalization has an important function in this work. The word *māyā* is capitalized by some writers to indicate their great respect for the power that is inherent in *Brahman*, or in *Īśvara* whichever (or both) is their particular conviction. In the use of direct quotations the capital is maintained in deference to the views and to the distinguished character of the writer quoted. Otherwise, the word *māyā* appears consistently with a small *m* throughout this treatise. "Self" (capital *S*) and *self* are used to denote respectively the ultimate spiritual reality and the individual spiritual essence in man (not the *ego* as in psychology). In general, capitalization of words not capitalized in ordinary usage, is indicative of a transcendent meaning.

Brahman or *Brahma* (neuter and the latter unaccented) is a metaphysical term denoting the transcendent Absolute, and for the most part is referred to as *It*. *Brahmā*, or *Īśvara* (masculine) is signified by the pronoun "He," and is either the mythological or the anthropomorphic personification, or the phenomenological manifestation of *Brahman* as Creator, Governor, and Destroyer of the world, whichever meaning is intended by the various authorities discussed or quoted.

In selecting Śrī Aurobindo Ghose and Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan as representative 20th Century Indian philosophers, it was done without prejudice to other eminent and worthy Eastern contemporaries. Dr. Radhakrishnan was chosen for his luminous description in modern terms of a very old explanation of the phenomenal world, which is consonant with our own thesis that *māyā* as taught by the early Vedāntins is a *conception perennis*, and for his delivery of a positive approach to the science of life, for a troubled world preëminently torn by doubts and convictions of nullity. As to our selection of Śrī Aurobindo — we hold him to be the most daring thinker of this age whose incomparable intuitive penetration has produced a great work on the science of Life, and

whose metaphysical explanation of the phenomenal world once translated into secular language, will be seen to anticipate the postulates of physical science in this present century and in the century to come.

My sincere gratitude is extended to Dr. Charles A. Moore, University of Hawaii, for his valuable assistance in the arrangement of the format of this work ; to Dr. D. H. H. Ingalls, Harvard University, for his excellent suggestions for the "Introduction ;" to Dr. Haridas Chaudhuri, American Academy of Asian Studies, for his scholarly notes and letters clarifying the salient points of Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy of integralism ; to Swami Nikhilananda, Rāmakrishna-Vivekānanda Center, New York City, for his generous devoting of time and patience in discussing with me the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta ; and to Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of India, Dr. P. T. Raju, University of Rajasthan, Dr. S. K. Saksena, Lucknow University, for their letters of interest, encouragement, and advice, and especially to Dr. Robert D. Miller and the staff of the department of philosophy of the Florida State University for their affectionate inclusion of me in their philosophical family.

I am deeply grateful and deeply touched by the kindnesses and generosity of these eminent scholars in sharing with me their intellectual talents.

R. R.

Poona, India, 1961

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

AiU :	Aitareya Upaniṣad.
Āś :	Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda.
ĀSB :	Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya's annotations of his translation of Gauḍapāda Āgamaśāstra.
BG :	Bhagavadgīta.
BrU :	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
BS :	Brahma Sūtras.
ChU :	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
CIPh :	Radhakrishnan and Muirhead : Contemporary Indian Philosophy.
DM :	A. K. R. Chaudhuri : The Doctrine of Māyā.
DP :	Dhammapada.
GK :	Gauḍapādaśālikā.
IPh :	Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy.
ITI :	Raju : Idealistic Thought of India.
IU :	Īśa Upaniṣad.
IVL :	Radhakrishnan : An Idealist View of Life.
KaU :	Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
KBS :	Kumārila Bhatta, Ślokavārtika.
KnU :	Kena Upaniṣad.
LD :	Śrī Aurobindo : The Life Divine.
LS :	Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.
MāU :	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
Mb :	Mahābhārata.
MS :	Mādhyaṃika Sūtras.
MuU :	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
N :	Nāgārjuna.
NSVB :	Nyāyasūtras with Vatsyāyana's Bhāṣya.
PEW :	Radhakrishnan, ed : History of Philosophy Eastern and Western.
PhI :	H. Chaudhuri : The Philosophy of Integralism, or the Metaphysical Synthesis Inherent in the Teaching of Śrī Aurobindo.
PrM :	Prabhākara Mīmāṃsa.
PrU :	Praśna Upaniṣad.
RSB :	Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras.
RMSB :	Radhakrishnan and Moore : A Source Book of Indian Philosophy.

RV:	R̥g Veda.
Ś:	Śaṅkarāchārya.
Śa Br:	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.
ŚĀtm:	Śaṅkarāchārya's Ātmabodha.
ŚĀtmN:	Nikhilananda's commentary on ŚĀtm.
ŚB:	Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras.
SBE:	Sacred Books of the East.
SBG:	Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgīta.
SKSS:	Somadeva's Kathā Sarit Sāgara.
SN:	Saṃyutta-nikāya.
SnK:	Sāṅkhya-Kārikā.
SnPS:	Sāṅkhya-Pravacana Sūtra.
SSSS:	Sarvasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha.
ŚvU:	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
TaiU:	Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
Tai Br:	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa.
TLB:	Thomas: The Life of Buddha as Legend and History.
U:	Upaniṣad.
UN:	Nikhilananda, tr.: The Upaniṣads.
UNc:	Nikhilananda's commentary sections in the UN.
UR:	Radhakrishnan, tr.: The Principal Upaniṣads.
VB:	Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya.
VM:	Visuddhi-Magga.
VmV:	Vimśatikā of Vaśubandhu.
VSt:	Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.
WBT:	Warren: Buddhism in Translations.

VEDIC INVOCATION¹

Om. May Brahman protect us both !


May Brahman bestow upon us both the fruit of Knowledge !

May we both obtain the energy to acquire Knowledge !

May what we both study reveal the Truth !

May we cherish no ill feeling toward each other !

Om. Peace ! Peace ! Peace !



INTRODUCTION

Prolegomena

IN INDIA the philosophical attempt to disclose the nature of reality is centered in the self or *Ātman*.² Its concern is with the discovery of the nature of the Real through the realization of the self in the *Brahman-Ātman* principle of unity, the supreme and positive principle by which the empirical actuality and the spiritual ideal are reconciled. In Indian philosophy man is accountable for man — “it has its interests in the haunts of men and not in supralunar solitudes; ‘*Ātmanam viddhi*,’ know the self, sums up the law and the prophets. Within man is the spirit that is the center of everything.”³ The responsibility for reclaiming the primordial unity rests squarely upon the shoulders of man himself. Even the determination of rebirth into the phenomena of tears and suffering depends upon how man handles himself in each worldly life. His spiritual faculties are not permitted to atrophy in an inactive dependence upon other than himself to achieve his immortal recognition in or as the Absolute. It is his effort alone in the free choice of the practice of the physical, mental, and spiritual disciplines offered by the Indian *Darśanas*⁴ that enables the self to realize itself in the enjoyment of the eternal freedom of the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness. Perhaps it is this sense of personal responsibility deeply rooted in the Hindu mind by tradition and practice that accounts for the lasting virility and unwavering dynamism of the Indian spirit.

*The Idea of Māyā in the Rg Veda*⁵

Whatever the trend of the ancient Vedas⁶ in their investigation of religion, superstition, and magic, their gropings come to rest at last in the forming of the philosophical question — What is the “Self” who is ‘all that has been and will be.’⁷ Who am I, they ask, and what is the substratum of this apparent self that I can cognize and feel and see, and how do I reconcile the existence of the embodied self with the transcendental Self that is pure Being and that I

can know only through intuition and revelation. The answer to these perplexing questions sought by the ancient seers was termed *Vidyā* or Knowledge,⁸ and was considered by them to be the prime attainment, for through Knowledge Self-realization is achieved, and thus immortality, bliss, perfect spiritual consciousness with its undivided purity and absolute certainty.

As early as the *Rg Veda* there appears the concept of the Eternal Unity of Existence which "holds in its embrace all that has come to be," a unity in which the unchanging Reality behind the universe, what Hindu philosophers call *Brahman*, is at once the indestructible Spirit in man, the *Ātman* identical of nature — *Brahman-Ātman*, the First Principle. And it is upon a premise of non-duality⁹ that most of the Indian philosophical schools¹⁰ posit their doctrines. It is this direct inheritance from the Vedic past that distinguishes India's philosophies from the speculative philosophic novelties of the Western World. But reverence for tradition does not exclude adaptation since the Vedic texts themselves offer bases for a variety of interpretations. It is for this reason that the six¹¹ orthodox schools of Indian thought seem to profess opposing doctrines; yet, when viewed in synthesis they produce a magnificent integral whole, embracing all major areas of philosophical exploration.¹²

It follows from this that *māyā* has different connotations in the various texts of India's sacred and philosophical literature, lending itself also to varied interpretations; but all texts and commentators upon the texts are agreed that *māyā* is concerned with the relationship of the phenomenal character of the self and the transcendent Absolute. And all are equally agreed that *māyā* is either the anti-thesis or the obscuration of *vidyā*. Rarely does *māyā* mean to Indian philosophers, even for Śaṅkara, that the world is illusion, that it does not exist and therefore should be explained away. Indian philosophers, for the most part, defend the existence if not the reality of the empirical world and find its basis in the Absolute, the source of its many permutations. But from the viewpoint of the absolute Being, phenomena may very well be unreal. This doctrine is not peculiar to Indian thought; it is universally common to all metaphysics, an underlying conviction of representative religious and philosophical thinkers. In Indian metaphysics the phenomenal and multiple appearance of the world, its questionable reality, and its impermanence is denoted respectively by the word *māyā*.

Māyā as the explanation of the visible universe is not a modern concept, for it can be found in its primitive meanings in the *Rg Veda*, although the adoption of the term *māyā* to describe its essential application can be said to have been popularized in later thought. In the *Rg Veda* there occur passages which show that even then the ancient Indo-Aryans were forming the belief that an ineffable unity lay beneath the apparent multiplicity of the phenomenal, and they began by gathering their gods into a cosmic One, declaring 'that which is one the sages call by many names.' In the words of the *Veda* :

They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Agni,
and he is heavenly noble-winged Garutmān.¹³
To what is one, sages give many a title :
They call it Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan.¹⁴

Another passage offers the idea of *māyā* as an explanation of apparent multiformity which in reality is one : '*Puruṣa* is this all, that which was and which shall be.'¹⁵ It is here understood that the universe is alone *Puruṣa* (the Cosmic or Universal Person or Self) and the implication is that all that is not *Puruṣa* is illusion (*māyā*).

The word *māyā* actually occurs in the early *Mantras*¹⁶ and denotes a kind of magic. Indra¹⁷ assumes many forms (*māyābhiḥ*) 'by magic wiles, or mysterious powers :¹⁸ through *māyā* (supernatural power) Indra triumphs over the *mayin* demons,'¹⁹ 'and he has much *māyā* [*purumāyā*]'.²⁰ Germs of the later Upaniṣadic development of the word in the sphere of metaphysics as meaning the power of manifestation of the Absolute are found in such passages of the *Rg Veda* as 'Indra assumes form after form, working *māyās* about his body,'²¹ and 'through *māyās* Indra goeth in many forms'.²² Without *māyā* as a governing concept such ideas as the identity of the *Ātman* as Supreme Reality, the unreality of the phenomenal world apart from *Ātman*, and the unity of existence as discussed in the Upaniṣads could not be posited. It was, however, later Vedāntists such as Gauḍapāda,²³ Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and notably in our era, Śrī Aurobindo and Dr. Radhakrishnan who fully developed the doctrine of *māyā* and made it basic to their respective viewpoints.

In the first phase of its doctrine the *Rg Veda* is definitely polytheistic and with divinities of anthropomorphic character; and although many gods are named and worshipped, such as Sūrya (sun), Agni (fire), Indra (thunderstorm), Viṣṇu (the all-pervader), and others, the prerogative of creation, preservation, and destruction is ascribed to a single personality, Prajāpati, the lord of creatures. 'As the Golden Germ he [Prajāpati] arose in the beginning; when born he was the one Lord of the existent . . . He who giveth strength . . . [but] whose shadow is immortality, is death . . .'²⁴ So speaking, the *Rg Veda* records its reluctance to ascribe the order of the world (*Ṛta*) to more than one deity, and this despite its advocacy of a plurality of gods, for "if the endless variety of the world suggests numerous deities, the unity of the world implies one deity."²⁵

Indeed, the reflective tendency of the ancient Indian thinker and his enquiry into the identity and nature of the Supreme, the world Cause, is evident early in the vedic hymns where it is said, 'Of whom, the terrible, they ask, "where is he?" of him indeed they also say, "He is not",'²⁶ and 'through whom the mighty heaven and earth have been fixed . . . what God with our oblation shall we worship?'²⁷

Through the enquiring doubt of these early passages a superpersonal non-duality develops and the universe is explained in the *Hymn of the Creation*²⁸ as an evolution out of the ultimate One; and it is in the verses²⁹ of this hymn also, that there can be detected a foreshadowing of the modern Indian point of view of the distinction between absolute reality (*Brahman*) and the personal God (*Īśvara*), which forms the basic structure of such schools of thought as that of the qualified non-dualism of Rāmānuja in the 11th century, and the integralistic philosophy of Śrī Aurobindo in the 20th century.³⁰

*Māyā in the Upaniṣads*³¹

The inclination to philosophic introspection manifest in the hymns of the *Rg Veda* take on a more metaphysical character in the Upaniṣads³² as his search for the underlying reality of things causes the Indian philosopher to ask, "What is that which by being known makes us know everything in the world?"³³ What is that which

by being known all is revealed for what it is ? He enquires into the self, and reads in the Upaniṣads the answer, 'knowing that the individual self, eater of the fruit of action, is the Universal Self, maker of past and future, he knows he has nothing to fear.'³⁴ "The real which is at the heart of the universe is reflected in the infinite depths of the self. *Brahman* (the ultimate as discovered objectively) is *Ātman* (the ultimate as discovered introspectively). *Tat tvam asi* (That art thou). Truth is within us [for] 'when we realize the universal Self in us, when and what may anyone fear or worship ?' "³⁵

Although the Upaniṣadic literature reveals a diligent application on the part of the seers to discover the essential nature or First Principle of the Universe ; and coming as they did to the decision that 'the great omnipresent *Ātman*'³⁶ which is greater than heaven, space, and earth,³⁷ and is at the same time present 'small as a corn of rice,'³⁸ "whole and undivided in man's own self, the Universal Self identical with the individual self,"³⁹ there remained unanswered the question of why the essence of things is not given in the objects as they present themselves to our senses in the phenomenal world. What then, is this mere appearance, this shadowing of the real essences of things ? The Upaniṣads answer that the world is *māyā*, and that empirical knowledge does not give true Knowledge but belongs to the realm of ignorance or *avidyā* ;⁴⁰ for, if the Self within us and *Brahman* are One, if that is the only reality, then all of the perceived multiplicity of the world must partake of unreality ; and therefore, all that we see and feel and cognize with our senses and with our intellects, yes, and even the seeming dual character of self, is *māyā*.⁴¹

Māyā in one of its earliest appearances with the meaning "cosmic illusion" can be found in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 'know then, that prakṛti⁴² is *māyā* and that the Great God is the Lord of *māyā*. The whole universe is filled with objects that are parts of his being.'⁴³

Śaṅkarācārya in his commentaries on the *Vedānta Sūtras*⁴⁴ explains the use of *māyā* in this passage of the *ŚvU* and other similar lines, as meaning both illusion and the "power of the Lord," saying, "anything beside the Supreme Self is illusory . . . the world is created by *māyā*, the inscrutable power of the Lord, and is therefore unreal," and again, "duality is an illusion and Non-duality is Ultimate Reality."⁴⁵

It is his use of the equivocal term "illusion" to denote the veiling of Knowledge that is charged against Śāṅkara by his critics as meaning "hallucination."

One of the most significant of the Upaniṣads, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, reputed to have been written by Yājñavalkya,⁴⁶ can be said to contain in essence the fundamental precepts of the traditional⁴⁷ Vedānta which has become established in India as its predominant philosophical doctrine. According to Yājñavalkya's teaching in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the individual *ātman* is in reality the Supreme *Ātman*, 'this [self or *ātman*] was indeed *Brahman* in the beginning. It knew itself only as "I am *Brahman*." Therefore, it became all, [and he who realizes his Oneness like] whoever among the gods had his enlightenment, also became That [*Brahman*] . . . [he also in this manner] knows the self as "I am *Brahman*," becomes all this [universe]⁴⁸ . . . [the illusion of the self vanishes] and even the gods cannot prevent his becoming this, for he has become their Self.'⁴⁹

The conception of the identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman*, the acceptance of the utter non-duality of the Supreme Self as Reality, the substratum of the universe, necessitates the logical denial of all that is not the self, and imputes unreality to the appearance of anything that is other, for says the Upaniṣad, 'there is in It no diversity.'⁵⁰ Therefore, the multiplicity perceptible in the universe independent of *Ātman*, is *māyā*.

In a hymn in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the petitioner begs to be led from the unreal to the Real, from darkness to Light, from death to Immortality —⁵¹ unreality, darkness and death is interpreted to signify duality which is *māyā*, and Non-duality meaning *Ātman*, alone is Reality, Light and Immortality.⁵²

The Idea of Māyā in Buddhism

The concept of cosmic ignorance can be said to have gained its first popular acceptance with Mahāyāna Buddhism,⁵³ in which Nāgārjuna⁵⁴ the dialectician and early exponent of this school introduces the distinction of what is neither real nor unreal.⁵⁵ In his philosophical presentation Nāgārjuna advocates two kinds of truths — truth as veiled by ignorance⁵⁶ or *avidyā* and dependent upon commonsense presuppositions (*samvṛtisatya*), and truth as

unqualified and ultimate (*paramārthasatya*). In the postulation of a truth that is ultimate and unqualified, *samvṛtisatya* or empirical truth perforce becomes consonant with *avidyā*, whose action would be the veiling of the truth of all things, causing the world of sense experience to present, if not an unreal, at least an untrue appearance. To better understand the Buddhistic doctrine of *avidyā* as the obscuring principle to enlightenment (*vidyā*, or true knowledge) we will examine in a moment the principle of dependent causation in Buddhism, that of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

For Gautama, the original Buddha,⁵⁷ existence was process or becoming, and birth after birth was for him a flow of consciousness. But the logical conclusion that becoming must necessarily result in a becoming "something" does not here obtain, for in the understanding of Buddha, the "becoming" was the surcease from birth, pain, old age, and death. It was the attainment of the blissful peace of the Void (*Śūnya*) or *Nirvāṇa*.

The translation of *śūnyatā* as meaning "void" which in English connotation equals "nothingness" or "emptiness" is unfortunate, for such a meaning of the term is not acceptably demonstrated in the teaching of Gautama Buddha, and is more aptly defined as "indeterminateness" in the Buddhistic implication. The fact that Buddha does not preach a positive doctrine of the Absolute, and that he maintains enigmatic silence regarding the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the *Ātman*, does not mean that he rejects the idea. His very reluctance to speak of such an absolute could well indicate that he accepts the *Ātman* as the Transcendent Entity about whom nothing can be predicated; and this notion cannot be disproved by any of his utterances. Gautama was one of discriminating conversation and notably remained silent where the limitations of finite symbolization proved inadequate to represent the Truth, for "whereof we cannot speak we must keep silent — and this is the great tradition of the mysticism of the Upaniṣads."⁵⁸

For that matter, nihilism need not at all be read into the teaching of Gautama, for he repeatedly asserts, "That is not my Self,"⁵⁹ excluding all the elements of phenomenal being; to which Śaṅkara's remark is exceptionally apropos, that it is not possible to negate the empirical world without affirming another reality.⁶⁰ And again, in speaking of his Path, Gautama is reported to have said with subtle meaning, "and what brethern, is the path that goes to the

uncompounded [the unconditioned and indeterminable Void] ? Concentration that is void [i.e., devoid of personal consideration], signless [rewardless], aimless [free from desire]."⁶¹

Buddha did not profess to be an expounder of profound metaphysical truths, was not so much concerned with the working out of philosophical propositions and with the analysis of the nature of the universe, but more with the investigation of self and of desire as the cause of human suffering and the basis for the misconception of truth. He begins tracing the ills of this life to an evolutionary source by breaking down the self into causal parts. He observes that the suffering of man is caused by pain, old age, and death, which in turn are dependent upon birth. Birth indicates a previous existence in which clinging (*upādāna*) as a result of desire for the comforts of the flesh (*kāma*) has not been transcended. Desire, the basal cause of man's predicament, could result only from the actions of the empirical senses whose foundations (*āyatana*s) depend upon mind and body (*nāma-rūpa*). *Nāma-rūpa* appears from the root of consciousness (*viññāna*) which is due itself to aggregation (*saṅghāta*),⁶² and bringing up the final phase of the evolutionary series is ignorance (*avidyā*) which is responsible for the belief that the self exists as an integral entity instead of the combination of *skandas*⁶³ or aggregation which it is. So it is, that in tracing all suffering to its roots in *avidyā*, Gautama Buddha postulates the doctrine of dependent origination,⁶⁴ 'inasmuch as it is dependently on each other and simultaneously that the factors which constitute dependence originate the elements of being, therefore did the Sage call these factors dependent origination.'⁶⁵ Having come to the conclusion that the misery of the world is unavoidable as long as man erroneously believes that there is a self or ego, Gautama sets about breaking up the five *skandas* that make up the physiological and psychical states of the individual ; and after making this separation he finds no residue of ego, so concludes that the self is delusion. It is nothing more than a reference to the aggregate of *skandas*, 'just as the word "chariot" is but a mode of expression for axle, wheels, chariot-body, pole, and other constituent members, placed in a certain relation to each other, but when we come to examine the members one by one, we discover that in the absolute sense there is no chariot.'⁶⁶

What Buddha is saying is, that there is no self, but only the five *skandas* or elements of being put together, which through

ignorance man imagines to be an existent separate self. This mistaken notion of self would seem to contain the germ of the theory of cosmic ignorance detected in the Brahmanical schools as well, who hold similar notions of *māyā* as the power of delusion by which the deceptive picture of the reality of a separate self appears in differentiation from the One.

Nāgārjuna, who has been mentioned as principal speaker for the Śūnyavādan element of Māhāyana, regards the phenomenal world as *śūnya*; but *śūnya* for him as for Gautama does not mean a void or nothingness — it is what is neither real nor unreal, nor both nor neither. It is, so to speak, *māyā*. But unlike Buddha who remained silent upon issues he could not express, Nāgārjuna in his work, the *Mādhyamika Kārikās*, proceeds to prove that nothing is real, making excellent use of the Buddhist doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* to demonstrate this point. Things that have a cause, he says, must either be real or unreal. If they are real they do not need a cause because they already are and do not need to be produced; and if they are unreal there is no point in speaking of causation.⁶⁷ In addition, as the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* or dependent origin itself implies, nothing can have its own nature for it depends upon something else for its composition, and since the effect does not exist in each of its conditions examined separately, what cannot be found in each of them cannot be found in all of them; therefore, the aggregate itself is not real.⁶⁸

The most important result of Nāgārjuna's dialectic is his main thesis that all things appearing to be, only because of a mistaken relatedness, with no way of defining or describing or even of discovering their essences, cannot be said to possess any essences of their own, not even the self. This does not mean that the world is contradicted in our empirical experience; but as no essence can be discerned or attributed to any phenomenal entity, and it is not possible to assert anything of its nature, the apparent reality of the world has, therefore, the mysterious veil of ignorance over it. Hence, concludes Nāgārjuna, 'those who see that things exist or that they do not exist, do not see the truth,'⁶⁹ for 'all things are called *māyā* because they are unreal like a lightning flash, . . . because they are not born, yet appear to be, [and] as the world is neither different from reality nor identical with it, and though the world is treated as *Māyā*, *Māyā* is said to be not without reality.'⁷⁰

*Māyā in the Philosophy of Gauḍapāda*⁷¹

Gauḍapāda⁷² carries the non-relational teaching of Nāgārjuna still further, denying that there has been any creation at all, and postulating in addition, an extreme non-dualism in which all existents are in reality the Supreme One, i.e., the Absolute or *Brahman*.

In the *Maṇḍukyakārikā* (or *Kārikās*)⁷³ his profound philosophical commentary on the *Maṇḍukya Upaniṣad*, Gauḍapāda refutes the theory of relationships (*jāti*). Early in Book IV of the *Kārikā* he introduces his thesis: 'There are certain disputants who maintain that *jāti* "origination"⁷⁴ is a thing which is already existent, while there are others of firm resolve who hold that it is a thing which is non-existent. Thus they dispute with each other.'⁷⁵ He seems to be saying here that of the two classes of disputants, one of them holds that it is the existent (*bhūta*) that originates, while the other says that which originates is the non-existent (*abhūta*).⁷⁶ In the next verse he demonstrates his agreement with those *Advayavādins*⁷⁷ (Buddhists) who maintain that there is no origination, that neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being. Repeating the dialectic of Nāgārjuna, Gauḍapāda says, 'That which is already existent does not come into being and that which is non-existent does not also come into being; disputing thus, the followers of *advaya* assert absolute non-being (*ajāti*).'⁷⁸

A student of the *Āgamaśāstra*⁷⁹ will no doubt be interested in pursuing the various arguments set forth by Gauḍapāda as he refutes the theory of origination (causation or creation) in Book IV; but for the purposes of this present work it suffices to leave this area of consideration with the statement that Gauḍapāda clearly establishes the view that non-origination is the highest truth,⁸⁰ and all that is real is the non-dual *Brahman*.⁸¹

It has been shown that, while Nāgārjuna neither denies nor affirms the *Ātman*, Gauḍapāda is more convinced and firmly teaches the *Ātman-Brahman* theory that is carried forward by subsequent Vedāntic philosophers.

In order to understand Gauḍapāda's application of *māyā* as the explanation of the phenomenal universe, it is necessary to investigate at least superficially, the structure of his idealism. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya in his commentary on the *Āgamaśāstra*,

considers Gauḍapāda to be the first practical advocate of *Vijñāna-vāda* or "Idealism," asserting that it is originally adopted by Gauḍapāda from Upaniṣadic sources, viz., *BrU*, IV. 3. 14,⁸² on which is based his fundamental statement⁸³ that the waking state and the dream state are in fact, one.⁸⁴

Gauḍapāda's argument for this type of Idealism upon which he bases the unreality of existents runs as follows : the things witnessed in dreams such as chairs, animals, etc., are within, as they are in an enclosed place (the body),⁸⁵ therefore their reality is impossible. The time of dreams being very short, it cannot be possible for the dreams to transcend time and the dreamer actually to be present in distant places that may be seen while in the dream state, 'the time being not long one does not see the things dreamt by going to [different] places ; and no person on waking is in the place [where he dreamed himself to be].'⁸⁶ Similarly, in the waking state the things around us as experienced are as equally unreal from the fact that they also, are *within*, for 'the same is declared of the things in waking on account of the fact that they are inside, as there [in the waking state] so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not differ.'⁸⁷ Therefore, concludes Gauḍapāda, the things present in conscious experience, like the unreal of the dream or a mirage are solely imagined by the mind. But even in the face of this declaration of unreality, Gauḍapāda is forced to admit that external things *appear* to be real, for he says, 'in the dream that which is imagined by the mind within is [regarded by men as] non-existing [*asat*], while that which is cognized by the mind without is [regarded as] existing [*sat*] ;' but, he concludes in the same verse, 'the unreality of [both of them] is a matter of experience.'⁸⁸ Whether in dream or waking, what is cognized by the mind is unreal. Moreover, the mind which in both states is undoubtedly without subject and object 'owing to illusion . . . moves [in dream] with the appearance of the two [percipient and perceiver], even so, owing to illusion the mind in the waking condition moves with the appearance of the two.'⁸⁹ This duality, therefore, is perceptible only by the mind. It is upon this thesis that Gauḍapāda postulates the non-existence of the phenomenal world and asserts the non-duality of *Brahman*, for it follows that when mind becomes non-mind, that is, when its function of thinking ceases, no duality is experienced, that this duality in whatever form, comprising the movable and the

unmovable is perceived by the mind, 'but when the mind becomes non-mind duality is not experienced.'⁹⁰ And so, upon the cessation of the function of thinking 'when by the knowledge of the truth of *Ātman* it [the mind] ceases from imagining [ceases to function] it goes into the state of non-mind [that is, non-mind is reached through its knowledge of the truth of the *Ātman*] being non-cognizant in the absence of owing to the absence of the things to be cognized.'⁹¹

Despite what seems to be an extreme idealism in which he implies the non-existence of the world, Gauḍapāda does not actually deny its existence and the individuality of living beings. For him Brahman alone is the real and all that is perceived is *Brahman*, 'It [*Ātman*] is imagined as *Prāṇa* [breath or life] and other innumerable things. This is an illusion of It, the shining One, by which it Itself is deluded.'⁹² Here Gauḍapāda affirms, if not the reality of things, then the reality of illusion⁹³ from the aspect of eternity, from the standpoint of the non-dual *Brahman*.

The theory of *māyā* is accepted by Gauḍapāda as the explanation for what appears to be existent. If one sees the universe as subject and object, as a world of multiple entities, he is the victim of illusion, for when the knowledge of the truth of *Ātman* is reached, duality does not exist. He has shown that all external things both in the waking and in the dream experience are unreal, all being due to *māyā* or mere imagination of the mind that moves on account of *māyā*.

We have seen that for Gauḍapāda the phenomenal universe has no reality, for when Knowledge is attained it is not perceived. But for Śaṅkara,⁹⁴ who for later Vedānta ameliorates somewhat this extreme view, the world of names and forms are existent facts of daily experience for those under the misapprehension created by ignorance (*avidyā*,⁹⁵ or non-knowledge). While Śaṅkara is emphatic in holding the multiple world to be totally non-existent from the standpoint of *Brahman*, he recognizes the logical impossibility of determining the precise relationship between Reality and appearance; for, in order to determine this relationship the finite mind would have to perceive through the infinite Absolute, and such absolute perception would compel the negation of the finite. This mysterious relationship then, this dark veil of *avidyā*, impenetrable as it is from the very limits imposed by the construction of the mind of man, an ignorance that seems to apprehend the universe as a

multiple form, this power of illusion that can neither be known, nor if known can be explained — the Advaitin calls *māyā*.

Fundamentally, there is little difference between the philosophical views of Gauḍapāda and those of Śaṅkara. Both are Advaitins (non-dualists) and both posit the non-reality of the world. But in a comparative analysis it would have to be said that they draw their premises from opposite standpoints. Gauḍapāda in writing his philosophy from the standpoint of *Brahman* declares the world to be non-existent; whereas, Śaṅkara viewing the phenomenal from the standpoint of *māyā*, sees it to be real (existent) as long as it is cognized as such by the individual *ātman*, and until the individual's realization of *Brahman* negates it as real. Gauḍapāda believes he has proven non-relationship between appearance and Reality and that there is no possibility of appearance being either real or existent. But Śaṅkara does not attempt to prove the existence of *māyā* (this he accepts); his aim is to prove the reality of *Brahman*.

*Māyā in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy*⁹⁶

It is the doctrine of *māyā* in the Advaita Vedānta that forms the main point of digression from its rival system the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Sāṅkhya posits a "cause of the world" or *māyā* in its doctrine of *prakṛti*, a primordial stuff out of which the universe is created, which like the *māyā* of Vedānta is indefinable, undemonstrable, and indeterminate. Originally *prakṛti* is insentient, 'unmanifest as the cause gone before the cause of all phenomena,'⁹⁷ and in its quiescent or unmanifest stage represents the equilibrium of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*) that eventually make up all matter.⁹⁸ The *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*⁹⁹ explains, 'the *sattva* attribute is held to be buoyant and illuminating; the *rajas* attribute exciting and mobile; and the *tamas* attribute sluggish and enveloping.'¹⁰⁰ It is the combining in various proportions of its reals (the three *guṇas*) that make for differentiation in the world of objects '... some persons abound in the *sattva* attributes, e.g., saints and deities; others abound in the *rajas* attributes, such as men; others again in the *tamas* attribute, such as beasts.'¹⁰¹ The doctrine of plurality of selves professed by the Sāṅkhyas thus follows naturally 'from the distributive nature of the incidence of birth and death and the endowment of the instruments of cognition and action... and

from differences in proportion of the three constituents.¹⁰² *Prakṛti*, then, is the potential of all objective existence, both physical and psychical, for it is the source of all the world of becoming.

It is this identity of one common nature, *prakṛti*, that for the Sāṅkhyan accounts for the unity of the world of experience and not the non-dualism of the Ultimate Self¹⁰³ as held by the Advaitins. In this unity of a common substratum the Sāṅkhyan works out the diversity of selves as demonstrated above, affirming that there is nothing contrary to the sacred teaching¹⁰⁴ in the theory of individuation; and what is more, maintains the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, the Vedic declaration regarding the non-dual self is in reference to the *genus* of the self which consists of the general characteristics of being the self, and not to its wholeness.¹⁰⁵

However, while contending *Prakṛti*, the substratum of all creation, to be unconscious (*jada*) nature, the Sāṅkhyan school does not overlook the metaphysical principle of consciousness. It is only by virtue of its proximity to *Puruṣa* the principle of a transcendental and eternally pure consciousness that *Prakṛti* may begin its action; it is from the interdependence of these two principles that the Self evolves. *Prakṛti* is insentient and incapable of action until fused with the individual conscious principle, *Puruṣa*, the Cosmic or Universal Self, which unity results in the living empirical self, or *jīva*. Once created the individual soul or *jīva* is bound to this life and is automatically involved in the endless rounds of birth to birth (*saṃsāra*, reincarnation), and is concerned with the impermanences and miseries (*duḥkha*) of the world so long as there remains any identification of the *jīva* with the empirical, for teaches the *Kārikā*, 'without the conjunction of *prakṛti*, there can be no conjunction of bondage in the self *puruṣa* who is by nature, eternal . . .'¹⁰⁶ Therefore, it is the goal of Sāṅkhya to free the self or *puruṣa* from its bondage to *prakṛti*, to wipe away the veil of *avidyā* that prevents the self from distinguishing between the matter of life (*prakṛti*) and *Puruṣa* the individual eternally perfect spirit that is beyond birth and death, beyond becoming and decay. With the complete isolation from *Prakṛti* the soul (each soul) illumined (*vidyā*) then exists as pure unobjective consciousness, eternally above the urgencies of worldly life 'when the separation from the body has at length been attained, and by reasons of the purpose

having been fulfilled, Nature ceases to act,¹⁰⁷— then he the emancipated self obtains eternal and absolute isolation.¹⁰⁸

It is upon the premise of the eternality of the individual self that the Sāṅkhyans develop their teaching of the multiplicity of empirical selves as a reflection of the real multiplicity of the transcendent selves, and deny that such multiformity is in any manner illusory. 'The world,' they say, 'is not unreal, because there is no fact contradictory to its reality, and also because it is not the product of causes faulty senses or illusion.'¹⁰⁹

It has been shown that according to the Sāṅkhyan philosophy *Prakṛti* cannot be known, since in its primal or causal state no demonstrable quality belongs to it. It is only after combining the reals composing it that empirical demonstration is at all possible; and that, even after such a manifestation, *prakṛti* as the substratum of the world remains unknowable. But indefinable and indeterminate as it is, in common with the *māyā* of the Advaita, it differs in the respect that, while *māyā* is held to be neither real nor unreal, *prakṛti* for the Sāṅkhyans is real even apart from its connection with *Puruṣa*, for 'the non-perception of that [*prakṛti* or primal nature] is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence . . .'¹¹⁰ In the evolutionary theory of Sāṅkhya, when *Puruṣa* becomes emancipated by the removal of the illusory veil arising from *aviveka* or non-discrimination between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, *prakṛti* subsides into quiescence, but remains as real as before, ready to unite again with a *puruṣa* and to remain endlessly in its creationary role. Thus in Sāṅkhya two eternal principles are posited side by side, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.

However, in the teaching of the Advaita Vedānta, *māyā* which is the causal agent of the appearing world, ceases to be and is itself annulled once the Self realizes itself to be the One, for *māyā* is wholly dependent upon *Brahman* and has no separate, independent existence. Śaṅkara¹¹¹ contends that the cause of the world cannot be unconscious matter such as the Sāṅkhyans posit in their theory of *Prakṛti* as primal nature, because 'the *Brahman* is that from which the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of this world proceed.'¹¹² *Brahman* is both the material and efficient cause of the world; and as an efficient cause it cannot be insentient.¹¹³

To summarize the doctrine of the self as taught by the Sāṅkhyas, it can be said that the self manifested in time is the conjoining of

the two interdependent principles of the organization of the elements of Nature (*Prakṛti*) impenetrated by pure Consciousness (*Puruṣa*). And although the *jīva* in essence is one with the Universal Soul, Sāṅkhya teaches an autonomy of selves¹¹⁴ in a transcendental world, a pluralism standing against the Upaniṣadic non-dual One.

It is this empirical self which must struggle through the various experiences of birth, death, and rebirth. "In all its struggles and thrilling adventures in the Cosmic drama, the empirical Self is however, sustained by the unique transcendent Self whose shadow or empirical counterpart it is."¹¹⁵ But the confused identification with material nature obscures the absolute simplicity of the spiritual entity, and so it is the goal of Sāṅkhya to separate *Puruṣa* from *Prakṛti* and thereby put an end to the suffering created by the individual self's illusory identification with nature. Thus it would seem that the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the Self although culminating in an ultimate spiritual realization, is more of a separation than a union, and from this viewpoint has little in common with Vedānta. But there is one observation that can be made of Sāṅkhya — it has in common with Vedānta the declaration that "the enemy of the soul is not the body as such, but our bondage to the body and the sense of mineness."¹¹⁶ We find the arguments of both Vedānta and Sāṅkhya pointed in the one direction — that the life of the spirit is repressed and hampered by union with the material body, a bondage that endures as long as there remains the ignorance of its true Cosmic Self.

*Māyā in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja*¹¹⁷

The meaning and application of *māyā* in the teaching of Rāmānuja¹¹⁸ differs from that of the Śāṅkaran school only in its particular aspect or emphasis. The difference in emphasis arises from the variance in viewpoint concerning the character of the Absolute. Śāṅkara holds the nature of *Brahman* to be that of the Unconditioned or Pure Consciousness, indescribable and unknowable as suggested in the Upaniṣads, "The Supreme Self is not to be fixed; He is limited, unborn, not to be reasoned about, not to be conceived."¹¹⁹

We read in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* the famous "description" employed by Yajñavalkya — "not this, not this (*neti*,

neti)"; 'He, this self, is that which has been described as "not this, not this."'120 Śaṅkara emphasizes the indescribability of the Absolute in his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, mentioning that *Brahman* can best be described by silence, calling attention to Badhva, who after considerable silence remarks, 'I am teaching you indeed [concerning *Brahman*] but you do not understand. Silence is the Self.'121 This, then, is the *Nirguṇa Brahman*, devoid of attribute and unrelational, beyond the confines of time, space, and causality; yet, no relation need be assumed, for according to Advaita Vedānta it is a metaphysical oneness that is the very foundation of relative existence, 'that which is above heaven and below the earth, which is heaven and earth as well as what is between them, and which they say was, is, and will be pervaded by the unmanifested *ākāśa* (*Brahman*)'122 and 'that Being is the seed; all else is but His expression. He is Truth. He is Self. You are That.'123

This is the meaning of the Absolute to Śaṅkara. He recognizes, however, the conditional reality of a qualified Being (personal God) from the phenomenal standpoint. As long as one sees the material world one must postulate a Creator. That Śaṅkara admits and respects this personal God is evidenced by the many devotional hymns124 that he composed to the gods and goddesses of popular religion. But how does this qualified Being come about? Swami Nikhilānanda states the Vedāntic explanation in these words:

Without compulsion from outside, *Brahman* imposes upon Itself, as it were, a limit and thus becomes manifest as God, soul, and world, . . . it is *Saguṇa Brahman* by whom all things have been created, and by whom, after being created, they are sustained, and into whom, in the end, they are absorbed.125

This inscrutable power of *Brahman* to accomplish such a manifestation is conceived by the Vedāntin as *māyā*; and qualified by the limiting power of *māyā* the Absolute becomes the conditioned, the *Saguṇa Brahman*. It must be remembered, however, that this conditioning (for Advaita Vedānta) is not real but only apparent, in that *Brahman* appears to the finite mind with attributes and creative function. *Māyā*, then in this sense is conceived of as both the inscrutable power of projection and the mysterious veiling

power of *Nirguṇa Brahman*, who remains the unchanged and unchanging substratum of all that is — “like the ocean, *Brahman* appears to us in two aspects ; *Nirguṇa Brahman* is without a wave or ripple [untouched by the appearance of creation and the activity of the created] ; *Saguṇa Brahman* is the ocean agitated by the wind [of created things] covered by foaming waves . . . but *Nirguṇa Brahman* and *Saguṇa Brahman* are not two realities . . . it is the same sea whether peaceful or agitated.”¹²⁶ *Māyā*, therefore, both as projecting power and veiling power has no independent reality ; it inheres in *Brahman* as the power of *Brahman*.

Rāmānuja, while describing *māyā* as “a screen that hides the true nature of the Lord [*Saguṇa Brahman*],” denies that there is anything illusionistic about it. He contends that *māyā* in the Upaniṣads really denotes that which produces various wonderful effects, citing the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* ‘from that the *māyin* creates all this, and in that the other is bound up by *māyā*,’¹²⁷ he concludes that here the highest Person is called *māyin* because he possesses the power of *māyā*, not on account of ignorance ornescience on his part.¹²⁸ *Māyā* is to Rāmānuja the loving, transforming power of God, resulting in a Oneness (God, soul, and nature) which admits of distinction.

Rāmānuja accepts *Brahmā*, or God, as the Real with attributes. The general character of his teaching is best known as qualified non-dualism, in which there is posited three kinds of reality, the *Brahmā*, the *jīva*, and the physical world, all modes of reality each differing from *Brahman* but combined form Reality. Diverging thus from the traditional Vedānta, Rāmānuja in his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras* argues for the realness of multiplicity against the Śāṅkaran non-dualism, and like the latter uses the Upaniṣadic texts to confirm his position. The Śāṅkarans, maintains Rāmānuja, deny the existence of plurality on the basis of such passages in the Upaniṣads as ‘there is not any plurality here ; from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality (*BrU*, IV. 4. 19) ;’ and another, ‘but when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom shall he see (*BrU*, IV. 5. 15) ?’ But what these texts deny, in the opinion of Rāmānuja, is plurality insofar as they contradict that unity of the world which depends upon its being in its entirety an effect¹²⁹ of *Brahman*, and having *Brahman* for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. Nor, contends Rāmānuja,

can the Śāṅkarans logically maintain that the declared oneness in some passages of the Scriptures negates as unreal the plurality declared in other parts such as the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* which says, 'may I be many, may I grow forth (VI. 2. 3.)' for it is not reasonable to hold that the Scriptures should first teach the doctrine of plurality as belonging to *Brahman*, and should later deny this very doctrine. And what is more, the Śāṅkarans are mistaken in believing that the *Brahman* is without qualities, for what is meant in the *Mundaka Upaniṣad* by '*Brahman* . . . which has no root or attributes,'¹³⁰ is that *Brahman* has no evil qualities connected with *Prakṛti*, for, Rāmānuja points out, the same Upaniṣad "then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-pervadingness, subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperishableness, creativeness with regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities."¹³¹

Further defending his thesis of the real of multiplicity and the assignment of attributes to *Brahman*, Rāmānuja continues to argue on scriptural grounds. The text 'in the beginning all this was *Ātman* only, one without a second' (*ĀiU*, I. 1. 1), he maintains, does not deny all duality to *Brahman* as understood by Śāṅkara, but what the phrase "without a second" really means to imply is that *Brahman* possesses manifold powers, and this he does along with denying the existence of another governing Principle different from *Brahman*. If the scriptural declaration were meant to deny all duality, he reasons, it would deny also the eternality and other attributes of *Brahman*.¹³²

Rāmānuja contends that the *jīva* and the physical world form the *śakti* (energy, power) of *Brahman*, that the world and *Brahman* stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, "the former being like the power and the latter like that in which the power inheres";¹³³ but, since energy cannot be separated from its possessor, although they are not the same, the *Brahman* must perforce be determinate, that is, particularized by *śakti* (*śaktiviśiṣṭa*) which is the quality of *Brahman*.¹³⁴

The relation between the world and *Brahman* is for the Rāmānuja school that of body and soul, the body of *Brahman* comprising both the *jīvas* and the physical world — " . . . the individual self has *Brahman* for its Self, owing to the fact of *Brahman* having entered into it [and] from this it follows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent, and non-intelligent, has its Self in *Brahman* insofar as

it constitutes *Brahman's* body, therefore, "That art thou"¹³⁵ we understand merely as a special expression of the truth already propounded in the clause 'in that, all this has its Self.'¹³⁶ *Brahman* as the soul is the cause of the world, and as the controlling power of the body, *Brahman* becomes a plurality, or an effect of itself,¹³⁷ that is, *Brahman* is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.¹³⁸

In this analysis then, the world is due to the transforming power (*śakti* or *māyā*)¹³⁹ inherent in *Brahman* which permits an effect of *Brahman* but does not affect Its nature, because it is the body only that undergoes the change ; but, as the soul of the body the *Brahman* remains unchanged. Therefore, by regarding the *jīva* as the body of the *Brahman*, both identity and difference can be retained. Since, in the understanding of Rāmānuja, the *jīva* is an attribute or mode of *Brahman*, and as an attribute cannot be separated from possessor, the only logical conclusion that can be predicated on this teaching of Rāmānuja, is that although there is identity between the two (*Brahman* and *jīva*) yet one is not the other, and so difference obtains between them. And this difference for Rāmānuja is real,¹⁴⁰ natural, and is eternal ; it is due to the mysterious and equally real and eternal power of *Brahman* — *māyā*, and not as the Śaṅkarans teach,¹⁴¹ to *māyā* as deluding, non-eternal *upādhis* (limitations).

Māyā as Educative Illusion

Māyāvāda in the hands of the various exponents of Indian philosophy ; in the *Vedas*, the *Upaniṣads*, the *Gīta*, the *Sūtras*, and the *Āgamas*, is used for but one purpose — to enlighten man, to educate man, to give him a starting point or an ending point for the explanation of the existence of himself and of the mysterious Universe around him. Philosophy in India has always had a practical bearing that distinguishes it from the purely theoretical philosophizing of the West. For the Indian philosopher it is not a pursuit of intellectual fancy, not a profession, but a dedication to the spiritual education of himself and his fellow man. Like a benevolent mother, Indian philosophy has been cognizant of the varying capacities of the different minds of her children. Not all are capable of understanding the abstract notion of the Absolute as *Nirguṇa*, Unconditioned, Pure Consciousness ; there are those who need to be kept

in touch with the metaphysical subtleties in a defined and concrete manner. Novices with their untutored and unformed minds need something other than abstractions in order to reflect fruitfully if not comprehensively upon the Supreme. The Indian seers have their own way of meeting this contingency — through the legitimate use of myth, analogy, and symbol.

For instance, we find in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*¹⁴² the discourse between Bhrigu, the teacher, and his pupils takes on an evolutionary educative character. Step by step Bhrigu advances from symbol or analogy to development of truth. *Brahman* is first represented as *Anna* [food or matter]; 'Bhrigu meditated and found that food is Spirit. From food all things are born, by food they live, toward food they move, into food they return.' In the next verse the definition is cast aside and *Brahman* is then taken to be *Prāṇa* [Universal life or Vital Force]; 'Bhrigu meditated and found that life is Spirit.' From *Prāṇa* he passes on to *Manas* [mind or sensation]; 'Bhrigu meditated and found that mind is Spirit'; then to *Vijñāna*, 'that knowledge is Spirit,' and finally to *Ānanda* [Bliss, or the Absolute, the Infinite or the Perfect] for 'Bhrigu meditated and found that joy is Spirit.' After serving their educative purposes the lower definitions are progressively cancelled out and are shown to be wholly false with regard to the ultimate Real — 'as the real, he became whatever there is here. That is what they call the real . . .'

In the seventh chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* there is a similar use of progressive symbolization to direct the uninitiated. Here Sanatkumāra instructs Nārada in the Knowledge of *Brahman* through such symbols as "speech," "mind," "conception," "thought," "meditation," and "understanding." Sanatkumāra speaks: 'Speech (*vāk*) assuredly is more than name . . . 'Mind (*manas*), assuredly is more than speech . . . 'Conception [*desire*] (*samkalpa*), assuredly is more than mind . . . 'Thought [*mind-stuff*] (*citta*) assuredly is more than conception . . . 'Meditation (*dhyaṇa*) assuredly is more than thought . . .'¹⁴³ Through these familiar symbols Nārada was instructed in "understanding" (*vijñāna*), and finally in the "Infinite beyond which there is nothing, which comprehends all, fills all space, and yet is identical with *Ātman*."¹⁴⁴

The seers who were at least as discerning as ourselves, recognized the need of man for tangible support for the understanding of invisible truths, and gave their imaginations full play, fashioning from

the material of historical traditions conceptual substitutes for the ineffable experiences. Through suggestions derived from the traditions of the race they devised symbolic representations such as waters as creative aspect of the Absolute, the divinities in various forms and their vehicles, and descriptions of God and heaven. The sacred literature of India abounds in thrilling, symbolic beauty: 'Wind is the honey of all beings, all beings the honey of wind. The bright eternal Self that is the wind, the bright eternal Self that lives in breath, are one and the same; that is Spirit, that is all' (*BrU*, V. 4); 'As a caterpillar, having reached the end of the blade of grass, takes hold of another blade, then draws its body from the first, so the Self having reached the end of his body, takes hold of another body, then draws itself from the first' (*BrU*, VII. 46); 'Make my body, my tongue sweet, my ears keen — You are the Spirit's armour, hidden by sensuality; keep me from forgetting' (*TaiU*, I. 4. 2); 'God lives in the hollow of the heart, filling it with immortality, light, intelligence' (*TaiU*, I. 4. 1); and perhaps the most pregnant of all descriptions of the Eternal is that of the *Mundaka*: 'He is the inmost Self of all; fire His Head; sun and moon, His eyes; the four quarters His ears; revelation His voice; wind His breath; world His heart; earth His feet' (II. 1. 4). This description does not refer to a monster or a demon; it is not a grotesque, imaginative cosmogony — this "mammoth being" with the elements for its parts symbolizes the Eternal Consciousness. The vision is not truth itself, but an allegory of Truth, for

God is too great for words to explain. He is the light making things luminous but himself invisible, and yet we cannot afford to be absolutely silent. Though the tools of sense and understanding cannot describe adequately, creative imagination with its symbols and suggestions may be of assistance. The profoundest wisdom of the past is transmitted to us in the form of myths and metaphors.¹⁴⁵

What happy illusion — the *māyā* of the myth!

The symbolization of *māyā* is developed further in a magnificent Eleventh Century volume of myths, Somadeva's *Kathā Sarit Sāgara* (*The Ocean of Streams of Story*).¹⁴⁶ In Chapter 70, "The Story of Mrigankadatta," an interesting allegory propounds the doctrine of

māyā. Here a woman turns a wheel while bees suck milk and blood from a bull and an ass.¹⁴⁷ The woman, the hermit explains, "is *Māyā*, and the wheel which she caused to revolve is the wheel of mundane existence, and the bees are living creatures."¹⁴⁸ The bull and the donkey are symbols of righteousness and unrighteousness, and the milk and blood of which the bees partake are represented by the author as good and evil actions. The bees after acquiring these various properties turn into spiders and weave a net of white and black strands significant of happiness and misery. But the bees are eaten by a two-headed snake (symbolizing death taking both the good and the bad). Then the woman, "that female typifying *māyā*,"¹⁴⁹ puts them into various pots (wombs) and takes them out again¹⁵⁰ "where they again emerge from them (resumed their appearance in the empirical world)" "corresponding to what they had been before, they fell into entangling webs which are symbolic of sons and other worldly connections resulting in happiness and misery (acts and their retribution, re : doctrine of *Karma*)."¹⁵¹ Finally, the Supreme Spirit (in the form of an ascetic) disturbed by the noise of their weeping,¹⁵¹ consumed the whole, all the entangling webs with the fire of knowledge (became Self-realized). Then *Māyā* who had no further work to do since all had been made one in the Absolute, vanished with all her accoutrements, as well as the revolving wheel of births and deaths and all distinctions of the world, righteousness and unrighteousness as exemplified in the ox and the ass.¹⁵²

So it is, that "the profoundest wisdom of the past is transmitted to us in the form of myths and metaphors." They are not to be taken literally ; like all constructs of the finite intelligence they are meant to be transcended when the capabilities of the spiritual self are raised above the need for symbol, and the truths that they imply are to be applied in ever new meanings with the progress of man in time. This is the way that man understands best. "Symbolism is an essential part of human life, the only possible response of a creature conditioned by time and space to the timeless and spaceless reality."¹⁵³

Let us see how men of the present have used their heritage — the wisdom of the past.

CHAPTER I

MĀYĀ IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEGRAL NON-DUALISM :

ŚRĪ AUROBINDO¹⁵⁴

Prolegomena

THE GREAT tradition of Vedānta is one of catholicity and tolerance, a universality and lenity essential to its dedicated role of bringing to intellectual and spiritual fruition the metaphysical quest of man. It arranges into a complete and remarkable philosophical mosaic, all of the systems of Indian thought ;¹⁵⁵ for it recognizes the limitations of human intelligence to devise a single, all-inclusive discipline that will circumscribe the entire Truth of Eternality. Appropriately, it absorbs into its depths, diverse and opposing concepts, bringing them together into a single encompassing view that reaches beyond the periphery of man's horizon.

Śrī Aurobindo¹⁵⁶ exemplifies the Vedic tradition of synthesis in his philosophy of *Integral Non-Dualism*,¹⁵⁷ a philosophical system that integrates three seeming contradictory modes of interpretation of Vedānta. They are, the *Nirguṇa Brahman* of Advaita, the *Saguṇa Brahman* of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, and the *Jivātman* of Dvaita,¹⁵⁸ which he reinterprets as constituents of one integrating principle of the universe, super-transcendence, cosmic universality, and unique individuality — freedom, creativity, and uniqueness respectively. The philosophical conviction of Aurobindo "may be designated *Integral Vedānta* in so far as it is the reaffirmation of what he calls the original Vedānta, i.e., the original teaching of the Upanishads into concrete fullness and integrality."¹⁵⁹

Aurobindo rejects what he considers the illusionism of Śaṅkara, and accepts the reality of the world as well as its ultimate sublimation ; for there is no reality, he teaches, that is not a reflection of the descent of the Absolute into the finite. But such an involution of Spirit into matter compels a subsequent evolution of the lower into higher forms, that is, if the self that is thus exposed to embodiment

is to return to its status as one with the Absolute. It is the task of the self to achieve its ultimate identity by transcending the realm of the mental through a supra-mental change — a concept vital to the philosophy of Integralism (this concept is examined at greater length in a later section of this chapter).

The descent of the Absolute into the finite, which would be categorically denied in the Śāṅkaran interpretation, is essential to Aurobindo's view as being the positive expression of the essential power of *Brahman*. A sort of negation, however, cannot be avoided in any of the Vedāntic viewpoints, if the Self in its phenomenal appearance is to be considered either a manifestation of the Absolute, or a mistaken manifestation of It; for, reason dictates that finite objects must be denied in some manner or to a certain degree if the fundamental Self is to revert to its position as pure Consciousness. So, too, there is an element of negation in Aurobindo's teaching which he does not deny; but what he terms the negative attitude of Śāṅkara, is "sublated in Integralism's higher synthesis of re-affirmation. Śāṅkara negates the life impulse as an ascetic, and negates the reality of the world as *māyāvādi*. For Śrī Aurobindo, negation¹⁶⁰ is a factor in the transformation of the life impulse into active cooperation with the force of evolution, and the re-affirmation of the world as the field of increasing self-manifestation of the Spirit in matter."¹⁶¹

The descent of the Absolute into the finite, this power of creative Self-expression in the sphere of relativity, the Infinite power of self-manifestation under the aspect of finitude, is *māyā*. *Māyā* is also the power of liberating the spirit from its finite enclosure into a clear vision of its essential totality in, or continuity with, the Infinite. In the teaching of Aurobindo, this is the "higher *māyā*." He poses, also, the idea of a "lower *māyā*" which he designates as the "illusion of *māyā*," a mental play "which persuades each that he is in all but not all in him and that he is in all as a separate being, not as a being always inseparably one with the rest of existence."¹⁶² That is to say, the illusion (*avidyā*) of *māyā* consists in the individual thinking of himself as a self-contained, exclusive particular.

In the understanding of Aurobindo, then, the higher *māyā*, as the power of the Supreme Being to give itself phenomenal expression, is first concealed from us by the mental play or *illusion*

of *māyā*. This lower and deluding mental *māyā* has first to be embraced, then to be overcome; for, in the emergence from this error into the supra-mental *māyā* the truth becomes evident that "the 'each' and the 'all' coexist in the inseparable unity of the one truth of the multiple symbol."¹⁶³ This distinction between the higher and the lower *māyā* is the link between finite existence and cosmic reality. It is the respective action of the two *māyās* that for Aurobindo accounts for the Supreme Spirit's self-differentiation into the phenomenal aspect, and the evolution of the self back into Cosmic mutuality.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, the concept of *māyā* in its various roles in the cosmic panorama of involution and evolution will be examined in the context of the teachings of the Philosophy of Integralism.

The Absolute as Multi-poised Unity

As a preparation for the understanding of Aurobindo's thesis regarding the function of *māyā*, and its pragmatic relation to the Real, it would seem necessary to investigate first, his position on the nature of the Absolute.

It could be said that Aurobindo agrees with Śaṅkara up to a point — that the Supreme is eternally perfect in itself, and in its transcendental poise of being is not in any manner dependent upon the world of appearances for its perfection. But while Śaṅkara stops here and considers the *Brahman* to be a supra-logical, undifferentiated unity, and the world of plurality to be entirely relative to *avidyā*, unreal from the standpoint of ultimate Reality, Aurobindo looks upon the world as a "free creative act on the part of the Absolute Spirit — an act which is eternal, which expresses the mystically latent power of self-determination (*Shakti*)"¹⁶⁴ of the Absolute, and which symbolizes the Absolute's delight¹⁶⁵ of mutable becoming or variable self-manifestation."¹⁶⁶

For Śaṅkara, ultimate Reality is a unity beyond all differences; but Aurobindo goes a step further and conceives the Absolute to be one multi-poised unity inclusive of both unity-beyond-diversity of the pure undifferentiated Consciousness (*Nirguṇa Brahman*), and the unity-in-diversity of the *Saguṇa Brahman*. In Aurobindo's way of thinking there is no incongruity in the combining of two seeming

diverse concepts into one real. He sees "no reason why the Absolute should be limited to that aspect [*Nirguṇa*] only, and thus betray an incapacity for other forms of self-manifestation."¹⁶⁷ Therefore, the Absolute (*Parabrahman*), in the idea of Integralism, is manifested in both forms, that of *Nirguṇa* and *Saguna*, although It does not become exhausted by one or both, but rather transcends them as an unfathomable mystery.¹⁶⁸ However, this mystery is not a blank, featureless unity indistinguishable from void, but rather, an "ineffable Plenum" which contains within itself an infinite richness of diversity "in a sort of mystical latency."¹⁶⁹ It is the capacity of the Infinite Consciousness to have the powers of all qualities and characters inherent within it, and the free power to put all forth;¹⁷⁰ yet, the Absolute can neither be defined as a quality, nor a sum of qualities.

Aurobindo believes that the negation of attributes as a process of arriving at the affirmation of *Brahman*, the course taken by Advaita, is a limiting description to an Eternality that is limitless. He says, "It [the Absolute] is describable neither by our negations, *neti-neti*, for we cannot limit it by saying it is not this, it is not that, nor for that matter by our affirmations, for we cannot fix It by saying it is this, it is that, *iti-iti*."¹⁷¹ It is a supreme Reality, eternal, absolute, and infinite because of which eternity, absoluteness, and infinitude, *Brahman* is in essence not only indeterminable, but indefinable, and inconceivable by finite and defining mind, and incommunicable by mind-created symbol. Yet, although It is unknowable to mind as finite, it is not completely unknowable, as we shall see in a moment.

In his exposition of the philosophy of Aurobindo, Haridas Chaudhuri states :

The Absolute integrally conceived, overrides every species of one-sidedness. It is at once static [attributeless] and dynamic [creative] — a vast silence [the Ineffable] and an eternal Activity [as *Īśvara*, the Creator, Governor, and Destroyer of the world]; It is at once impersonal and personal, formless and possessed of Infinite forms, transcendent and immanent.¹⁷²

But, we ask, is this not a vast logical contradiction? How can the Absolute be at once both static and dynamic, transcendent and

immanent, formless and yet possessed of infinite forms ? Aurobindo answers, that we cannot conceive of the indeterminable *Brahman* to be at the same time having infinite determinations, and to be indivisible while embracing all relativities, only because we try to understand the Absolute in terms of the rigid distinctions of our logical thinking.

Chaudhuri explains, that there is no real opposition between the formlessness of the Absolute and its infinitude of forms, "because the Absolute is not formless in the sense of being incapable of assuming forms, but rather in the sense that, even though self-expressed in an infinite variety of forms, it at the same time transcends all forms and refuses to be circumscribed in its self-expression."¹⁷³ Chaudhuri seems to be saying here that, although the Absolute has infinite potential in its creative aspect, it is in no wise bound either by its potential or by the manifestations that it freely chooses to assert. The very formlessness of the Absolute is the condition for its power of assuming infinite forms, and is not to be construed as a negation of the power of formation.¹⁷⁴ The Absolute is personal in so far as it is individually present in every person, and it is impersonal in so far as it is not limited to a particular person or even to the entire collectivity of persons, for as Chaudhuri has pointed out, *Brahman*, while capable of assuming personal forms remains unbound either by its potential or by its self-expression, but rather "ever shines as transcendent consciousness."¹⁷⁵ The Absolute is likewise indeterminable, not in the sense that it is encompassed in an impenetrable and undifferentiated void of Pure Being, incapable of self-creation or manifestation from out of its self-existent infinitude, but it is indeterminable in the sense that it is not limited by any one determination or by a defined totality of determinations — "Its indeterminability is the natural, the necessary condition both of its infinity of being and its infinity of the power of being ; it can be infinitely all things because it is no thing in particular and exceeds any definite totality."¹⁷⁶

It seems illogical that there can be an entity that is at once indeterminable and determinable. But it is only our insistence upon determining the believability of all things upon the equations of our finite logic that these different aspects of the one Reality appear irreconcilably opposed to each other. It is only from the standpoint of our divided mentality or *avidyā* that these seeming

contradictions appear so baffling and incomprehensible to us. The question, then, can be legitimately asked — if through our finite logic we cannot arrive at the proper truth of Reality, is not our own real existence, as well as that of the relative universe incompatible with the incommunicable Reality of the Absolute? In answer, Aurobindo maintains that while the Supreme Truth eludes the analysis of man's logic, it postulates a logic of its own, and if the intellect is to be of real service, it must consent to pass out of the bounds of finite logic and accustom itself to the logic of the Infinite. The bridge that closes the gap between man's ignorance of the Real and his knowledge,¹⁷⁷ is a mystery, the mystery of *māyā*; yet Aurobindo does not imply that the work of *māyā* is the production of a superrational magical Power which arranges things according to its wisdom or its phantasy. "It is a wisdom which is not ours and a phantasy which baffles our imagination."¹⁷⁸ In fact, the mysterious way in which the Supreme Spirit and Nature operate, which is only partially and at points intelligible, but as a whole escapes our comprehension, must not be assigned to anything fantastic or illusory in the Supreme of the universal Self-existence, but to "our own inability to seize the supreme clue to its manifold existence, or discover the secret plan and pattern of its action."¹⁷⁹ Aurobindo does not posit an Absolute that is altogether unknowable. He circumvents the logic of man; for although the Supreme Existence is inexpressible in finite symbols, it is "self-evident to itself, and self-evident to a knowledge by identity of which the spiritual being in us must be capable; for that spiritual being is in its essence and its original and intimate reality not other than the Supreme Existence which has put forth what is in Its own being."¹⁸⁰ But, since Ultimate Truth cannot be seized directly by intellectual understanding due to the intervention of *māyā*, the inscrutable volition of the Supreme Being, an instinct, or intuition is needed which the intellect does not have at its command. Aurobindo believes that although the Eternal Infinite, because of its absoluteness and infinity, is indeterminable to Mind,¹⁸¹ it nonetheless, determines itself to our consciousness in the universe by real and fundamental truths of its being which are beyond the universe. "These truths present themselves to our conceptual cognition . . . not by intellectual understanding but by a spiritual intuition, a spiritual experience in the very substance of our consciousness . . .,"¹⁸²

for our way of knowing must be appropriate to that which is known.

Viewing the seeming incongruities in the being and action of the Infinite from the limited perspective of the finite, the only possibility of the two extremes being coincidental in the one, is that the Spirit either operates void of reason or through the mystery of magic. However, Aurobindo holds that the Infinite is not constrained to work in the narrow logic of man, and "what is magic to the finite reason is the logic of the Infinite";¹⁸³ for there is greater reason and greater logic in the operations of the Infinite — it comprehends all the data and relations which our reason as the instrument of an ignorance with a very limited vision cannot grasp. Our finite intelligence conceives the Absolute as indeterminable, and at the same time it sees a multitude of determinations which emanate from the Absolute and exist in it. Were we to look from the cosmic viewpoint we would see that a supreme Reason regards all its acts as a one-awareness and observes itself in difference, so that each thing, each being, each power has its own dynamic nature, yet all are respected in a total unifying truth and harmony. Our reason is disposed to conclude that there cannot be diversity in Oneness and determination in the indeterminate; but when this logic of the finite mind fails and "we look from the viewpoint of a larger, more plastic reason, taking account of the logic of the Infinite, the difficulties which must meet our intelligence when it tries to conceive the Absolute and omnipresent Reality, we shall see that the whole difficulty is verbal and conceptual and not real."¹⁸⁴ And, in Aurobindo's description which we will examine in a moment, he demonstrates that "Oneness finds itself infinitely in what seems to us to be a falling away from its oneness,"¹⁸⁵ which in reality is an inexhaustible display of unity. In the language of Integralism, "this is the miracle, the *Māyā* of the universe, yet perfectly logical, natural, and a matter of course to the self-vision and self-experience of the Infinite . . . for the *Māyā* of *Brahman* is at once the magic and the logic of an infinitely variable Oneness."¹⁸⁶

The Philosophy of Integralism as a metaphysical synthesis teaches the Absolute as inclusive of three aspects or fundamental spiritual determinates of the infinite existence — *Brahman* the Reality, is *Ātman* (the Self), *Puruṣa* — the Conscious Being, and *Īśvara* — the Divine. They are the triple powers or the self-determinations of the

Supreme Being, necessary first postulates for all its self-creation or manifestation.

The Supreme *Brahman*, for Integralism, is not the unqualified Absolute of the Advaita, from whose viewpoint there is no multiplicity, or in which there does not exist even the potential of differentiation; it is rather, the omnipresent Reality in which all that is relative exists as its forms or its movements. This is an Absolute that takes all relatives in its embrace, yet remains transcendent and incommunicable, unchanged by the application of its power of differentiation. *Brahman* is the Consciousness (*Puruṣa*), the inner soul in all that knows itself in all that exists; *Brahman* is the force that acts in man and animal and forms the energies of Nature, "he is the *Īśvara* (God), the omniscient and omnipotent All-ruler, and it is by his *Shakti* [*Māyā*], his conscious Power, viz., his conceptively creative power, that he manifests himself in Time and governs the universe."¹⁸⁷ And, when the Self is realized from the viewpoint of *Brahman*, the cosmic multiplicity appears as the ideal projection of an indescribable principle of creativity called *māyā*.

What we have then, is the Absolute as the base of all relatives, "the Absolute governing, pervading, and constituting all relatives. There is nothing that is not the omnipresent Reality. In observing the triple aspect and the triple power we come to see how this is possible."¹⁸⁸

The Advaitin calls upon the concept of *Ātman-Māyā*, the mysterious delusion of the Self, as the key to ultimate reality, and when *Ātman* is realized the world is seen not to exist. The Sāṅkhyan relies for interpretation of the Real upon the detachment of *Puruṣa*, the individual eternal and transcendent Soul, from the unconscious and eternal creative principle called *Prakṛti*, each being radically different in nature. When the *Puruṣa* aspect of reality is realized, the world appears as the modification of *Prakṛti* and as eternally evolving from this common primordial source. Vaiṣṇavism¹⁸⁹ and Tantricism¹⁹⁰ lay dominant emphasis upon the *Śakti*, the creative power of *Īśvara*'s¹⁹¹ infinite consciousness to reveal the plan of ultimate reality.

What we can conclude then, from Aurobindo's idea of integration of the three points of view¹⁹² regarding the nature of *Brahman*, is that *Ātman*, *Puruṣa*, and *Īśvara* are not mutually exclusive truths, but rather, they are fundamental spiritual determinations of the

one Supreme Spirit (*Parabrahman* or *Purushaottama*), corresponding to different levels of spiritual realization and calling for different lines of philosophical approach.

The Triune Consciousness

In further explanation of the seeming paradox in the nature of *Parabrahman* — that He is at one and the same time eternally self-realized and eternally self-realizing, Aurobindo points out that all universal existence moves between two terms — a diversification of the One, and a unification of the many. This, in Aurobindo's reasoning, indicates that the One and the many are fundamental aspects of the Infinite ; for, what the divine Self-Knowledge brings out in its manifestation must be a truth of its being.¹⁹³ This, for Integralism is the logic of the way of the universal being of *Brahman* and the basic workings of the infinite intelligence of *Māyā*.¹⁹⁴

As we have seen, Aurobindo uses the term "*māyā*" in several meanings, all of which are vital pieces in the pattern of his integral philosophy. The supreme and universal consciousness is *māyā*.¹⁹⁵ Consciousness, like the being of *Brahman* is not bound to any finite restrictions of itself, for this *māyā* as the supreme force of the Eternal and Infinite, is by its very nature unbound and illimitable ; and since it is illimitable it can "put forth" many states of consciousness at a time without changing or weakening its basic force ; that is to say, without depleting its energy which remains eternally such as it is. *Māyā*, as the Power of Consciousness, chooses to reveal itself to us in the three aspects mentioned before as *Ātman*, *Īśvara*, and *Puruṣa* : It is at once transcendent as the supreme supracosmic Being that is aware of itself as All-Being, the universal or Cosmic Self, and individual as the Consciousness-force of Cosmic Nature which at the same time experiences itself as the individual being and consciousness in all existences.¹⁹⁶

Aurobindo describes the three aspects of Consciousness as possibilities of Pure Consciousness, using the term "possibilities" not in the indecisive sense of likelihood, but in the meaning of potential dispositions of Force, eternal and illimitable from which the Spirit may freely choose. The first possibility of Pure Consciousness, as we have seen, is that of the Supreme Being's awareness of itself as All-Being; its power to experience itself in triple status, to know

itself as limited and separate, yet unbound by these limitations to know itself as both universal and Pure Being transcendent of the universe. The vision of the Absolute of itself as All-Being, Aurobindo points out, springs from the truth that "there is in all these states or positions, or underlying them, the same triune consciousness."¹⁹⁷ He sees no difficulty in the Indivisible One experiencing itself triply, whether from above in the transcendent Existence (the Absolute), or from between in the Cosmic Self (as both determinant and determiner, yet well within the fold of integral knowledge), or from below in the individual consciousness as spiritual selfhood. All that is necessary for this to be accepted as natural and logical, Aurobindo believes, "is to admit that there can be different real statuses of consciousness of the One Being, and that [such] cannot be impossible for an Existence which is free and infinite . . . [for] a free power of self-variation must be [logically] natural to a consciousness that is infinite."¹⁹⁸

A second possibility of Infinite Consciousness that must be admitted as an operative choice is its power of self-limitation, or as Aurobindo puts it, "its secondary self-formation into a subordinate movement"; yet a movement that is within the illimitable Consciousness and infinite Knowledge, "for that is a necessary consequence of the self-determination of the Infinite."¹⁹⁹ This self-determination can be described as individual specialization of a common universality or totality; for each self-determination of the self-being must have its own awareness of its self-nature by virtue of its self-limitation; or if we prefer to put it in Aurobindo's words, "the Being in that determination must be so self-aware."²⁰⁰ However, such individual awareness would be on a common basis with full knowledge of other-self and other nature—"it would be consciousness limiting its action with full knowledge, not a movement of ignorance."²⁰¹ But along with this individualizing self-limitation there must also be in the consciousness of the Infinite, the power to limit its action in order to put forth a given universe or world and to confine such a world to its own order or nature, a power, as it were, of cosmic limitation; in as much as the creation of a universe predicates a special determination not only to preside over the world as Governor, but to select as Creator from within the Infinite what is needed for the movement of fashioning a world. This cosmic or individual conscious self-limitation is, in the teaching of

Aurobindo, "one of its [the Infinite's] spiritual possibilities," a fundamental spiritual determinant which may be termed, the Divine, *Īśvara*, or God, or in Vedāntic terminology, *Saṁgha Brahman*.

A third power or fundamental possibility of Infinite Consciousness posited by Aurobindo in his Integral system, is that of pure self-absorption, "a state in which [infinite] self-awareness exists but not as knowledge and not as all-knowledge."²⁰² He uses the phrase "not as knowledge and not as all-knowledge" not in the sense of restriction, but that "the all would then be involved in pure self-awareness; and knowledge and inner consciousness itself [both of which belong to the state of self-limitation or to the Divine] would be lost in pure being."²⁰³

This self-absorption, this trance of the Infinite which can be no other than the attributeless *Nirguṇa Brahman*, is at once luminous and dark. The luminosity springs from Superconscience in an absolute sense,²⁰⁴ and the darkness arises from the state of its Inconscience. That is, in the explanation of Aurobindo :

The being of the Infinite is there though by its appearance of inconscience it seems to us rather to be an infinite non-being . . . [but] a self-oblivious, intrinsic consciousness and force are there, for it is by the energy of the Inconscient [and not by the act of consciousness] an ordered world is created, . . . the force acting automatically and with apparent blindness . . . but still with the inevitability and power of truth of the Infinite.²⁰⁵

It can be seen that here also, a fundamental double status obtains — "the *Nirguṇa* standing back from the *Saṁgha* and absorbed in its own purity and immobility, while the rest is held back behind a veil and not admitted within that special status."²⁰⁶ The totality of the Infinite Consciousness would be there in latency, "active only by inherence or by the instrumentality of the limited awareness, not in its own manifest power and presence."²⁰⁷ Thus we have the explanation of how in its concentrated condition of pure Being and total Self-absorption, the Infinite can become aware separately of one aspect of its being. Infinite manifoldness is there in a supra-relational whole in the unity of the Supreme Spirit (*Parabrahman*) in its supra-cosmic transcendence and ineffability, "not in the sense

that It is void of any capacity for real self-determination, but in the sense that It is absolutely free in the matter of granting or withholding sanction to its inherent power of Self-determination (*Śakti*), without which sanction the latter can by no means embark upon her creative adventure."²⁰⁸

It should be evident from Aurobindo's discussion of the possibilities of Infinite consciousness, that "all these three powers can be accepted as possible to the dynamics of the Infinite consciousness,"²⁰⁹ and it is by considering the manner in which they work that we can come to an understanding of the operation of *māyā*. A summary to this point of the Integralist conception of *Brahman* will provide a justification of their synthetic reconciliation of *Advaitavāda*, *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda*, and *Dvaitavāda*,²¹⁰ as well as a preliminary approach to their teaching of *māyāvāda*.

The concept of *Nirguṇa Brahman* (as held by the Advaitins) as Ineffability, total Transcendence, and Absolute Freedom, and also described in the same manner in the Integralist discussion above, indicates the two schools to be in agreement at this point. Chaudhuri holds "that *Māyāvāda* is perfectly right in regarding *Nirguṇa Brahman* as the highest aspect of the Spirit, but [from the viewpoint of Integralism] (Advaita) is definitely mistaken in stripping it of any inherent power of real self-determination."²¹¹ Accepting the argument from the thesis set forth by the Integralists, one would have to favor Chaudhuri's reasoning, that "it is by reason of its power of real self-determination that the Spirit beside being *Nirguṇa Brahman* can also function as *Saguṇa Brahman*, that is, as a determinately qualified unity (*Viśiṣṭādvaita*)."²¹² But here also, Integralism has a quarrel with *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, claiming that the qualified-non-dualists²¹³ ignore the feature of the Spirit that at its highest, is pure transcendence and absolute freedom, and that it is this free power of diverse self-determination that enables *Parabrahman* not only to function as the Creator, Governor, and Destroyer of the universe, but also as an infinite plurality of spiritual Individuals (*Jivātman*).²¹⁴ And as to *Dvaitavāda*,²¹⁵ Integralism is in accord with its laying emphasis upon the non-temporal reality and ultimate significance of spiritual Individuals, but in the light of Integral Non-Dualism, Dvaitins fail to recognize that the spiritual Self in ultimate analysis is the Supreme Spirit itself in individualizing self-limitation; for, according to integral synthesis, "the spiritual

Individual is, in point of truth, a center of universal consciousness, a focus and medium of the transcendent Divine."²¹⁶

In the following section the contention of Integral Non-Dualism will be examined — that supra-cosmic transcendence (absoluteness), cosmic universality (creativity), and unique individuality (the spiritual individual) are three equally real non-temporal poises of the same supreme Spirit, which through the mysterious power of *māyā* reflect themselves in the composite individual self.²¹⁷

The Phenomenal Self as Poise of Being

It has been shown that Aurobindo holds there are different orders of Self-fulfilment of the Supreme Spirit: as *Nirguṇa Brahman* standing infinitely aloof from manifestation, a total transcendent and Absolute Freedom; as *Saguṇa Brahman*, infinite Consciousness, yet limiting itself to creative action; and as the result of the creative delight,²¹⁸ the experience of itself as separate and individual — in every one of which, one of the infinite components of ultimate reality functions as the basic and dominant principle. But if we are to pose and to accept the proposition of the variety of self-fulfilment of the Absolute Spirit, then we must also accept the postulation of a variety of function in the Infinite Consciousness, to which it must dedicate its powers upon unequal planes. It is not difficult to observe around us in the universe and without the aid of supra-perspective, various planes of consciousness which Integralism tells us are "planes in which the Supermind functions as the basic and dominant principle."²¹⁹ Aurobindo holds that all of these planes are fields of manifestation of fixed type, and whatever takes place in them is in the nature of increasing self-expression within the limits of these types.²²⁰ He speaks of the Absolute as *Saccidānanda*²²¹ "Existence, Consciousness, Bliss," positing three entities and then uniting them to form the One. How this can be possible has already been discussed in the preceding section.

Matter, according to Aurobindo, is the lower form of manifestation of the element of *sat*, but it is a form of manifestation of the Spirit, and as such, matter in its inmost essence is different from what it phenomenally appears to be. Since the different "terms and powers" of the Absolute are essentially inseparable from one another, "it is only natural that from the very beginning Matter should implicitly

contain within itself such other powers of the Spirit as life, mind, and the rest of them."²²² It is because these principles are from the beginning implicitly present and secretly operative in matter that it can be said that "Matter contains the promise and potency of all terrestrial life, not as an absolutely blind entity, but as an apparently unconscious²²³ mode of operation of the superconscient creative energy of the Spirit."²²⁴ Matter is, without doubt, the starting point of the Divine manifestation in the terrestrial plane ; but, Chaudhuri warns, "it would be a grievous mistake to confound chronological priority with ontological superiority. The earliest to appear in phenomenal manifestation should not be accepted as the fundamental ontological principle."²²⁵

Since a comprehensive discussion of matter is not pertinent to the general character of this present work, we will leave a greater disclosure of the subject to another time. For the present purpose it will suffice to observe with Aurobindo, that "the fundamental opposition which Matter offers to Spirit is this, that it is the culmination of the principle of division and struggle,"²²⁶ as the two are one — "Spirit is the soul and reality of that which we sense as Matter ; Matter is a form and body of that which we realize as Spirit."²²⁷

Pursuing further the discussion of *Brahman* as *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*, Integralism holds that life is the lower form of manifestation of *cit* or consciousness. It is, in the judgment of Chaudhuri, an inferior mode of operation of the Consciousness-Force of the Spirit supporting and modifying the substantial existence of its own forms. He says,

Life is the lower form of manifestation of the element of *Citśakti* in *Saccidānanda*. In relation to its own substratum, life is neither an epi-phenomenon nor an emergent quality. The body or material frame is a suitable vehicle for the manifest operation of the life-force of the world . . . [but] life is a higher form of expression of the *śakti*, the creative energy of the Spirit than Matter.²²⁸

Examining more closely the connection between material existence and conscious life : Integralism teaches that, while material energy is phenomenally inconscient,²²⁹ vital energy is phenomenally subconscient,²³⁰ spontaneous and self-developing. But despite such

difference in respect to function and phenomenal manifestation, they are inseparable in their inmost essence, as both are forms of manifestation of the same fundamental Spirit. Matter provides life with the basis of its operations, while life constitutes from the very beginning the secret promise of matter. Matter and Life, therefore, in the understanding of the Integralist, are expressions of the elements of *Sat* and *Cit* in *Saccidānanda*.²³¹

"Soul," in the teaching of Integral Non-Dualism, appears as the veiled manifestation of *Brahman* as Delight,²³² as a lower form of expression of the element of *ānanda* (bliss)²³³ in the Spirit. Śrī Aurobindo has described "Soul" as the highest representative of the transcendent Individual Self within evolving nature; and while the transcendent Self presides from above over the evolution of the individual, the Soul or Psychic is the Individual Self in its aspect of active immanence in the individual.²³⁴

Mind appears as the veiled manifestation of *Brahman* as *Vijñānam* (Infinite Consciousness), as an inferior mode of operation of the element of *Vijñāna* (creative consciousness, or Supermind), or self-luminosity (*ātmajyoti*) in the Spirit. Aurobindo defines mind as "a consciousness which measure, limits, cuts out forms of things from the indivisible whole and contains them as if each were a separate integer."²³⁵ That is, mind "conceives, perceives, senses things as if rigidly cut out from a background or a mass and employs them as fixed units of the material given to it for creation or possession."²³⁶ Thus mind establishes the fiction that they are things with which it can deal separately and not merely as aspects of a whole; for, if mind appears sometimes to conceive, to perceive, or to enjoy the finite, it is only seeming and always in a figure of the infinite. And if mind goes beyond the limits of its mathematics and tries to conceive a real whole, it loses itself in a foreign element, for its limitation is to the consideration of each part as a whole. The moment mind tries to deal with the Infinite, the inalienable tendency to delimitation enters and mind finds itself again using images, forms and words.²³⁷ In view of Aurobindo's analysis of the nature and limitations of the mind, it is not difficult to place mind as the lower form of manifestation of the Supermind or of what Aurobindo terms His creative "Truth-Consciousness" or *Vijñāna*. *Vijñāna* is the power of *Vidyā* (Knowledge), whereas, Mind is the power of *Avidyā*.²³⁸

Now it can be seen that an integral phenomenal self has been pieced together from the various manifestations of the Absolute. Matter, life, mind, and soul go to make up the individual self, which in its essence is a veiled manifestation of the supreme Spirit, of which infinite Existence, infinite Consciousness-Force, infinite Self-Luminosity, and infinite Delight are integral and inseparable movements. Thus Integralism establishes the composite phenomenal self as a poise of Being of the Infinite Self — in the declaration of Aurobindo, "there is no reality that is not a reflection of the descent of the Absolute into the finite."²³⁹

The Ignorance and the Knowledge

Now that the relationship of the phenomenal to the Transcendent has been demonstrated as that of manifestation of various aspects of the Absolute through its powers and possibilities of Infinite Consciousness, two additional points need to be cleared. First, if as Aurobindo says, mind is a lower form of Supermind, and the latter is inseparable from its parts, leaving mind in inherent possession of all the possibilities of Supermind — what, then, is the process that accounts for mind's lapse into Ignorance, since so far, there has been nothing demonstrated in the original nature of Mind, Life and Matter that necessitates a fall from Knowledge? Secondly, since we have found mind in its origin to be a subordinate process of the supramental Truth-Consciousness²⁴⁰ — what is the power or plane of consciousness that bridges the gulf between mind as we know it and Brahman as *Vijñāna*, or Supermind — two seeming irreconcilables, one finite, the other infinite? These are two problems that must be wrestled with if the philosophy of Integralism is to maintain its integral character.

As to the first point: Aurobindo has already shown through his treatment of the divisions of consciousness — the individual from the cosmic and the transcendent, mind from the supramental Truth, life from the original Force, matter from the original Existence — all divisions of Infinite Consciousness into subordinate actions or inferior modes, and with the limitations naturally imposed by their lower natures, — that each division can very well be made the basis of Ignorance. An understanding of the meaning and nature of Ignorance and Knowledge²⁴¹ as held by Integral Non-Dualism, will serve to resolve in part the point in question.

First, let us examine the relationship of Ignorance (*Avidyā*) and Knowledge (*Vidyā*); howsoever diverse they may appear to be in essence, they are not absolutely exclusive of each other. In their conjunction and continuity they are necessary to the purpose of the Infinite's phenomenal self-manifestation, as we shall attempt to demonstrate in a moment.

We have seen that Divine Mind is the divine counterpart of the mental or the phenomenal process of mind. It is in its function, the power of consciousness which makes Individual Selves respond to the Infinite Spirit's purpose of creative delight, and start thinking as if they were different from the Absolute Spirit and from other Selves. That is, in its descent from the Supramental to the mental, while establishing multiple manifestations and relations on the basis of the Divine Delight in Self-manifestation, the Divine Mind allows the infinite variety of forms thus created, to appear as if they were a self-contained thing in itself. However, although "the Divine Mind,²⁴² which is the final operation of the Supermind, views and governs the relations of the individual soul-forms himself in a manner appropriate to each particular form, there is no delusion for the Individual Divine who is fully aware of the all-permeating unity of the Supreme."²⁴³ *Vidyā*, we would say then, is the immediate knowledge of the Infinite that what appears to be separative existences is in appearance only, and for its creative purposes in Delight, as Aurobindo puts it :

... it is only 'as if,' for the divine soul is not deluded, it is aware of all as phenomenon of being and keeps hold of its existence in the reality of being; it does not forfeit its unity.²⁴⁴

Thus far there is yet no lapse from Knowledge, but rather a self-aware self-enjoyment of the One in and through its aggregation of countless differentiations. There is yet no gulf separating Knowledge from Non-Knowledge — it is at this point but a conscious delimitation.

A new factor, a new action of consciousness force is needed in the descending movement to create the operation of a helplessly limited as opposed to a freely limiting mind "with a view to a new intensification of the [ultimate] delight of unity on the basis of utmost intensity."²⁴⁵ That new factor is *Avidyā*, "the self-ignoring

faculty which separates the action of the mind from the action of the Supermind that originated it and still governs it from behind the veil."²⁴⁶ With the veil of *Avidyā* which the Spirit seems to have drawn upon its face, it allows self-differentiation to degenerate into ontological separation.²⁴⁷ Thus we have the mind separated and limited, and perceiving only the particular and not the universal, or conceiving "only the particular in an unpossessed universal and no longer both particular and universal as phenomena of the Infinite."²⁴⁸ This ignorance is further deepened by man's self-identification with matter; and the "infinity of the One has translated itself into an extension in conceptual Time and Space . . ."²⁴⁹ *Avidyā*, in the definition of Integralism, may be considered now, as "a special mode of operation of *Vidyā* itself, and not a negation of nor a direct opposite of *Vidyā*, but rather its purposive diminution."²⁵⁰ In this sense, then, *Avidyā* or Ignorance is not an illusion, but a real power, the power of *māyā*;²⁵¹ in the mystically poetic words of Aurobindo,

it is through the power of Ignorance that the deeper eternal Self throws itself out as the adventurer in Time, a gambler and spectator in infinite possibilities, limiting itself to the succession of moments so that it may have all the surprise and delight of the adventure, keeping back its self-knowledge and complete self-being so that it may win again what it seems to have lost, reconquering itself through the chequered joy and pain of an aeonic passion and seeking and endeavour.²⁵²

The Transitional Planes and Overmind Māyā

The second problem as posed in the preceding section, has yet to be considered. It is the closing of the gulf between mind as we know it and the supramental Truth-Consciousness of which we have found that mind in its origin is a subordinate process. This cleavage is considerable; for on one side stands an illimitable consciousness and force of integral being, and on the opposite there is limitation and separateness. By what possibility then, does the Limitless enter into the limited, the Infinite into the finite? Their seeming contrary characters make it highly improbable if not impossible that there could be an abrupt transition from one of these levels of

consciousness to the other, either in the descending or involution of Spirit into Matter or the corresponding evolution, the inherent groping of self back to Spirit. These are the difficulties that Aurobindo not only recognizes but for which he poses a possible solution.

There must be somewhere in the descending and ascending scale of Being an intermediate power or plane of consciousness; he says, "perhaps something more than that, something with an original creative force, through which the involutionary transition from Mind in the Knowledge to Mind in the Ignorance is effected and through which the evolutionary reverse transition becomes intelligible and possible . . . for the involutionary transition this intervention is a logical imperative, and for the evolutionary it is a practical necessity."²⁵³ Aurobindo explains the phrase "practical necessity" by pointing to the slow gradation of evolution — as Energy into Matter, Matter to Life, from the subconscious to a perceptive active life, from primitive mentality to conceptual reasoning Mind observing itself and Life and governing it also, and acting as an independent entity, and the seeking consciously of the self for self-transcendence — a preparation by slow gradation that logically necessitates other gradations from Mind in Ignorance to the Truth-Consciousness of Supermind.

However, if such intervening gradations exist, it is clear that they must be superconscious to human mind, which is now so much identified with the individual form, so exclusively concentrated in the direction of self as ontologically separate from other individuals as also from the Transcendent Universal, that it does not seem to have in its normal state any entry into these higher grades of being. But this is only a deceptive normality. Since all of being has its center and impetus in the supramental Truth-Consciousness, there is a logical requirement for re-entry. According to Aurobindo there are several directions in which the human mind can reach beyond itself. There is the avenue of intuition, an intervention, as it were, from above, — "the fact that behind all our original thinking or authentic perception of things there is a veiled, a half-veiled or a swift unveiled intuitive element, is enough to establish a connection between mind and what is above it."²⁵⁴ There is also the reaching out of the mind to exceed the personal ego limitation, the inclination toward cosmicity, toward a quality which is the very character of the higher mental planes, toward the superconscious

cosmic Mind, which as Aurobindo has suggested, must in the nature of things be the original mind action of which mind is only a derivation. These and the "multitudinous field of mystic experience" open a passage of communication and entry into the spirit ranges, and the possibility of extending our consciousness beyond its present limits.²⁵⁵ Man sees that there can be a higher status of consciousness than his own; "the evolutionary oestrus is there in his parts of mind and life, the aspiration to exceed himself is delivered and articulate within him"²⁵⁶

From Aurobindo's analysis, it is evident that mind can rise from Ignorance into a spiritual state, a spiritual dynamis not altogether determinate in character, not altogether ignorant of the Reality, yet not a supermind level, "but deriving from the supramental Truth-Consciousness and still luminous with something of its knowledge."²⁵⁷ Here then, is the means of transition, the gradation of ascent, a gradual communication in a scale of intensities "which can be regarded as so many stairs in the ascension of Mind or in a descent into Mind from that which is beyond it."²⁵⁸

Thus far, what Aurobindo has described is the process of the involution of Consciousness to mind and the upward struggle of mind toward the Spirit; but what is the power, or the intermediary, the occult link that at once connects and divides the supreme Knowledge and the cosmic Ignorance? Integralism teaches that within this new range, above cosmic Ignorance and yet below a greater Truth-Light with which mind cannot directly communicate, there is an original intensity, a superconscient cosmic Mind in direct contact with the supramental Truth-Consciousness, and which at the same time is a determinate of all movements below it and of all mental energies. This cosmic Mind is not mind as we know it, but is described by Aurobindo as "an Overmind that covers as with the wide wings of some creative Oversoul this whole lower hemisphere of Knowledge-Ignorance, links it with that greater Truth-Consciousness while at the same time . . . it veils the face of the greater Truth from our sight, intervening with its flood of infinite possibilities as at once an obstacle and a passage in our seeking of the spiritual law of our existence, its highest aim, its secret Reality."²⁵⁹ Overmind plays a dual role — in its nature and law it is a delegate of the Knowledge, of Supramental Truth-Consciousness, as well as the delegate to the Ignorance; for "Supermind transmits

to Overmind its realities, but leaves it to formulate them in a movement and according to an awareness of things which is still a vision of Truth and yet at the same time a first parent of the Ignorance."²⁶⁰ Overmind uses the individual self-determinations but is not limited by them, for it is well aware of the essential Truth of things and embraces totality while in the same power it distributes multieity. Its Energy in which it gives each Aspect or Power an independent force to work out its own world of creation, derives from the "illimitable capacity of separation and combination of the powers and aspects of the integral and indivisible all-comprehending Unity."²⁶¹ It is in the Overmind, maintains Aurobindo, that there rests the origin of the cleavage of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* in the Sāṅkhyan philosophy, in which they appear as two independent entities, "*Prakṛti* able to dominate *Puruṣa* and closing its freedom and power, reducing it to a witness and recipient by her forms and actions, *Puruṣa* able to return to its separate existence and to abide in free self-sovereignty."²⁶²

It has been brought out in this chapter that all possibilities of combination and relation between the Powers and Aspects of the one Reality are empowered to act, each as an independent entity in the whole, and to arrive at its separate expression and to develop the dynamic consequences of that separateness. "In Overmind this separateness is still founded on the basis of an implicit underlying unity; all possibilities of combination and relation between the separated Powers and Aspects, all interchanges and mutualities of their energies are fully organized and their actuality always possible."²⁶³ Through the power that is invested in Overmind, the one Consciousness-Force is liberated into a multitude of forces, each with the right to fulfil itself. Through the power of Overmind, the Delight of Existence is loosed into all manner of manifestations, each with ability to carry itself to independent fullness. Thus, Overmind makes it possible for the "One Existence-Consciousness-Bliss" to assume and to enjoy "the character of a teeming of infinite possibilities which can be developed into a multitude of worlds or thrown together into one world in which the endlessly variable outcome of their play is the determinant of the creation, of its process, its course and its consequence."²⁶⁴ It is the power of Overmind that allows Infinite Consciousness its emergence in the individual, in the veiling power of Overmind that obscures the Infinite

Consciousness to mind, and that enables the Infinite in delight to re-possess its own Self, of which the finite is only a mask and an instrument for various expression — "it is [in this power of] Overmind that we can recognize the original cosmic *Māyā*, not a *Māyā* of Ignorance, but a *Māyā* of Knowledge, yet a Power which has made the Ignorance possible, even inevitable."²⁶⁵

Summation of Māyā as Applied by Integralism

In the examination of this chapter of the ideas pertinent to *māyā* as taught in the Philosophy of Integralism, it will be noticed that there is some agreement as well as disagreement with the traditional Advaita (which cannot be avoided in the integrated treatment that Aurobindo proposes).

Integral Idealism concedes that Advaita is quite right in pointing out that the world as it appears to us is unreal or false, endowed with no more than a pragmatic or conventional type of reality. If, however, Advaita could be interpreted to mean that the world is unreal in the sense of being essentially dependent upon *Brahman* or as enjoying only derivative reality, then there would be left no ground for objection.²⁶⁶ However, in the meaning of Integral philosophy, the world from the vision of Knowledge, freed of all taint of *Avidyā*, appears in its proper perspective, the integral manifestation of the Spirit in terrestrial conditions, controlled by the idea of a definite goal, and eternally dependent upon *Brahman*. Here there is no illusion, no element of the unreal. What completely disappears, from the standpoint of the ultimate reality is the world based upon its own right of existence, but not the world perceived as the self-articulation of the creative unity of the basic Consciousness or Spirit.

In holding that there are different orders of self-fulfilment of the Supreme Spirit, a variety of planes in which Supermind functions as the basic principle, and an infinite richness of Spirit presenting itself to the temporal point of view, Aurobindo gives us the dominant meaning of the very real power of *māyā*. This is what Aurobindo terms the "Higher *Māyā*," the Absolute's power of creative self-expression in the sphere of relativity. It is the One's power of Self-expression of the Many without losing sight of the essential oneness of the Many and without a separation of the Many as mutually

exclusive realities ; in Aurobindo's words, "It [the Spirit] uses Its liberty of self-formation, Its *Māyā*, to make a scheme of Itself in the complementary terms of unity and multiplicity... [expressing] Itself openly in cosmic action and cosmic substance."²⁶⁷

Through an act of Self-veiling, an operation of the power (or *māyā*) of Ignorance, Consciousness descends from the Supramental to the Mental and identifies itself with a particular form of the not-self. It is motivated by "the secret purpose of the Spirit to carry its self-differentiation to the utmost limit of existential separation so that the drama of reunion through the sorrows of separation may have its full unfoldment."²⁶⁸ Here, in the plane of the phenomenal, restricted by the self-imposed obscuring veil of *Avidyā*, Consciousness as Mind functions as the basic principle — the higher *Māyā* as the lower, the Divine *Māyā* as the undivine, "the undivine *Māyā* which is the root of all our striving and suffering develops out of the divine reality or the Divine *Māyā*."²⁶⁹

This limiting *Avidyā*, the fall of mind from Supermind, and the consequent idea of real division, proceeds from the individualized soul viewing everything from its own standpoint and excluding all others. It proceeds from the particular entity's blind attachment to the ego or the principle of exclusive particularity, a unique self-identification that is only a part of its own play of being. This illusion of *Māyā* "starts from the soul's ignoring the fact that all others are also itself, all other action its own action and all other states of being and consciousness equally its own as well as the action of the one particular moment in Time and one particular standing-point in space and the one particular form it presently occupies."²⁷⁰ And from that one original error all of man's ignorances and limitations are contingent results.²⁷¹

Mind separated in knowledge from its source of knowledge, has the purposeful duty to hold forms apart from each other by a purely formal delimitation of their activity, and thus to establish the delight of separation and contact in the midst of eternal unity, "enabling the One to behave as if He were an individual dealing with the other individuals but always in His own unity."²⁷² It is in this manner that Integralism conceives Ignorance, as a particular mode of operation of self-consciousness itself — "as the Spirit's purposeful self-oblivion with a view to maximum intensification of the joy of division and differentiation, so that the joy of unity and harmony may eventually

be achieved in full measure."²⁷³ The mind, in the teaching of Aurobindo, is then the final operation of the descent of Truth-Consciousness into the finite that makes possible the delight of the creative putting-forth; and what he terms 'the Ignorance' "does not [therefore] create a new thing and absolute falsehood, but only misrepresent the Truth."²⁷⁴

The involutory descent of Consciousness from the Absolute is followed by the evolutionary ascent, and not merely for the purpose of returning the Spirit to its original perfection of unitary experience. The aim or purpose of the divine descendance into the finite, and the progressive ascent into the infinite is however, "no other than the purpose of delight, the delight of becoming, the delight of variable self-expression through a process of self-transcendence on the part of evolving individuals."²⁷⁵ This essential difference between spiritual Knowledge and mental Ignorance, the merging of one into the other, this act of self-veiling and the subsequent unveiling into the light of Knowledge, this particular mode of continuity, for Integralism is also *māyā*.

In the teaching of Aurobindo, the Self in its deepest essence is a poise of being of the Absolute, delivering to the individual an aspect of transcendence as well as an aspect of universality. His very rootedness in the Spirit makes inherent in man a seeking for Knowledge and the desire of return of the individualized self to the Infinite Self. Man is here to affirm himself — that is his first business, but also inherent in man's nature, as Aurobindo says, is the requirement "to evolve and finally to exceed himself,"²⁷⁶ for, "it is because the individual is That, that to find himself is his great necessity."²⁷⁷ For man to become himself by exceeding himself is a difficult assignment, confronted as he is by the illusion of *māyā*, the surface formulation of things mistranslated into the terms of Ignorance, partially illumined as he is from within by the deep stirrings of his heritage in the Infinite Consciousness — a Wisdom that confronts him but dimly as an inscrutable divine *Māyā*. To exceed the exclusiveness of the Ego and to be his true self, to perceive the transcendent Spirit as indivisibly present in his own Self, "to possess it, to possess a real delight of being is . . . the ultimate meaning of our life here . . ."²⁷⁸ And the power that raises the finite spirit into this clear vision of its essential rootedness in or continuity with the Infinite, this power that ushers man into the light of self-

realization to enjoy equality of vision in all things, to perceive his own self — this power of liberation that allows the spiritual individual to stand unbound by the limitations of objective self-expression, and to know clearly that it is eternally One with the Transcendent Spirit — this power is also *Māyā* !

There seems to be no more fitting conclusion to this chapter concerning the Philosophy of Integral Idealism, than to quote in the translation of Aurobindo, the words of *Śruti* :

It is there in beings indivisible and as if divided. (*Gīta*, XIII. 16).

The Master of *Māyā* creates this world by his *Māyā* and within it is confined another ; one should know his *Māyā* as Nature and the Master of *Māyā* as the great Lord of all. (*SvU*, IV. 9-10).

CHAPTER II

MĀYĀ IN THE ADVAITA OF INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE :

SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN

Prolegomena

RADHAKRISHNAN²⁷⁹ is a representative 20th century Advaitin, but one who is not fully persuaded to the philosophical viewpoint of the great Śaṅkara. In general character Dr. Radhakrishnan's ideas conform to the traditional Vedānta, but with differences that set him apart as an independent thinker in an age when Indian writers are making an attempt to adjust their individual interpretations of philosophy to a changed, if not a changing social outlook, and surely to changing world relations. Dr. Radhakrishnan makes this adjustment gracefully and without prejudice to the essential character of Indian philosophy. If his writing and expressions seem to take on a religious (in the Western connotation) tenor it is because he is using Western symbols to express Eastern concepts. This is understandable when one takes cognizance of his long and intimate association with the West. Fundamentally and firstly, Radhakrishnan is a philosopher ; and his aim is the preservation of philosophy, despite what other meanings one cares to read into his writings. Of course, if the term "religion" is analyzed as the striving of the individual to realize itself as the highest spiritual value, then not only the writings of Radhakrishnan, but all of Vedānta can be placed in the category of religion, a placement however, that is only provisional, for the very character of Hindu thought itself is addressed to the life of the spirit. As we have stated in the *Introduction* of this work, philosophical enquiry in India from the earliest times has handled its problems through the world of man's inner being, starting first from a realization of the inner world and proceeding outward into the investigation of the phenomenal ; and it is this way of approach that reveals itself in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. But because of this basic idealism the conclusion need not be drawn that Indian thought must be excluded from its proper

philosophical treatment. It may be true that so long as mysticism is the experience of an individual, it does not lend itself to philosophical enquiry; but when logical systems such as that of Radhakrishnan and Aurobindo are built up on the basis of such experience, and when personal experience becomes the common property of all men through the teachings of the various schools of thought, we will have to agree with the Honorable Maulana Azad, that "it [Indian thought] must not only be included within the province of philosophy but may well constitute an important part of it, [for] if we do not apply to it the name of philosophy, there is hardly any other term which can describe it."²⁸⁰

Radhakrishnan as a good Vedāntin also appeals to the Upaniṣads for confirmation of his particular philosophical treatment — in essence an absolute idealism, "but in a form and with dynamic character which; instead of nullifying the great richness of the many facets of life and experience in terms of a wholly transcendent Absolute, recognizes the reality and meaning of the many aspects and grades of experience."²⁸¹ This viewpoint, that is to be discussed in the following section can best be described as "Advaita of Integral Experience."²⁸²

Although Radhakrishnan is a follower of Śaṅkara, he does not hold strictly with the latter that the world is neither real nor unreal, and regards *māyā* not as illusion, but as a concept of explanation. We cannot know the why of the world, and "it is this fact of its inexplicable existence that is signified by the word *māyā*."²⁸³ But while admitting that the appearance of the world is without explanation, Radhakrishnan does not "cover up our confusion by the use of the word *māyā*,"²⁸⁴ nor does he consider that the world is devoid of value and importance, for in his words, "the things of the world ever struggle to recover their reality."²⁸⁵ So it would seem at this point he regards the world as a combination of Being and Non-Being, *sat* and *asat*, rather than neither Being nor Non-Being as most Advaitins would hold.

This meliorating tendency is also evidenced in his treatment of the aspect of *Brahman* as God, the Creator of the world. In this respect Radhakrishnan may be said to pursue a half-way point between the views of Śaṅkara and those of Rāmānuja, maintaining that the *Brahman* of Śaṅkara is the Absolute and that of Rāmānuja is God. He remarks: "Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are the two great

thinkers of the Vedānta, and the best qualities of each are the defects of the other."²⁸⁶

In the following section it will be shown that Radhakrishnan not only affirms the eternality of the deity, but also the real temporality of God as organic with the world, as conscious of himself and of creation.

On the Absolute and God

The Upaniṣads speak with a double voice in describing the nature of the ultimate reality. They sometimes make it absolute which cannot be characterized by the phenomenal categories; at times they identify this with the supreme person whom we are to adore and worship. As a result of this, we have two views about the nature of the world. In some passages, the world is regarded as an accident of *Brahman* (the absolute) and in others as organic to God.²⁸⁷

In these words Radhakrishnan sets forth the basis and essence of his middle stand upon the nature of the Vedic Absolute. He proposes to show that there are two tendencies running through the Upaniṣads, one that portrays the Absolute as pure being, eternally complete and aloof from the world which is at best only an accidental appearance (*vivarta*) of the Supreme Being; and the other view that declares the Absolute to be a concrete person of whom the world is a necessary expression, organic to each other — the Absolute as God dependent upon the existence of a created order, even as creation depends upon God. It is from this duality of standpoint readily recognized as that of Śaṅkara in the first instance, and a similarity to Rāmānuja in the second, that Radhakrishnan develops his own unique interpretation of Vedic thought. He confesses "it is difficult to decide whether the Advaita (non-dualism) of Śaṅkara or the modified position of Rāmānuja that is the final teaching of the parent gospel."²⁸⁸ However, since both lines of thought cross and recross in the Upaniṣads, Radhakrishnan believes he has the authority of *Śruti* (scripture) to effect a course in which each of the views can be made complementary to the other. From the premise of intuitive perception, he says, "we rise above the intellectual level and intuit the nature of reality [then] we see that there is nothing

but the absolute, and the world is only the absolute,"²⁸⁹ and since neither is a distinct entity, they do not require to be related. When we consider the Absolute from the viewpoint of the world, from the human end through logical categories, the Absolute "is looked upon as a personal God by whose power of self-expression or *māyā* the world is sustained,"²⁹⁰ a whole which binds together the different elements of phenomenal existence. For Radhakrishnan, the Absolute as pure being (as in Śaṅkara) and the Absolute as a person (as in Rāmānuja) are the intuitional and the intellectual representations of the one supreme reality. The Absolute, as Radhakrishnan puts it, when pressed into the moulds of thought, becomes a person.²⁹¹

Radhakrishnan's treatment of the main contents of Indian thought is from the outset far afield from the "negativism" so often charged against the Advaita Vedānta, and especially against the early non-dualist philosophers. The highest conception to have been reached in the Vedic hymns is that of one Reality (*Ekan Sat*), but Radhakrishnan would add, a reality "which realizes itself in all variety of existence."²⁹² He points out that this conclusion is strengthened in the Upaniṣads where the theory of the true self or *Ātman* is approached in progressive development, and is discussed not so much in the psychological as in the metaphysical vein.²⁹³

In the opening words on the discussion of the self in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Prajāpati states certain positive characteristics which the true self should possess: "The self which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, which desires nothing but what it ought to desire and imagines nothing but what it ought to imagine, *that* [Self] it is which we must try to understand."²⁹⁴ Prajāpati makes it clear that it is the transcendent Self or *Ātman* that is the Subject, the person that sees and not the object (the perceiver is the self, the body is the instrument of perception).²⁹⁵ It is not the conglomerate of qualities constituting the "me", but the "I" which gives up its identification with the body and remains beyond, viewing all these qualities. Radhakrishnan sees in the Upaniṣadic treatment of the *Ātman* an affirmation of experience leading to a knowledge of the Infinite Self, that "it is the subject which persists throughout the changes,"²⁹⁶ the common factor in the various states of consciousness that the Self experiences from birth to death to rebirth and to final deliverance.²⁹⁷ He does not, any more than Prajāpati, explain away the several states of

consciousness²⁹⁸ in the phenomenal life as illusory or non-existent ; but rather recognizes that there is a continuity of experience that naturally admits to a permanent self underlying all contents of consciousness.²⁹⁹

Radhakrishnan reads in the instructions of Prajāpati that the Self is the true life of the whole and not a mere abstraction, that the entire world is the one process of self-realization of the absolute thought. "Maghavan (Indra)!" he quotes of Prajāpati, "'this body is mortal and all is subject to death . . . He is the person of the eye, the eye itself is the instrument of seeing . . . he who knows, let me smell this, he is the self, the nose is the instrument of smelling, etc.'"³⁰⁰ The Self, according to Radhakrishnan, is thus shown to be "not an abstract formal principle, but an active universal consciousness . . . existing in simple self-sameness as well as varied distinctions" ; the true Infinite Self is not the self which is simply not finite, but contains all consciousness of objects, that is, "although it is none of the limited things, yet [it is] the basis of them all."³⁰¹

In declaring the transcendent Self or *Atman* to be alone subject, Radhakrishnan is in accord with Śaṅkara in that the universal self by its very nature cannot be perceived ; as Śaṅkara puts it : "witness self illumines consciousness, but never itself is in consciousness,"³⁰² for, Radhakrishnan agrees, "the subject of all experience cannot itself be an experience. If it is experience the question arises, by whom is it known . . . [as] knowledge always works dually. This Self, therefore, is indefinable."³⁰³ This, then, is Radhakrishnan's agreement with Śaṅkara ; his digression from the Śaṅkaran Advaita takes another line. He denies that it is the intention of the Upaniṣads to make the deeper self an abstract nothingness, in his words : "The Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara try to express the nature of the ultimate being in negative terms, 'the eye goes not thither nor speech nor mind,'³⁰⁴ and 'the soul which is not this not that, nor aught else, is intangible, for it cannot be laid hold of,'³⁰⁵ but the danger in these negative descriptions, the denying of all attributes and relations, is tantamount "to reducing the ultimate being to bare existence which is absolute vacuity."³⁰⁶

This is not to be taken as a blanket indictment of Śaṅkara on the part of Radhakrishnan, that Śaṅkara posits an Absolute of non-being and void, for he is well aware that Śaṅkara himself does

not hold that the rise of being can be explained by non-being, as evidenced in the latter's commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, that "entity does not spring from non-entity."³⁰⁷ With the Śāṅkaran logic of the Supreme *Brahman* or the indeterminate Absolute, Radhakrishnan finds no fault, "but the negative aspect of Śāṅkara's teaching is not much to his heart."³⁰⁸ He writes :

The negative account is intended to express the soul's sense of the transcendence of God, the "wholly other," of whom nought may be predicated save in negations, and not to deprive God of his positive being . . . We would not be able to say even that it is "wholly other". There is in the self of man, the very center of his being, something deeper than the intellect, which is akin to the supreme.³⁰⁹

From here Radhakrishnan's discussion of the *Ātman* as the subject, the universal ground which is in all individuals, takes on a positive tone, maintaining that its characteristic is not so much the *absence* of a condition, such as the negation of pain and sorrow, but it is rather, a positive being — it is positive bliss. In other words, the Infinite Self is none of the experiences of the finite self (i.e., neither the waking, nor dreaming, nor deep sleep), it is, he says, "the fourth or *Turiya*"³¹⁰ witnessing as well as transcending them all."³¹¹ If, then, in this analysis, the Self is the only Real, and can be none of the experiences of the phenomenal world, it stands, that in Radhakrishnan's meaning, the experiences that are unique to the character of the finite entity must themselves be of the unreal real. He cites the Gauḍapāda *Kārikā* (i. 6) for verification of his stand that the first three states of finite existence (*Viśva*, *Taijasa*, *Prājña*) are unreal though not non-existent ; it reads : 'What is naught at the beginning and naught at the end must surely be naught in the middle.' Thus we observe in Radhakrishnan's philosophy of the Self a singular synthesis of both the negative and positive approach to the nature of the Absolute. The negative descriptions, he agrees, indicate that we as finite cannot know the positive nature of *Brahman*, that it is quite impossible for us to say anything concrete of it, since "we are obliged to use intellectual concepts with their limited validity."³¹² But what we can affirm of the Self, handicapped as we are with this limitation, is that

"it is the fullest reality, the completest consciousness, and not a mere negative calm, untroubled by any unrest and unpolluted by any blot or blemish."³¹³ The negative movement has its place in the logic of thought, where it rises by the repudiation of the finite, Radhakrishnan holds, and is only a stage in the ascent to the realization of the Infinite Self; but both the negative and the positive approaches serve their respective purposes in the plan of the whole; for, "by the negative process the self has to recognize that its essence is not in its finitude or self-sufficiency, . . . by the positive method it finds its true self in the life and being of all — all things exist within the true self."³¹⁴

Intuition, Intellect, and Logic

In his desire to neutralize what he considers the negativism in the Śaṅkaran Advaita, Radhakrishnan appeals both to intellect and intuition, and points out a positive way from the lower to the higher Absolute in a logical and systematic approach to the ideal Reality. He states :

We are impelled to transcend the world of change and finitude in order to reach a reality where the subject and predicate are absolute. The assumption of such a reality is the basis of all logical procedure. In judgment we try to bring out the full nature of reality by a series of predications.³¹⁵

But strictly speaking, Radhakrishnan rightly admits, it is impossible for us as finite beings to define the character of the infinite Real, "yet, for the purposes of discussion, we are obliged to use intellectual concepts with their limited validity."³¹⁶ Here we see, that in this latter qualification, Radhakrishnan makes a concession to practicality, and so, for all his logic, cannot be termed a rationalist, but more aptly he could be designated as a pragmatic idealist, if such hyphenation can be imagined.

As a preliminary to the discussion of Radhakrishnan's logical approach to the Absolute, it would seem necessary to consider the problem of whether *ānanda* (bliss), the highest fruition where the knower, the known, and the knowledge become one, is or is not looked upon as the logical highest or the Ultimate Being. That is,

as Radhakrishnan puts it, "whether there is nothing higher than *ānanda* as the perfection of being, or is *ānanda* active enjoyment or unimpeded exercise of capacity."³¹⁷ In any event, holders of both opinions define *ānanda* as Reality. We have here, two concepts, that of defined reality and the undefined one, both of which the Upaniṣads support.³¹⁸

But we have said before that the Ultimate is indefinable, so what must we believe of Rāmānuja's qualified *Saguṇa Brahman*? (*Supra*, *Introduction*). Radhakrishnan has said that necessity requires us to give some description, but in giving this description do we fall just short of the Absolute Indefinable? And if we do, what have we then, for all our logicizing? Looking at it from the viewpoint of the intellect, Radhakrishnan points out, that it is *truer* to consider *ānanda* concrete than abstract, and in this context it is not the ultimate Reality that ever exists in its own essentiality, "but only the highest conceivable by the thought of man."³¹⁹ But, if *ānanda* in this sense is also *Brahman*, he can be so only in a limited sense, as the object of the intellect. This seems to be near the thought of Radhakrishnan, for he goes on to say, "to the logical mind, the whole is real, and within it falls the diversity of the world . . . the concrete *ānanda* is the . . . real revealed to thought," and "answers to the highest *Brahman*³²⁰ accepted by Rāmānuja."³²¹ Thus it can be said that Radhakrishnan accepts into his system Rāmānuja's "Absolute" as the "highest logical expression of Reality," or the Absolute intellectualized, which he sees as *Īśvara* or God, Creator, Governor, and Destroyer of the world; although at the same time Radhakrishnan does not repudiate the *Nirguṇa Brahman* of Śaṅkara which he characterizes as an indefinable real that is larger and better than our thinking has room for.

At this point it would be well to remind ourselves that in this discussion *ānanda* has not been employed in an adjectival sense — *ānanda* or delight is Reality, it does not merely describe the Real; and this is its meaning and its use by Radhakrishnan. He writes:

The highest *Brahman* which is *ānanda* is just *Ātman* as realized in the fourth or *turiya* state, there the object and the subject³²² are one, the seer, the seeing eye and the object seen merge together in one whole.³²³

This, as we understand it, is the intuitive Self that transcends intellect and knows itself as that of *Ānanda*, the Absolute, where existence is no longer formulated in terms of knowledge, as Radhakrishnan states, "Reality is not a metaphysical concept, but spiritual being . . . It is an object of intuition, not inference."³²⁴

According to Radhakrishnan's theory of logical progression : in the ascending scale of progressive idealization (*pralaya*), that is, in the ascent from *jīva* to the Absolute, the differing conceptions of *Brahman* correspond to the differing identifications of the intellect, or its logical accounting. When we identify the *Ātman* with the self-conscious individual, the intellectual self (*prājñā*), *Brahman* is viewed as the self-conscious *Īśvara* which is the unity of all *prājñas*, the principle and unity of the world. This corresponds very well to Rāmānuja's Absolute, but Radhakrishnan does not call it by the name of Absolute, but by the name of God, and treats it as a person. He has already stated that we cannot do otherwise with our finite intellects than to impose limitations upon the supra-rational Absolute, which is the best that man can do in his highest logical expression of the Real. The result of this rational action makes God a product of the intellect, which cannot do away with the distinction between self and other. "It is indifferent whether we say that *Brahman*, cast in the moulds of logic, is the world of experience or that it is *Īśvara*, [for] *Īśvara* is all-comprehensive and contains within himself all that exists, potentially in *pralaya* and actually in creation."³²⁵ The intervening steps of *pralaya* from the *jīva* (the soul as identified with the physical body) to the self-conscious *Īśvara*, are briefly and in their order of progression,³²⁶ variously described by Radhakrishnan as follows : the unity of all *jīvas* constitutes the collective or cosmic self in the waking state ; this comes about when we identify *Ātman* with our body — *Brahman* becomes the Cosmos or *Virāt* or *Vaiśvānara* ; this is the sum total of existence, the basis of the conception of the world as a whole. When *Ātman* is identified with the mental and vital self (*taijasa*)³²⁷ *Brahman* is reduced to the *Hiraṇyagarbha*³²⁸ or the cosmic soul ; that is, it is related to the universe in the same way that the individual soul is related to the body. It is, so to say, the mind or consciousness of the world, the knowing subject that sustains the entire objective universe. In the Upaniṣads, *Hiraṇyagarbha* is called *Kārya*

Brahmā or "the effect of God [the first manifestation of *Saguṇa Brahman* in the relative universe], the *Brahmā* of *Natura Naturata*, as distinguished from the *Kāraṇa Brahmā* of the Causal God, *Īśvara*, or the *natura naturans*."³²⁹

In reverse order, the *syṣṭi*, or progressive materialization can be traced : from *Īśvara*, the Cosmic Divine, to *Hiraṇyagarbha* (world soul), to *Virāt* (Cosmos); from *Prājña* (the intellectual self), to *Taijasa* (the vital self), to *dehin* (the bodily self).³³⁰ From this logical accounting Radhakrishnan considers he has proven that "the Brahman of the Upaniṣads is no metaphysical abstraction, no indeterminate identity, no void of silence . . . [that] it is the fullest and most real being . . . and the distinctions, instead of being dissolved away as illusory, are transfigured in the highest reality."³³¹

Abstracting the core of Radhakrishnan's logical analysis, we would have to say that he has brought the world of things to the door of the Absolute and deposited them in the reservoir of a God that is *due* to our intellect. But how can this be, if this same God is the Creator of the universe as Radhakrishnan indicates in his theory of progressive manifestation? If this is actually the meaning he wishes to convey, then we are caught in a round-robin from which no amount of logical analyzing can extricate us. It poses an inconsistency between intellect and manifestation. Strictly speaking, if our intellect produces God who in turn produces us, and if we are no other than the knowing subject who is One, indivisible and undivided, then it can be said that we are the logical cause of ourselves. But such a connection would point to a subject and predicate within the One, a duality that would negate the postulation of a non-dual Absolute. It would resolve into the impossible position of pure subject observing itself, a sort of subjective idealism that cannot be ascribed to Radhakrishnan's view. But if we do not take his approach too literally, we will have the answer, for it will be necessary to take into account the bridge he provides from the lower Absolute to the Higher. He says : "In knowledge . . . we have the subject-object relation [but] there must be something higher than mere intellect, where existence is no longer formulated in terms of knowledge. The unity of existence requires that we transcend the intellectual level."³³² It is the ideal of intellect to discover the unity which comprehends both the subject and the object ;

however, since the intellect works with the categories of space, time, cause, and force, "which involve us in deadlocks and antinomies," and the self-existent *Brahman* is independent of these limitations, "we have to pass beyond thought . . . beyond the antinomies that confront us when we work with the limited categories of abstract thinking, if we are to reach the real where man's existence and divine being coincide."³³³ The intellect is cognizant of its limitations, and the unity, for it, is only a postulate, an act of faith. But the distinction between the self and other that intellect cannot by-pass is overcome in intuition. This, then, is the bridge that spans the crevasse, the link by which the "unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, and the unknown becomes known."³³⁴ Intuition is an experience, more direct than thought or perception; it is individual, inarticulate, incommunicable mystic insight in which the soul finds itself revealed in non-separativeness with the eternal Absolute.

In his emphasis upon intuition as the means by which the individual certifies the Supreme as Real and One, Radhakrishnan does not intend to invalidate the intellect, but only to supplement it. He says of the intellect, "the account of reality given by it is not false, it fails only when it attempts to grasp the reality in its fullness."³³⁵ It is only by mutual cooperation and supplementation, the results of mystic insight subjected to logical analysis, and intellectual analyses enlightened with intuition and experience, that one can grow into true understanding — "the ideal of intellect is realized in the intuitive experience, for in the supreme are all contraries reconciled."³³⁶

Here we have the key to our statement in the fore part of this chapter, that Radhakrishnan takes the world to be both *sat* and *asat*, i.e., to the intellect the world is real, yet what it grasps is not absolutely real. And since our intellect cannot render a full report of the ineffable, any definitions of the intellect cannot be the measure of the Supreme, "and we can only answer, 'it is not this, it is not this,' . . . the negative definitions point out to us how the positive attributes known to us are inadequate to the highest,"³³⁷ . . . we are obliged to use negative conceptions so long as we employ the dialects of intellect, though positive features are revealed when *Brahman* is intuited."³³⁸

The Status of the World

Radhakrishnan has made it quite clear that the finite mind in the absence of knowledge of *Brahman*, cannot dogmatize about the relation of the empirical world to the Absolute. But if we are to believe the *Śruti* which in many passages declare the world to be the development of the absolute spirit,³³⁹ then we must also accept that "the two cannot be unrelated, for all that is, is one, yet we do not know how precisely they are one."³⁴⁰ That *Brahman* is in the world, though not as the world, Radhakrishnan accepts. The possibilities of *Brahman* are, he says, "the logical prius"³⁴¹ of the world, a postulate that can easily be accepted by the intellect; although *Brahman* as the efficient cause of the world we cannot know anything of — "we cannot ask how the relationless *Brahman* is related to the world . . . [for] a reciprocal dependence of the world on *Brahman* and vice versa, would be to reduce *Brahman* to the level of the world, subject to the categories of time and purpose."³⁴² The very nature of the Absolute would preclude any reliance upon the world as an essential factor in the existence of *Brahman*; that is, the perfection of *Brahman* implies "that all worlds, states and aspects, and all manifestations . . . are realized in it in such a wise that they are nothing without it, though it is independent of all other existence;³⁴³ and that the pure Being is not in any manner changed or depleted by the cosmic process, which is only one of the infinite possibilities utilized by the Absolute Reality to reveal Itself.

Therefore, if we are to conform to the strict philosophical position — that we do not know the precise relation between *Brahman* and the world, then, Radhakrishnan maintains, we must hold with Śaṅkara that "it is *māyā*, or mysterious, or *anirvacanīya* (inexplicable)."³⁴⁴ If, however, in the interests of practicability, we proceed to characterize the relationship, "it is truer to say that the world is the self-limitation of the supreme than it is a creation of it."³⁴⁵

In view of the postulations already laid down by Radhakrishnan, it is better that he makes the world the *expression* of God. Were the world to be affirmed as the creation by *Kāraṇa Brahmā* (the causal God), there would be the implication that God as cause is antecedent in time to the world as effect, and this cannot be reconciled to the meaning of God as Radhakrishnan sees it.

It will be remembered, that in Radhakrishnan's logical progression to the Real, he posits God or the lower *Brahman*, not as mere appearance of the Absolute as in Śaṅkara, but as the very Absolute from the human point of view — "we call the supreme the Absolute when we view it apart from the cosmos. The Absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God and God is the Absolute from the cosmic point of view."³⁴⁶

Radhakrishnan further explains³⁴⁷ this "relationship" between the Absolute and God (or the lower *Brahman*), as that of transcendent divine and cosmic divine. While the Absolute is the total divine, God as cosmic divine is the thought or possibility of the Absolute that lies beyond the world in the universal consciousness of the Absolute. That is, we understand Radhakrishnan to mean, that of the infinite possibilities or what he calls ideal forms and possibilities which are the mind or the thoughts of the Absolute, one such possibility is actualized. Viewed from this actuality, the Absolute is God, organic to ourselves; but apart from this actuality God is seen to be the Absolute, "even as the world is a definite manifestation of the specific possibility of the Absolute, God . . . is the very Absolute in the world context and is not a mere appearance of the Absolute."³⁴⁸ If therefore, the actuality of God is dependent upon the intellect of man, there is imposed upon God certain conditions to be met in order for God to be God. According to Radhakrishnan, God can only be a creative personality, which is possible only with reference to his creation or to an environment upon which to impose his creative results; in other words, "the being of a personal God is dependent on the existence of the created order — God depends on creation even as creation depends on God."³⁴⁹ God being organic to the world and thereby limited by it, is in the view of Radhakrishnan's philosophy, a person with all the limitations the idea of personality necessarily involves.

At this point we are still involved in an endless circle of logic; and we ask — if the Absolute is the Real, and the Creator *Brahmā* is dependent upon the world for his own existence, how does the world itself come to be? Radhakrishnan explains that the world exists in and through an act of self-assertion of the divine Self, which says, "I am." But this can be possible only in the sphere of thought, for here being and non-being are opposites. He has shown that the being of which we have experience is not absolute being,

and "whatever falls short in any degree of absolute reality has in it an admixture of non-being . . ." and this environment of mutual hostility is the prerequisite for the world to come to be, "for if there were no non-being, there would be no being."³⁵⁰

So it is, that the moment the "I" is affirmed, over against this self, this "will to be," the infinitude of non-being, the "Not-I" appears, "the passive resistance which has to be met and overcome."³⁵¹ God, the knower with ideas and plans executes designs in the sphere of the created order, the self and not-self interact and develop the whole universe.³⁵² It is God and the world facing each other, but the alienation between the two must be overcome, the "Non-I" must be returned to the "I," and in the process the "I" becomes a "me," and the duality of subject and object is set up. However, since this movement and flow is toward the creator, "the 'me' becomes an adequate representation of the 'I' at the end . . . [and] when the creator and created coincide [no longer a duality of subject and object], God lapses into the Absolute."³⁵³

It is upon the premises that have been set forth above that Radhakrishnan validates his thesis that God is really infinite, but appears to be finite until the plan of the world transformation, of the imperfect into the perfect, reaches its fulfilment. But according to Radhakrishnan, the world of plurality cannot become one with the Absolute until all individuals and God become identical;³⁵⁴ for it is only then that there ceases to be a necessity for God — as long as there is the world God must continue to be God. It is only when there is no world, that is, when there are no more unliberated *jīvas* that God and "the world of plurality can be reduced without residuum into the everlasting one, *Brahman*."³⁵⁵

The World as Both Sat and Asat

In the foregoing review of certain aspects of Radhakrishnan's philosophy, it becomes apparent that he supports the phenomenal both as real (*sat*) and as not real (*asat*). The world of every day events and things is not ultimate reality, to be sure, but neither is it illusion. He defends the reality of the empirical world not categorically, but only conditionally. It finds its logical basis in the possibilities of the Absolute, which out of the infinite possibilities inherent in its nature, freely chooses this one possibility. From the

point of view of this one possibility which has become actualized, the Absolute (which is pure consciousness, pure freedom, and infinite possibility) appears as God. As to why this one possibility is chosen for actualization over the infinite other, Radhakrishnan has only the traditional answer of Advaita — it is *māyā*, or a mystery, which he says we have to accept reverently.³⁵⁶

Now let us consider Radhakrishnan's treatment of the attempt to define the connection of *Brahman* to the world of becoming. Admittedly, the relation of the finite world to the infinite Spirit is a mystery to human understanding. But "progress in knowledge may enable us to describe the phenomena which make up the objective world with greater detail and more accuracy, but the rise of the finite world out of the bosom of the infinite . . . is quite beyond us."³⁵⁷

Radhakrishnan, in his theory of logical progression from the divine, seems to have made a positive explanation of this historical process without resort to too much negation. However, even he, for all his appeal to logic, reaches a point "when elucidation stops and nothing is left for us but to admit a fact capable of not further deduction."³⁵⁸ Here the concept "*māyā*" must be employed to register our finitude and to point to a gap in our knowledge. The difficulty of giving a satisfactory explanation of this relationship, Radhakrishnan attributes to the imperfections of the human mind which employs the limited categories of space, time and cause, and which at best can only entertain fragmentary aspects of the world that are not genuinely real.³⁵⁹ With this argument Radhakrishnan shows the world to be neither full reality nor absolute unreality, but a mixture of the two.

In the opinion of many, Dr. Radhakrishnan's signal contribution seems to be the providing of a positive approach to the Absolute in which human values are preserved. P. T. Raju says of him :

Professor Radhakrishnan has proved that the idea (the positive approach) is not inconsistent even with the traditional Advaita. The world is a combination of being and non-being, the Absolute is the fullness of being, therefore, whatever of positive value there is in this world must be preserved in the Absolute — and so the significance of understanding *Māyā* as both being and non-being is that it is possible to carry *Māyā* right into the heart of the Absolute.³⁶⁰

Has Radhakrishnan Reinterpreted the Māyā of Traditional Advaita Vedānta ?

For Radhakrishnan the world is the path of return of the imperfect to the perfect, in which it becomes more and more reality as it becomes more and more complete — a qualitative as well as a quantitative difference. Yet, even for him, it is necessary to employ negation in the progressive attempt at self-realization. We have his own words for it, that the moment the world is actualized through the pronouncement "I am," a contrary "not-I" presents itself that must be progressively negated until both created and creator coincide. Self-affirmation is possible only through self-negation.³⁶¹ Therefore, can it not rightfully be said, that the creative power of *Īśvara* that lets loose the universal becoming, thereby creating endless conflict between the "I" and the "Not-I" is also a negative principle ? It seems, as we have said before, that the negative relation is not entirely avoidable in any Vedāntic interpretation. This poses the further question of whether Radhakrishnan has re-interpreted Śaṅkara's "negativistic" philosophy into a positive approach to the Absolute as he has been credited with, or whether in view of his intimate connection with the West, he simply is restating the Advaita negation in a form more acceptable to Western scholars.

It makes little difference whether, as Radhakrishnan expresses it — that *māyā* (the appearance of the phenomenal) is both being and non-being, or whether it is, as in the Śaṅkaran thought, that the world is neither real nor unreal.³⁶² In the first instance, Radhakrishnan admits to the fact that God is a product of the intellect, and therefore, what the Creator puts forth as the world and ourselves, is not the "real" real. Thus we have his attitude of the non-real. But above our intellect, he tells us, stands intuition by means of which we see that the *Brahman* is Reality ; and all things, including God, at long last disappear into the Absolute. Compare this to the Śaṅkaran view that the world is neither real nor nonreal. This is a matter of viewpoint, and an argument between the two, Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan, is merely a quibble over words. In maintaining the world to be unreal, Śaṅkara does not intend to convey the thought that all is "illusion," a product of the imagination.³⁶³ He subscribes to the existence of the world, the same as Radhakrishnan does, and he recognizes the reality of the personal God from the

phenomenal standpoint.³⁶⁴ As long as one sees Creation, Śaṅkara maintains, one must postulate a Creator. That he admits and respects a personal God can be known from the various hymns that he has composed. Nikhilānanda remarks of Śaṅkara on this point :

Even in his theistic hymns Śaṅkara never permits one to forget that *Brahman* alone is the foundation of all relative ideas and that the effulgence of Pure Consciousness radiates through the vesture of name and form. The devotee catches a glimpse of the Absolute through the form of the personal God, who is the highest manifestation of the Infinite that a finite mind can comprehend on the relative plane.³⁶⁵

Śaṅkara, like Radhakrishnan, postulates the entire world in *Brahman*. He says in the *Ātmabodha*, "All objects are pervaded by *Brahman*,³⁶⁶ all actions are possible because of *Brahman*."³⁶⁷ So God too, like all other appearances, is an idea having the non-dual *Brahman* as its substratum.

We have said of Radhakrishnan, that he uses *māyā* as a concept of explanation of the relation of the apparent to the real. It can be said of Śaṅkara that he uses it in the same manner. *Māyā*, in his thought, is a statement of fact, and "our daily practical life in the dual world is not possible without *māyā* . . . we live, move, and think in *māyā* . . . inexplicable in the extreme, *māyā* is described as making the impossible possible."³⁶⁸

Brahman, according to traditional Vedānta, creates the universe out of *māyā*.³⁶⁹ Therefore, from the standpoint of *māyā*, *Brahman* is the material cause of the world ; but as Pure Consciousness, It is the efficient cause ; thus *Brahman* Itself is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. However, the Advaitins do not explain the phenomenal through the causal relationship, holding that while *Brahman* creates, preserves, or destroys the universe, Itself is unchanged, remaining Pure Being. All changes seen in the empirical world are *māyā*, or mere appearance — that is to say, "*Brahman* appears through *māyā*, as the universe with all its living and non-living beings, from the lifeless atom to *Īśvara*, the exalted Cosmic Soul."³⁷⁰

However, the relationship between the world and Absolute cannot be determined by the finite mind which is a part of phenomena, a point upon which both Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan are agreed. To Śaṅkara, the world is not a "nothing," a void. He cannot be a

nihilist as charged by his critics, for he repudiates the Buddhistic doctrine of nihilism with the argument that he who denies everything, himself exists, for there can be no denial without consciousness; there can be no negation of the empirical world without affirming an underlying reality.³⁷¹

But the purpose of Śaṅkara is not to explain or affirm the universe, but to establish through it the ultimate reality of *Brahman*. From the standpoint of reality, the Absolute alone exists. The universe apart from *Brahman* is unreal, like a mirage without a desert; "the world appears to be real as long as the non-dual *Brahman*, which is the basis of all, is not known."³⁷² How does this differ, then, from Radhakrishnan's thesis that what we have fabricated from our intellect is not the "real" real, and that we can only know Ultimate Reality when we supersede the finite intelligence, when we negate bit by bit, the not-self until the residuum equals the Infinite Self? Śaṅkara follows this same method of discrimination of falsely superimposed attributes, in order to arrive at the affirmation of *Brahman*, likewise arguing that every act of negation leaves a residuum of affirmation. He teaches in the *Ātmabodha*: "by negating all *upādhis*"³⁷³ through the help of the scriptural statement, 'It is not this, It is not this,' realize the oneness of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul . . . "³⁷⁴

Considering the statement that Radhakrishnan is credited with providing an approach to the Absolute in which human values are preserved, we take this to mean, if not by way of direct attack, then by implication or exclusion on the part of some writers, that the Śaṅkaran philosophy denies the need for ethical practice on the part of man. No doubt this implied charge stems from a misunderstanding of Śaṅkara's adherence to *Nirguṇa Brahman* of Advaita. If taken literally, *Nirguṇa* means "without qualities," and would amount to pure nothing. If this were Śaṅkara's belief, then there would be no point in man aspiring to a higher spiritual level, however, we cannot help but hold with Wadia who remarks,

I find it difficult to believe that such a meaning could be intended by such a clear thinker as Śaṅkara. It can only mean that no quality we human beings can possibly conceive can be adequate description of *Brahman*, which in its infinity must necessarily transcend all human categories.³⁷⁵

We cannot discern a more positive teleology in Radhakrishnan's affirmation of the world as both being and non-being, than in Śaṅkara's consideration of it as neither being nor non-being — both systems, whether called positive or negative, serve the same purpose, that of giving man experience in order to come to a realization of *Brahman*. As to the charge against Advaita that because of its supposed "negative attitude" it lacks ethical prescription, it is not a valid accusation. Śaṅkara takes the position that both *Brahman* and phenomenal multiplicity are facts of experience, as Nikhilānanda says, "Śaṅkara does not deny the *fact* of creation, but the *act* of creation."³⁷⁶ And regardless of Advaita's teaching of the unreality of the world, as long as man remains under the influence of *māyā*, in which he mistakenly believes himself to be a unique entity, not only is the world real to him, but all the human values contained in it. Therefore, good and evil must be reckoned with and treated as real; and on this point Vedānta teaches that "only by pursuing the good and shunning evil can one ultimately go beyond the illusion of the pairs of opposites."³⁷⁷ The effect of *māyā* is felt when under its influence the Self is constrained to regard itself as individual, as an ego apart from other selves. It is this egoism that is the source of the evils — jealousies, hatred, envies, and the like, and it is only by overcoming these wrong actions by the practice of the opposite virtues that one can hope for Liberation. According to non-dualist Vedānta, it is solely by way of self-denial that one can effect self-affirmation.

Radhakrishnan, as we have pointed out before, appears to be making the same interpretation in his theory of the struggle between the "Not-I" and the "I"; and if he differs from the traditional Vedānta it is only "seeming." What Śaṅkara presents as pure metaphysics for the *Jñāni*, Radhakrishnan weaves into theory for the masses. What Śaṅkara eschews as "a theistic veiling of the truth in a mist of sentiment,"³⁷⁸ Radhakrishnan embraces as a functional method of presentation more palpable to the present day enquirer. The divergence that seems to obtain between the two interpretations of Vedānta, rests not so much upon doctrinal dispute, as upon the recognition of need for expressing the doctrine in a manner more suitable to the mental framework of a society removed some twelve centuries from the original.

CHAPTER III

MĀYĀ : A LEGITIMATE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT

Prolegomena

IN THE preceding chapters *māyāvāda* has been presented in its various applications as the fundamental and ruling concept of all orthodox schools of Indian thought in their respective explanations of the phenomenal world, and the relationship if any, to the existence of the real. But whether they are the orthodox systems which claim *Śruti* as their authority, or the unorthodox such as Buddhism which posits the real in the perceptive consciousness — all are agreed that if their systems are to be rationally explained, they must start with the explanation of error, that is, with an explanation of the propensity of the finite mind to mis-interpret what it sees and experiences.

The theories of monism with which this text has been most concerned, rely expressly upon *māyā* as the link between appearance and reality. Whether *māyā* is employed as *śakti* or creative power of the lower *Brahman*, or whether it is the veil of *avidyā* through which the self must first penetrate to be cognizant of the real, the application is the same — the erroneous metaphysical perception of reality, an error of judgment. And in order to save the principle of unity, all monisms or idealisms must explain experience on the basis of the same principle, that all appearances must somehow be included in the Absolute, and the criterion of truth must be formulated at the level of perceptual illusion. It is upon these two postulates that the metaphysics of the various Indian schools of thought discussed in the present work can best be understood.

All schools of Hindu thought propose an analysis of erroneous cognition as a medium of explanation of man's mis-interpretation of the real. Even Śaṅkara, whose hypotheses are based in general upon *Śruti*, that the world has no reality apart from the reality of *Brahman*, permits a dialectical discussion of immediate experience, in which he maintains that error is the experience of what is *anirvacanīya* — the content of error is neither real, nor unreal, nor both.

In the foregoing chapters on the discussion of *māyā* from various standpoints, we believe that it has been sufficiently established that *māyā* as cosmic ignorance, *avidyā* as individual ignorance, and *ajñāna* as non-knowledge, terms used for the most part interchangeably, are as one effect a given fact in illusory experience, both metaphysical and empirical. Now it seems in order, to define the various dialectical systems in Indian idealism that account for the fact of illusory experience, and to show that error occurring in pure immediate experience can be explained only on the assumption of *ajñāna* as its ground ; for, unless a thing is shown to be a possible content of experience, its definition and logical validity cannot be certified.

There are different views of error in Indian philosophy. Of the six principal theories of false presentation that are to be considered in this chapter, the first three (*satkhyātivāda*, *akhyātivāda*, and *anyathākhyātivāda*),³⁷⁹ while differing greatly in the application of immediate experience to their metaphysics, have an aspect in common — that of *satkhyāti*, in the sense that the basic datum of illusion is objectively real. The fourth (*ātmakhyātivāda*), although held by subjective idealists (Buddhists), may also be considered *satkhyāti*, in that the ground of illusion as psychic fact is not denied, only its externality is rejected.³⁸⁰ The fifth (*asatkhyātivāda*), that held by the Mādhyamika Buddhists in opposition to all other theories, maintains the content of illusory experience to be pure non-entity. The sixth (*anirvacanīyakhyātivāda*), is accepted by the Advaita Vedāntists whose concept of *māyā* posits the world (the object of error) as neither real nor unreal. The Advaitins whose metaphysics hold the content of error to be private to the individual, nevertheless do not regard the object of illusion as purely subjective — it too, as we shall see in a later section, has a kind of objectivity indicating the qualified acceptance of realism in epistemology by the Vedāntist whose ontological view is primarily idealistic. While the basis of error in the various theories unanimously centers around the content of false cognition, the ontological status of the content is explained differently in the respective schools of Indian Philosophy.

Ātmakhyātivāda

In considering the subjective idealists' (Buddhists) theory of error, *ātmakhyātivāda*, which we explained in preliminary as denoting

that the object of illusion is the perceiver's own self or mind, is not intended in a manner suggestive of chronological treatment, for a sequence on that basis will not be maintained in the following explications of the other theories. The Buddhistic concept is being placed first in discussion because its prominent concept, the negation of an underlying reality to life, is a favourite point of attack by other schools of thought, a vulnerability brought on, perhaps, by its exposed position of probable antecedence in history as a systematic philosophy.

In the early Buddhistic thought there is little or no metaphysics. The interest is centered upon disintegrating the ego (*supra*, p. 8f) in order to escape the reach of death, old age, and re-birth. It is in the breaking up of the erroneous self that there evolves the theory of the real as a continuous flow of consciousness, rather than to deal with the individual life with reference to a permanent self. All that is, is a grouping of the *skandas*,³⁸¹ of which *viññāna* or consciousness and name and form (*nāma-rūpa*) are simultaneous phenomena. At death, while the other elements, body, feelings, perceptions disappear, *viññāna* persists as the connecting link between the vanished old and the appearing new birth. It is only upon the attainment of *Nirvāṇa* that the flow of consciousness is broken — "If consciousness were not to find name and material form as its resting place, would then birth, old age and death, the origin and development of sorrow reveal themselves in succession?" "No, sir," answers the buddha, "they would not."³⁸² The name and form are seen to be ever changing composites and the world of object is dependent upon the individual as subject; it is purely internal — if there is no subject, there is no object. Here then, can be detected the nexus of *Vijñānavāda* that develops the idea that consciousness and not material object is the real, and from which logically proceeds the theory that the object of illusion is only the perceptive consciousness projected. It is on this basis that the *Vijñānavādins* explain the world as only *viññāna* or consciousness which assumes various forms; and who in turn, defend the theory of consciousness as the real through the doctrine of *Ātmakhyāti*, described above as the theory that the object perceived in illusion is the self itself.

Error for the *Ātmakhyātins* consists in regarding the internal object as external, that in illusion there is no object apart from

cognition. That is, the internal cognition appears as the external object. We read in the *Vimśatika* of Vaśubandhu:³⁸³ "... it is established that the three worlds³⁸⁴ are representation-only (ideation-only)³⁸⁵ . . . according to the scriptures it is said that the three worlds are only mind. Mind, thought, consciousness, discernment, are different names . . . "Only" excludes external objects; it does not do away with mental associates. When inner representations arise, seemingly external objects appear, as persons having bad eyes see hair and flies."³⁸⁶ However, this subjective idealism is somewhat modified in other philosophical schools arising from the Buddhistic font.

The Vaibhāśikas³⁸⁷ are dualists who maintain the independent existence of nature and mind, and whose epistemology may be termed "direct realism," in so far as they maintain that the substratum of illusion is externally real and is an object of perception.

The Sautrāntikas³⁸⁸ with a shade of difference from the teachings of the Vaibhāśikas, can be characterized as indirect realists, holding that the substratum of illusion is externally real; that it cannot be perceived but only inferred — that all external objects are inferred and can never be sensed. When illusion is discovered, the negative judgment, "this is not that," rejects merely the external appearance and not the content itself. The rejection of the externality (an attribute) does not cancel the substratum of the "that" or the object mistaken for a "this," for, the external appearance of the object of illusion as well as of the "this" for which it is mistaken, appears as an attribute. After correcting cognition, the "that" (the thing for which the present object was mistaken) regains its natural position as an internal cognition. Therefore, according to Sautrāntika, nothing external stands as an object of illusion — the "this" exists outside, but it is only the stimulus and not the object of the cognition of "this". As a substrate of illusion it lends its relative disposition to consciousness; and thus we have the knowledge of an erroneous "this."³⁸⁹

The Yogācāra or idealistic school of Buddhism may be said to be more strictly *Ātmakhyātins* than the others, in as much as they do not admit to anything extramental. In illusion the entire content is superimposed on the unreal external object; therefore, according to them, what is cognized is identical with cognition; or, in other words, the cognition cognizes itself, and there can be no dualism

between cognizer and the object of cognition. In the *Tattvasuddhi* we read: "Cognition and the object are always apprehended together; therefore, cognition and the object are non-distinct. Thus it can be argued that in every case of cognition there is nothing beyond cognition."³⁹⁰ The *Sarvasiddhāntasarasamgrha* teaches, "what is the nature of consciousness is indeed indivisible, but by those whose vision is confused (by *avidyā*) it seems to be, as it were, differentiated into the perceived object, the perceiving subject and the perception itself;"³⁹¹ and in another passage, "there exists in reality only one thing, and that is of the nature of the intelligent principle of consciousness, and its oneness is not destroyed by the varied character of its manifestations."³⁹²

Asatkhyātivāda

In explaining that both the real and illusion are existent in some manner in the phenomenal mind, the Mahāyāna Buddhists posit ultimate reality in this world to a greater extent than any of the Vedāntic systems that we have reviewed in this present work. It is for this reason that some interpreters have considered Nāgārjuna to be advocating pure phenomenalism without recognizing a reality behind it. This is not correct, of course, as we have noted in the *Introduction*. The Mādhyamika school of Buddhism which is believed to have been founded by Nāgārjuna,³⁹³ are advocates of *asatkhyātivāda*, the theory that the object of illusion is unreal or non-existent, and therefore, the content of illusory experience is pure non-entity. But this poses the question of how we are to advance beyond perception to consciousness (*viññāna*), which is said to perceive, if there is no connecting link between perceptions and the objects they are supposed to represent; for, it will be remembered that we noted the Buddhist scriptures as declaring that even *viññāna* cannot exist if there are no objects to be known.³⁹⁴ However, the Mādhyamikas do not find this a problem, and their answer is, that substance is not different from the attribute, for if it is not one and the same, then it is beyond our apprehension. Attribute being not anything except mind-positing, and substance being beyond apprehension, there are then, no discoverable relations, and therefore, no world at all; and their logic concludes — external objects as well as internal states are both void, or *śūnya*.³⁹⁵ Thus the

Mādhyaṃika infers the inexplicability of subject and predicate. However, the erroneous cognition has the peculiar power (a mystery) to manifest the object with the aid of impressions alone, and therefore, it is the capacity of cognition that unveils the non-existent object, and this capacity of power is called *avidyā*. The appearance of the non-existent in illusion is brought about by this peculiar power of cognition, and its non-entity is proven by the correction of illusion, "for illusion and its correction cannot be accounted for if it is held that an object is true as it appears in illusion ; and so we are forced to admit manifestation of the non-existent."³⁹⁶

Nāgārjuna makes an interesting defense of his doctrine that the objects of the phenomenal experience are unreal because we cannot predicate anything of them, since we do not know whether they arise from existence or not ; and since the categories through which we construct our reality are unintelligible and self-contradictory, all that is, may be actual, but not real.³⁹⁷ The whole world of experience is to him an appearance, a network of disconnected and unintelligible relations and so nothing can be known as real.³⁹⁸ A thing is known to us through its attributes, his argument continues, and when we apprehend all of these we are said to know a thing, and when we do not know them we do not know the substance. In the *Mādhyaṃika-Śāstra* Nāgārjuna argues that there is no substance prior to attributes for that would mean an attributeless substance.³⁹⁹ There is, therefore, no place for attributes to exist. They are neither in substance without attributes nor in themselves without substance to harbor them. Substance cannot exist beyond the attributes and there is nothing which is not a substance or an attribute, and so again, we have an endless circle — attribute leads to substance which leads to attribute and we do not know whether the two are one or different. We cannot, therefore, know the thing so-called, for our knowledge is confined to qualities, and the thing is beyond experience.⁴⁰⁰

If substance merely binds the qualities together, then it becomes only a relation, and cannot exist apart from consciousness which is its inceptor. Since then, substance and quality are shown to be correlative and neither can be known as real, what absolutely exists is neither substance nor quality, "there is no death, no birth, no distinction, no persistence, no oneness, no manyness, no coming,

no going forth."⁴⁰¹ The conclusion that Nāgārjuna draws, is that the world of experience is an illusion bred by unintelligible relations, and therefore, the real cannot be predicated of experience; and from this discussion it follows that if we cannot know the final explanation of things, it is understandable that illusory experience as explained in *asatkhyātivāda*, points to pure nullity.

Anyathākhyātivāda

The Naiyāyikas⁴⁰² in advocating the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti*, that the object of illusion is a real object mistaken for another real object, indicate their contention that recognition is a kind of qualified perception. We see an object and recognize it as having been perceived on a previous occasion, giving us a knowledge of present objects qualified by the past.⁴⁰³ Therefore, to justify an illusory perception a relation of identity must be assumed to exist between two objects, the one perceived and the one mistaken for the one perceived. This relation, however, is not to be taken for memory, because it contradicts the whole of the erroneous perception which later sublation proves to be false superimposition of two real objects. Let us take for example, a mother-of-pearl shell which has been mistaken for a piece of silver. The silver is cognized through an extra-sensuous relation together with the present datum perceived as "this," the illusory object. The knowledge of silver is here regarded as the *relation* between the silver and the sense organ. Although one must at sometime have cognized real silver in order for an inference of silver to obtain, it is not expressed as memory, but as *jñāna-laksanā pratyāsatti*, meaning "cognition as relation." It is, so to speak *alaukika*, extraordinary or non-empirical because something different prevails than from an objective transition of a thing to the character qualifying it. The transition in the case being conditioned not by objective relation between an object and its distinguishing (even though erroneous) quality, but by a *subjective* cognition in a relational knowledge of both remote and present objects. According to *Nyāya*, then, all error is subjective: "what is set aside by true knowledge is the wrong apprehension, not the object."⁴⁰⁴ The silver that is cognized in error is, therefore, not unreal, for then it would not have been perceived at all — "because what is 'non-existent' cannot be produced [at all, not even in

illusory perception] . . . because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect . . . [and] because the effect is of the same essence as the cause."⁴⁰⁵

The realism of Nyāya looks upon error as a single unitary cognition, but all qualities in the illusory judgment are of the separately real, only the presented identity between them is unreal. Vatsyayana, commentator on the Nyāya *Sūtras*, says, "No wrong apprehension is entirely baseless."⁴⁰⁶ Error then, in the meaning of *anyathākhyāti-vāda*, is not an experience of wholly unrelated contents, but is the erroneous apprehension of two reals one of which is taken for the other, a subjective conditioning or relationship to the perceiver; and the later correction of the illusion cancels only the relation of the two objects to each other and to the consciousness of the perceiver, the superimposed object remaining in its own peculiar reality. Correction then, is only the sublation of attribute, and not the rejection of the substance itself.

In view of this understanding of *anyathākhyāti*, we can conclude with Radhakrishnan that, "in its hostility to Buddhist subjectivism, the Nyāya insists that things are the ground of logical truth and that the external world exists apart from knowledge of it and determines that knowledge — that our ideas correspond to things."⁴⁰⁷

Akhyātivāda

The notion of error is worked uniquely into the epistemology of Mīmāṃsā⁴⁰⁸ as a valid means of knowledge. What passes for error is simply due to non-apprehension, or absence of cognition (*akhyāti*). In the *Ślokovārtika* of Kumarila Bhaṭṭa⁴⁰⁹ we find an interesting discussion of *arthāpatti*, "presumption," and *abhāva*, "non-apprehension" in which he shows both to be means of right knowledge. In regard to presumption, he gives the example of looking for Devadatta, who is alive, but who is not in his house. This leads to the presumption that Devadatta is somewhere outside the house, therefore, this *non-existence in the house* from which is presumed the being outside is necessary and legitimate to the obtaining of the right knowledge that Devadatta is outside. *Abhāva*, or non-apprehension stands for the non-operation of cognition, and it is what brings about the cognition that "it does not exist," in regard to things not in contact with the senses. "That is, in a case where sense-perception

and other means of cognition are not found to be operative towards bringing about the notion of the *existence* of a certain thing, we have the notion of the *non-existence* of that thing; and the means by which this notion is brought about is called *abhāva*.”⁴¹⁰ Thus *abhāva* is said to be a positive object of knowledge.

It is evident from this, that the Mīmāṃsākas begin with the premise that all cognition as such is valid, and that all knowledge is in nature true. Therefore, what is to be proved is not the truth of a cognition, but its possible falsity, and if no falsity is found, then the cognition must be adjudged as true.⁴¹¹ Illusion then, arises because we do not discriminate between the different cognitions and their respective contents.

But how does this premise of validity work in its application to error? The Prabhākaras⁴¹² do not consider error as a positive fact of judgment; “it is wrong interpretation of experience to say (in the case of a shell mistaken for silver) that we judge ‘it is silver.’ The experiences according to them [the Prabhākaras], do not express one unitary knowledge—they consist of two distinct (not known as distinct) cognitions, both of which are true.”⁴¹³ The knowledge of the present objective is perception and the knowledge of the silver is recollection, and while true, is invalid. Prabhākara remarks, “Valid cognition or apprehension is different from remembrance since the latter stands in need of a previous cognition.”⁴¹⁴ The dependence upon a previous apprehension is the cause of the wrong interpretation of the immediate datum. But this does not obviate the reality of knowledge. In this Prabhākara does not deviate from the general idea of the Mīmāṃsākas. He strictly maintains the realistic position that in the process of knowing, knowledge which reveals itself reveals reality as it is. Illusion or *viparyāya* may obscure reality so that it is sometimes known only partially, but it cannot be an absolutely false knowledge. It is, so to speak, a failure to reveal reality in its entirety, rather than positive error. We confuse the perceived with the recollected elements in one single psychosis.⁴¹⁵ The error is due to *akhyāti*, or the non-cognition of the difference between the given and the remembered; but “error [for Prabhākara] in the sense of identification of one object with another, or in the knowledge of a predicate which does not really belong to the subject is impossible.”⁴¹⁶

Despite the few differences in the explanation of illusion or error within the school itself, Mīmāṃsā, in its general teaching of the reality of knowledge, establishes the objective reality of the world along with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (*supra*, preceding section). The attempt of both schools is to establish the phenomenal reality of the world by refuting or replacing the subjectivism and nihilism of the Buddhists. The consequences of this attempt of Mīmāṃsā to confirm knowledge as a real, and to verify it through search for falsity, are reflected in their metaphysics. First, as has been mentioned before, they posit the non-createdness and eternality of *Śruti* through this argument.⁴¹⁷ Thus establishing a Vedic authority, it is not difficult to build an acceptable metaphysics, for that which cannot be proven to be false, must in their logic, be of the real. Like the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsākas admit the plurality of selves without which the varieties of actions and experiences cannot be explained.⁴¹⁸ Prabhākara posits the reality of the self, understanding it to be something that is non-intelligent and the substratum of knowledge, and experience.⁴¹⁹ The existence of the self as an external substance is proved by his theory of recollection of an object based on its previous perception. In Radhakrishnan's explanation of this point, he says, "The fact that we are able to remember a past cognition means the existence of a permanent self which is the substrate of past perception and the present recollection. So, according to Prabhākara, the permanent self or personal identity is not the object of recognition but the substrate thereof."⁴²⁰

Error, as we have seen in the logic of Mīmāṃsā, is never positive nor permanent. What passes for error is the cognition of two real and distinct elements, but which through some defect they are not asserted as distinct; but omission of knowledge is not error. The later correction serves only to point out their separateness, and does not invalidate the knowledge. In the view of the Prabhākara, "reality, although sometimes known partially, can never be known as other than what it is. Even the defective sense-organs cannot cause any positive error. They only fail to reveal reality in its entirety; but they never lie in respect to what they do reveal."⁴²¹

Satkhyātivāda

The theory that the object of illusion is real (*satkhyātivāda*), that the content of the illusory experience really exists in the substratum

of illusion, is accepted by Rāmānuja to explain the so-called illusory experience. Consonant with his doctrine of *māyā* as a positive element in the manifestation of the phenomenal and denial of its character as illusory (*supra*, *Introduction*), Rāmānuja denies error altogether. According to him, reality is knowable, and knowledge always corresponds to the existent object; he says in the *Śrī Bhāṣya*: "Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its object what is real; for *Śruti* and *Smṛiti* alike teach that everything participates in the nature of everything else."⁴²² Even what may be termed illusory perception refers to what really exists. Knowledge therefore, for the Ramanujites can be no less than the affirmation of reality, for according to them, the existent alone is apprehended. What appears as a mirage possesses not only earth and fire and also water;⁴²³ and although such appearance is due to a defective sense-organ, "the light and the earth are not apprehended, while the water is apprehended."⁴²⁴ The content of illusion is real, for knowledge always being of the determinate, can never reveal the non-existent. This is explained in the doctrine of quintuplication (*pañcikaṛaṇa*), that all objects of the physical world are of five elements in varying proportions; and it is in this meaning that Rāmānuja says, "everything participates in the nature of everything else." That one is "silver" and another "shell" has its reason in the relative preponderance of one or the other elements. The implication is that the constituents of everything are inter-involved. "When we observe that a shell is similar to silver, perception itself informs us that some elements of the latter actually exist in the former."⁴²⁵ Even dreams are for Rāmānuja a knowledge of the real. He holds that while God produces the entire world as an object of fruition for individual souls, "he creates things [dreams] of a special nature, subsisting for a certain time only, and perceived only by the individual soul for which they were meant."⁴²⁶

In the case of the shell that we cognize as silver, we take notice of certain attributes and miss others. What is called error here is merely cognition of an essential element of the object as the preponderant element of it. And in the dream experience we fail to observe that the objects are private to the dreamer. It is this distinction between things that are of general consciousness and those that are of private experience that makes the difference between what is called things sublating and things sublated; "the relation

of one cognition being sublated by another explains itself through the preponderant element, . . . and does not depend on one cognition having for its object the false thing and another the true thing . . . thus the distinctions made in the practical thought and business of life explain themselves on the basis of everything participating in the nature of everything else."⁴²⁷

While all knowledge is representative of reality in some manner, it is not complete and perfect until it takes in the whole of reality. The possibility of all-knowledge or *jñāna* being obscured by *avidyā* (ignorance or improper apprehension) is not removed until the knower (the *jīva*) is freed from all defects, only then is knowledge complete and comprehensive.

It is through Rāmānuja's theory of the denial of error and the positing of reality as knowable that we are led to an understanding of his positive stand on *māyā* (*ajñāna*) as a real and eternal power of Brahman. When the *jīva* is freed it attains the ideal of perfect knowledge, and "when *jñāna* is freed from the deterring influence of *avidyā-karman*"⁴²⁸ it expands into infinity and becomes the integral consciousness of God. *Jñāna* is attribute-substance like sunlight which is a quality and at the same time a substratum of colors . . . and just as knowledge (*jñāna*) is substance-attribute, so the self is itself a substance and also a quality of *Brahman* as an adjective of the Absolute."⁴²⁹

Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda

The theory of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* provides the clue to an understanding of the significance of *māyā* as both being and non-being and the position held by the Śāṅkarans that the world is neither being nor non-being. The Vedāntist holds that in order to justify the appearance as well as the illusory content of a cognition, the existence of an object that is inexplicable as neither real nor unreal (*anirvacanīya*) must be admitted at the locus of presentation. Applied on a cosmic scale, the idealism of Advaita does not necessarily imply the illusory nature of the world. It is rather, a systematic use of the idea of illusion in which it absorbs realism by treating the world as *anirvacanīya* and which disappears at the level of *Brahman*.⁴³⁰ Thus the world is experienced on the locus of the *Brahman*, on which absolute negation is experienced. "The world

appears to be real as long as the non-dual *Brahman*, which is the basis [*adhiṣṭhāna* or substratum] of all, is not known . . . it is like illusion of silver in an oyster shell,"⁴³¹ the substratum (the shell) gives the appearance of reality to an illusion based upon it. When the true nature of the shell is known, the illusory notion of the silver disappears.

In the world there is nothing that can be conceived as both real and unreal, and so the distinction from reality and unreality obtains everywhere. The objects of illusion are not real, for later they are sublated, and the real can never be negated. They are not unreal for they are cognized as existent, and the unreal can never be cognized. Therefore, the Vedantist concludes, the contents of illusion are *anirvacanīya*, inexplicable as either real or unreal, and distinct from a combination of real and unreal. Further, the Advaitin rejects the thesis that only the real can be cognized and the unreal alone rejected, by pointing out that reality and unreality cannot be regarded as the respective reasons for cognition and negation, there being no decisive evidence to support this postulation. Cognizability (that which makes one aware of the existence of a thing) belongs to *Brahman*,⁴³² and so cognition is not dependent upon what is real or unreal.

On the other hand, the fact that the real can never be sublated, and the unreal can never be cognized, is attested to by normal cognitive experience. It is, therefore, in the logic of the Vedānta, only the *anirvacanīya* object that can be a content of perception and an object of negation also. Vedānta does not hold that *sat* or real and *asat* or unreal are contradictory terms, but are independent of such mutual exclusion and cannot be defined antonymously; for, as we have said before, Vedānta describes the "real" as that which cannot be manifested. It is the *anirvacanīya* alone, the inexplicable as either real or unreal that can be both revealed and rejected.

From this, we see that Brahman cannot be *anirvacanīya*; for although It is distinct from the unreal It does not contain distinction from the real because It is reality. And by the same reasoning, the unreal (such as the hare's horn) also cannot be regarded as *anirvacanīya*, for although it is distinct from the real, it is not distinct from the unreal, for it is unreality. The self through thought struggles to know the real, but it can attempt to know the truth

only by relating the real to something other than itself. All knowledge whether perceptual or conceptual, attempts to reveal reality of the ultimate spirit, and in so doing assigns characteristics to it. It equates the real with what is different — the unreal. The attributing to one thing what is different from it, Śaṅkara calls *adhyāsa*,⁴³³ meaning illusion or superimposition. Technically, all knowledge of finite things, at least in the terms of Advaita, is the imposition (*adhyāsa*) of objects upon pure being or upon the eternal consciousness. Radhakrishnan remarks, that "the most striking instance of *adhyāsa* is the confusion of subject with object where we attribute to the Ātman activity, agency, and enjoyment . . . for, strictly speaking, there is nothing different from the subject, as the subject or reality includes all that we can possibly predicate of it. What we attribute to the subject is something less than real, an appearance thereof."⁴³⁴

Avidyā, the natural tendency to *adhyāsa*, is involved in the very roots of our being, and is another name for our finitude.⁴³⁵ *Māyā* does not mean for Śaṅkara, unreality, hallucination or absolute naught. This, we have shown in Chapter II. *Māyā* for him is *anirvacanīya* — neither real nor unreal. It cannot be real (*sat*) for it is destroyed by knowledge, and the real can never be negated, "it never ceases to be, . . . none can cause the destruction of that which is immutable."⁴³⁶ Neither can *māyā* be said to be unreal (*asat*) for it is the material cause of the world and no unreal can be the source of anything. It cannot also be both real and unreal (*sadasat*) for it has been proven by the Vedāntic logic that both being and non-being cannot inhere simultaneously in the same thing. *Māyā* must therefore, be regarded as *anirvacanīya* or indeterminate. This does not mean that it is impossible of description by the human intellect, but indeterminate in the sense that it cannot be described as *sat* or *asat* or *sadasat*, but as something other than all three. It is the "other" that is inexplicable, and which therefore, we must ascribe to mystery. In fact, we cannot make a definite statement with regard to the nature of *māyā*. It is not wholly different from *Brahman*, and it is only because of its being neither real nor unreal that identification of it with *Brahman* is made possible; for if it were real, it could not be identified with *Brahman* as the Real, since no two reals can be identical. If on the other hand, *māyā* were unreal, then also, identification with *Brahman* would

be impossible, as an unreal cannot have identity with a real. But since we experience the world as existing, identification of the world with *Brahman*, is for the finite mind a logical necessity, but one that needs a concept that will rationally accomplish such self-sameness.

It is this identification with a product of *māyā* that enables the *jīva* who is essentially *Brahman*, to feel that he is the limited being which he considers himself to be ; and to make possible the knowledge of *Ātman-Brahman*, *māyā* must be treated as neither *sat* nor *asat*, if one is to justify the Advaita philosophy in its teaching of the relation of the world to the Real through the concept of *māyā*.

CHAPTER IV

MĀYĀVĀDA IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Prolegomena

*Manasaiva anudraṣṭavyam
neha nānā 'sti kiñcana,
mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti
ya iha nāneva paśyati.*

'It is to be perceived by the mind alone, there is no multiplicity whatever; who sees here as it were "many" passes from death to death.'⁴³⁷ That multiplicity, the characteristic of the universe is false, is clearly denoted in this Upaniṣadic passage, and it is still further emphasized by saying that he who sees *as it were* (an appearance of) plurality as the existent world never knows release from the eternal round of birth and death in this *saṁsāra*. Here the conception of *māyā* exhibits itself most clearly, and yet many do not see it.

The first error to be proposed by human consciousness is that of multiplicity. In the first viewing of the Self as other than *Brahman*, it is necessary to place that Self in a time and space relation to all other entities. It is the only way that the "otherness" of our perceptions can be established. We have the intuitive and perhaps uneasy notion that there are other entities each encompassed within its personal system, that in turn are viewing our self as the object of their consciousness. The mind, then begins its probe for the cause of its conceptions that seem to place the Self as one apart and yet among many selves. And thus, from our *māyā* are born time, and space, and causality. It is this primal *avidyā* which is the "cause" of our viewing the phenomenal world as other than the Universal Self, and from this ground of ignorance we fashion physical characteristics to superimpose on *Ātman*,—"Avidyā, or nescience, indescribable and beginningless," Śaṅkara declares, "is called the cause, which is an *upādhi* superimposed on *Ātman*. Know for certain that *Ātman* is other than the three *upādhis**."⁴³⁸

* *Gross body, subtle body, causal body.*

That *avidyā* cannot be described as being or non-being is due to the fact that the mind through which one must understand the distinction between being and non-being, is itself a product of *avidyā*; it cannot, therefore, know the beginning of its *cause*. And, since it is mind,⁴³⁹ an effect of *māyā*, that creates the concept of time, space, causality, and multiplicity, the phenomenal self has no principle by which it can see before or beyond time's boundary. That is why the *jīva* feels itself "confined" and yearns for release from the bonds of delusion. 'Lead me from the unreal to the real,' it implores, 'from darkness lead me to Light; from death lead me to immortality!'⁴⁴⁰

Self (mind) seeks to overcome that first erroneous notion that it is separate from the Cosmic Self, and searches earnestly for a re-cognition of its primordial field — the all-encompassing non-dual *Brahman*. This search is not abandoned to the seers of ancient Vedic times as something impractical to modern life. Contemporary man seeks more seriously now and with greater sophistication and more refined methodology, to isolate a unifying principle that will again open to him the knowledge of his Undifferentiated Being.

Mind Seeks Unity

What is significant in the Scriptures is the consistent movement from the acceptance of multiplicity evidenced in the early Vedas to a denunciation of the concept of multiformity as error in the later Vedas (Upaniṣads) and the latter's persistent enunciation of the non-duality of Universal Consciousness — 'Its hands and feet are everywhere; Its eyes, heads, and faces are everywhere; Its ears are everywhere; It exists encompassing all,'⁴⁴¹ *Brahman* pervades all beings as Existence and Consciousness.

Mind is ever seeking a concept that will rationally accomplish such Oneness. Made aware of relatedness by modern science of relativity — the theory that all things of this world posit their *appearance* upon relatedness, modern man has accepted the doctrine that no eternally abiding *truth* is to be found in the phenomenal world. He has abandoned the philosophical quest for "truth," which in the history of time has brought forward such a confusing variety of "truths," and seeks instead, *unity* as his ultimate. This may be found only in the non-discrimination of Cosmic Oneness;

for, to say that "this" or "that" is *truth* implies a comparison to what is non-truth, and is contingent upon many perspectives, each of which may posit a "truth" that is valid to its own insight. But in the Universal Soul no such dichotomy exists, no such comparison is possible. *Unity* rather than *truth* will reveal a realness that does not posit its reality upon comparisons. What we have then, is the Absolute as neutralizer of all distinctions — "the Absolute, governing, pervading, and constituting all relatives. There is nothing that is not omnipresent reality."⁴⁴²

But it is only by a negational explanation that this fuller vision can be brought about. We cannot hope to arrive at a unified knowledge of all that is, by attempting through empirical observation to discover more and more properties and to assign more and more attributes to phenomenal event in the effort to attain a completed picture of the whole. Certainly, if we were to attempt to say what the universe is, we must go on "discovering," explaining, and describing *ad infinitum*, adding statements endlessly, never arriving at a full description. This is not only nonsensical, but a thankless procedure, for not only do men's perspectives differ, but no one man, nor group of men, nor any one age of mankind can know or measure all the possible predicates of the universe.

To say that the phenomenal world is "real," is not correct, for we have seen that it is an effect of *māyā*. To say that the world is "unreal," is equally fallacious, for we cognize the phenomenal object, and logic tells us that we cannot cognize the unreal. To speak of the world in such mutually exclusive terms as being "both real and unreal," we are talking physical nonsense, for no existent thing, logic again tells us, can be substantiated of polar properties. But when we say what a thing is not, we know something about it in a positive way. To say of a child that he is neither my father nor my mother, says something about the child, which at the same time does not negate the *being* of the child. Likewise, when we say that the phenomenal world is *neither real nor unreal*, we make a positive statement which precludes the necessity of looking for what the world is; for *is* denotes *being*, and by describing the world as neither being nor not being, we are still saying something positive about it without committing ourselves to the thankless task of enumerating all that it is.

The Vedāntic viewing of the world, then, in the context of *anirvacanīya* (neither real nor unreal) is quite logical, and an explanation that can be accepted comfortably by the intelligence of man. Nor does this approach assign a nugatory character to the world, as some critics have maintained of the Śāṅkaran teaching on this point. The very fact that we assign a predicate — however negatory — to the object, insinuates its existence, at least at the level of man's consciousness and intellect. That there can be no negation of the empirical world without affirming an underlying reality, is successfully argued by Śāṅkara in his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras (see note 371, *supra*). Cosmic Unity can be realized only through a system of negatory metaphysics — the progressive negating of all attributes and relations, until a residuum remains that reveals a Oneness devoid of time, space, causality, and all other of our physical conceptions. It is only the admission of the existence of this indescribable Cosmic Entity as an unchanging substratum that a unified experience and transfiguration of the world of appearance into a completed understanding of Ultimate Reality can be effected.

Māyāvāda and Science

In his persistent attempt to evolve a concept that will transfigure the world of multiplicity and diverse perceptions into a unified human experience — a completer knowledge of all that is — contemporary man stands obviously on the verge of dissipating the spell of *māyā*, a task which has ever been his goal. He is still teaching, now more forcibly perhaps, than the Vedāntic philosophers, that the phenomenal world is neither real nor unreal, that it is, as it were *inexplicable* in the symbolism of language and logic. Even the formalism of empirical science has had to give way to a more intuitive and idealistic approach to knowledge in order to preserve a stable and workable body of concepts. No longer does physical science affirm the universe to be real in the sense of being independent of human mind, endowed with unique existence and enjoying all the rich variety of qualities which our powers of observation may happen to discern in it.

This is emphasized by neo-modern science in its repudiation of the classical view that matter is a ponderable, impenetrable, and

extended substance, whose existence is posited upon its occupancy in time and space. Particle physics has declared the substratum of phenomena to be an inexplicable energy or *force* that is neither substance nor not substance, that comprehends and engulfs time and space, so that no individual physical entity remains. From this viewpoint science has had to discard the notion of empirical validation as a requisite for a declaration of the real, and looks to give an account of intuitive presentation. This is evidenced in atomic physics which has consistently "dematerialized" matter in its treatment of the atom as being both non-material and non-entical, which it holds as the basic structure of phenomenal event, and portraying this primal *force* or *energy* as an analytical apprehension — a construct for the picturization of our notions of phenomena. In positing a non-material and inexplicable force as the substratum of reality, a force that is neither mental nor material, science is demonstrating most lucidly the postulates of *māyāvāda*.

It is indeed, against an idealistic background that the scientific world now projects most vividly its more sophisticated conceptions of the real. But it does not say that the world is wholly mental. There is an external world not part of the mind, but neutral ground from which mind extracts and fashions the experiences which we hold in common. Śaṅkara speaks of this "previous seminal condition of the world" as the causal potentiality which is in the nature of *appearance* having *Brahman*⁴⁴³ for its substratum — "... it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating selves destitute for the time of their individual character. This undeveloped principle," he explains further, "is sometimes denoted by the term *ākāśa*, ether; ... sometimes again, it is denoted by the term *akṣara*, the imperishable; ... sometimes it is spoken of as *māyā*, appearance ... for *māyā* is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not."⁴⁴⁴

Science, unable to hold the basic particle that composes all phenomena as existent or nonexistent,⁴⁴⁵ cannot in consequence, logically characterize the universe in terms of real or unreal, but posits an objective world that is only pragmatically and conventionally existent, and admits to its probable nonexistence from a cosmic point apart from the present physical system of the universe. Thus the vision of the world rests in science as in *māyāvāda*, upon

the position of the observer. The world is existent and has a sort of reality as long as the individual conceives it as such from his particular physical observation point. However, outside the co-ordinate system of our universe, where none of our physical definitions are seen to hold, the world cannot be viewed as an existent entity in any of our known physical terms.

The modern physicist may be surprised to learn that he is resolving his science upon the same postulates as those of *māyāvāda*, but no other construction can be placed upon the present and anticipated notions of science. Its positing of energy as the basic field of reality — neither mental nor physical, admittedly inexplicable, yet real for all practical purposes — is no different than the teaching of *māyāvāda* that demonstrates the same conceptions of phenomena and posits the inexplicable *Brahman* as the substratum of the universe — “there exists nothing that is not *Brahman*; if any object other than *Brahman* appears to exist, it is unreal, like a mirage.”⁴⁴⁶

In its inability to assign attributes to the basic principle of phenomena, science acknowledges its belief that man is rooted in a reality far deeper than is apparent to formal investigation, and therefore, explanation of the being of the universe must come from regions beyond the scope of ordinary reason and perception. The procedure of *māyāvāda* as propounded by the Śāṅkaran School of Vedānta is plainly reflected in the axioms and protopostulates of modern particle science, and serves well to explain metaphysically the nature of the world as science has developed it in a physical understanding.

Apparently, the real nature of the world cannot be known by any method so far devised by science. According to Vedānta, *Brahman* as existence-knowledge-bliss (*satchitānanda*) is present in every material object. This accounts for the indescribable nature of matter. Śrī Aurobindo explains matter as the form which the inconscient Cosmic Energy assumes in order to exhibit in isolated prominence, the substantiality of the Supreme Spirit, and to furnish the Spirit with a formal basis of objective knowledge — “the energy of consciousness, acting, as it were, in a state of somnambulism.”

We cannot fathom the indescribability of matter by giving names to its inexplicability. When we consider that words are the sym-

bolic portrayal of finite ideas, we must admit that their use is dependent upon the standpoint — the level and type of perception ; therefore, such view of the world must remain a doubtful real until viewed from a purer knowledge, that is, from a cosmic position where both the observer and what the observer had viewed in a narrow sense, is seen to be nonexistent from the broader view.

Śaṅkara explains in his commentary on the first Vedānta Sūtra :

... as *Brahman* is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not *Brahman*. If *Brahman* were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with *Brahman* as its effect ; but as the effect only (i.e., the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with *Brahman* or something else.⁴⁴⁷

Apparently our ignorance stems from the confusion of the transcendental subject (*Ātman*) with empirical existence (*anātman*). But modern science seems to have mediated remarkably this confusion by demonstrating the "immateriality" of the atom, and by declaring the universe to be no more than an unmeasurable and undifferentiated field of energy from which we fashion all our physical conceptions, and by thus exhibiting the external world as a conceptual arrival at variety and multiplicity by mental manipulation of the *non-mental*, *non-material*, and *inexplicable force*.

In addition, modern relativity theory teaches that outside our universe a system prevails where none of our conceptions apply, where there is no gravitational point, no "up" and "down," no "east" and "west," no "right" and "left," no "time," no "space," no "causality," — and so to all our physical laws.

Thus it is that science posits upon formal grounds, the reality of a cosmic observational point where all our differentiations merge into a unified cosmic Oneness. It posits upon scientific grounds, what Vedic scripture has already validated — that Universal Consciousness is other than our physical world system, where simultaneity replaces time and motion, where non-duality replaces multiplicity, and where all our known physical laws are seen to be the product of ignorance. It is, as the *Ātmabodha* teaches :

All the various forms exist in the imagination of the perceiver, the substratum being the eternal and all-pervading Vishṇu,* whose nature is Existence and Intelligence. Names and forms are like bangles and bracelets, and Vishṇu is like gold.⁴⁴⁸

Looking at it from a cosmic vantage point, as it were, we realize that we have bound the world by conceptions of time and space and causality. But these are only pragmatic categories that point to something unalterable and absolute which remains unchanged, identical with itself in all its aspects. With Śaṅkara, "*Brahman* is the basis and ground of all experience. *Brahman* is different from the space-time-cause world. *Brahman* has nothing similar to it, nothing different, from it, and no internal differentiation, for all these are empirical distinctions. *Brahman* is non-empirical, non-objective, the wholly other, but it is not non-being. It is . . . the deepest part of our being, one with the essence of the world."⁴⁴⁹

The Vedāntic discipline aims at exposing the illusory notion of multiplicity. The modern scientific discipline proposes the same.

Through the ages of history and the eras of science, physical investigation has made a concerted attempt to uncover the real which is neither real nor unreal concealed by the apparent veil of phenomena. Beginning with the first atomic theory of material substance that wrapped the world in a decadent philosophy of materialism, science has through persistent enquiry struggled to free itself of this materialistic embrace. Step by step, and through many centuries, physical science has consistently negated the phenomenal world as a material entity. Denuding its basic particle, the atom, of impenetrability, form, extension, geometric construction, and lastly, declaring the subatomic entity to be impossible of location in time and space,⁴⁵⁰ modern physics has successfully arrived at a residuum of affirmation — that, from a neutral ground, an undifferentiated field of force which is neither mental nor physical, arise all our physical conceptions.

This "neutral" ground — the neither real nor unreal *force* of the newer vision of science, in which the macroscopic and microscopic worlds can be known in perfect unity, and from which the human mind conceives the various forms to which it assigns a

* The all-pervading Consciousness. Also signifies a manifestation of Reality usually designated as the Second Person of the Hindu Trinity.

variety of attributes, is a recognition of the first manifestation of the Cosmic Self, as the scriptures describe — ‘... from the Self sprang ether’ (*TaiU* II. 1); ‘... from It are born [projected through the power of *māyā*] breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water and earth, which is the support of all’ (*MuU* II. 1. 3); ‘... verily, what is called *ākāśa* is the accomplisher of name and form [individuality]; that within which they are, is *Brahma*, that is the immortal, that is the Self [*Ātman*].’ (*ChU* VIII. 14. 1).

And belonging to the Self, as it were, these names and forms, the figments of ignorance, can neither be defined as being (i.e., *Brahman*), nor as different from it, but are “the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called in *śruti* and *smṛti* the appearance (*māyā*), power (*śakti*), or Nature (*prakṛti*) of the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scriptural passages such as the following, ‘He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and names are contained is *Brahman*’ (*ChU* VIII. 14. 1); ‘Let me evolve names and forms’ (*ChU* VI. 3. 2); ‘He, the wise one, who having divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)’ (*TaiU* Ar III. 12. 7); ‘He who makes the one seed manifold’ (*SvU* VI. 12).”⁴⁵¹ This previous seminal condition of the world assumed by us, and from whence come all our conceptions of duality, may be admitted, so the *Śrī Bhyaśa* directs, because it is according to sense and reason, “for without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the potentiality of action”⁴⁵²

It would appear, then, that what has been so earnestly desired by the Vedāntic sages is close to being brought about by modern physical science. Through scientific declaration name and form, the multiple individuality that we have long thought to constitute the phenomenal world, is trickling back into Undifferentiated Unity. In the words of the *Maṇḍukya*: ‘As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great.’⁴⁵³

So it seems, that science in positing an impersonal and non-material character to the basic or seminal aspect of the universe — the all-pervasive “field of energy,” has approximated the

sublimation of the multiple world into the unity of Spirit, so insistently demanded by Vedāntic scripture.

At the rate of progress that modern man is making in physical science, the 21st Century may well witness his successful dissolution of the veil of *avidyā*, and thus to fulfil the Vedāntic affirmation — 'that serene being arising from this body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light.'⁴⁵⁴

OM

EPILOGUE

The doctrine and implications of ideation-only are of kinds infinitely diverse for decision and selection ; difficult is it to fathom their profundities. Without being a buddha, who is able to comprehend their total extent ?

I, according to my ability
Have briefly demonstrated the principles
of ideation-only ;
Among these all other kinds,
Difficult to think, are reached
by Buddhas alone.⁴⁵⁵

APPENDIX

MĀYĀ IN THE PRINCIPAL UPANIṢADS*

as cosmic illusion: *IU* 11, '... by the Ignorance they cross beyond Death and by the Knowledge enjoy Immortality.' * *IU* 12, '... those abiding in the midst of ignorance. . . . ' * *IU* 15, 'The door of the Truth is covered by a golden disc (*māyā*). ' (N) * *KaU* I. 1. 10. * *KaU* II. 5, 'Those abiding in the midst of ignorance, self-wise, thinking themselves learned, running hither and thither, go around deluded, like blind men led by one who himself is blind.' (H) (Recurr with variation in *MuU* I. 2. 8 ; similarly in *Maitri* VII. 9). * *KaU* I. 2. 6, '... one who thinks there is this world and no other.' (N) * *KaU* II. 1. 10, 'What is here, the same as there ; and what is there, the same is here. He goes from death to death who sees any difference here.' (N) *Brahman*, or Pure Consciousness appears through *māyā* to be conditioned by cosmic ignorance, and then becomes known as the Creator. * *KaU* II. 1. 11 (N). * *MuU* I. 2. 8 (they live and move in ignorance). * *MuU* III. 1. 2, '... the *jiva* moans bewildered by his impotence.' The cause of man's suffering and impotence is *māyā*, under whose influence he first forgets his divine nature and then associates himself with many illusory notions. (N) See also, *SvU* 4. 7. * *MāU* (GK) I. 16 (the *jiva* sleeps on account of illusion (*māyā*). * *MāU* (GK) IV. 58 (N). * *BrU* IV. 3. 7, 'forms of death' (ignorance, action, etc.). * *BrU* IV. 4. 19, '... there is in It no diversity. . . ' One sees diversity owing to ignorance. (N) * *SvU* I. 10, '... by meditation upon Him, by union with Him, and by entering into His being more and more, there is finally cessation from every illusion.' (N) * *SvU* IV. 8, '... that indestructible Substance, that *ākāśa*-like *Brahman*, which is greater than the unmanifest. . . . ' (N) Unmanifest: *Ākāśa* is the first modification of *Brahman* under the influence of *māyā*. In this state the names and forms of the phenomenal universe remain undifferentiated. * *SvU* IV. 9, '*Brahman* projects the universe through the power of Its *māyā*. Again, in that universe *Brahman* [as the *jiva*] is entangled through *māyā*.' It is the very nature of illusion to give an appearance of reality to both the mirage and the phenomenal universe. (N) * *SvU* IV. 9, '... this whole world the illusion maker (*māyin*) projects put of this [*Brahma*]. And in it by illusion (*māyā*) the other [the *jiva*] is confined.' (H) * *SvU* IV. 10, 'Now one should know that Nature is illusion, etc.' (H) * *Maitri* VI. 34, '*Samsāra* [cycle of existence] is just one's own thought ; with effort he should cleanse it then ; what is one's thought, that he becomes ; This is the eternal mystery.' (H) * *Maitri* VII. 9, 'By this [ignorance] men declare that the inauspicious is the auspicious, and that the auspicious is inauspicious. . . . ' (H) * *Maitri* VII. 10, 'As if by enchantment they see the false as the true.' (H)

* Taken from the translations of Hume (H), and Nikhilananda (N). See Bibliography.

as duality: *KaU* II. 1. 10, 'What is here, the same is there; and what is there the same is here. He goes from death to death who sees any difference.' (N) The apparent difference between *jīva* and *Ātman*, results from *upadhī*, or limiting adjunct, which is created by *māyā* or ignorance. * *KaU* II. 1. 11, 'By the mind alone is *Brahman* to be realized; then one does not see in It any multiplicity whatsoever.' (N) The knowledge of *Brahman* destroys ignorance, the cause of multiplicity. * *MāU* (GK) I. 16, 'When the *jīva*, asleep under the influence of beginningless *māyā* is awakened, it then realizes birthless, sleepless, and dreamless Non-duality'; verse 17, 'If the phenomenal universe were real, then certainly it would disappear. The universe of duality [which is cognized] is mere illusion (*māyā*); Non-duality alone is the Supreme Reality!' (N) * *MāU* (GK) IV. 61, 'As in dreams the mind acts through *māyā*, presenting the appearance of duality, so also in the waking state the mind acts through *māyā*, presenting the appearance of duality.' (N) * *ChuU* VI. I. 4, 'Just as, my dear, by one piece of clay everything made of clay may be known—the modification is merely a verbal distinction, a name; the reality is just "clay"—' (H) * *BrU* I. 3. 28, 'Lead me from the unreal to the real. From darkness lead me to light. From death lead me to immortality.' (N) Death is duality, which is *māyā*. * *BrU* IV. 4. 4. The simile of the goldsmith—the *Ātman* creates through *Avidyā* various forms, hence unreal. * *BrU* IV. 4. 19, 'By the mind alone It is to be perceived. There is on earth no diversity . . . ' (H) Multiplicity characteristic of the universe is false. * *ŚvU* IV. 10 (nature is illusion). * *Māitri* VI. 24, ' . . . when the mind has been dissolved, etc. (freed of the erroneous idea of duality).

as magic: *KaU* V. 12, 'The Inner Soul (*antarātman*) of all things . . . Who makes his one form manifold' (is performing a piece of supernatural magic in appearing as many). (H) * *BrU* II. 5. 19, 'He became corresponding in every form to every form. This is to be looked upon as a form of him. Indra by his magic powers (*māyā*) goes about in many forms; yoked are his ten-hundred steeds.' (H) This is the first occurrence in the Upaniṣads of the word *māyā*.

as the perceived world: *KnU* I. 4, ' . . . know That for the Brahman and not this which men cherish here.' (N) * *KaU* II. 1. 2 (the natural tendency of man to dwell on external objects other than the Self — this is called *avidyā*). (N) * *KaU* II. 1. 10, ' . . . He goes from death to death who sees any difference here.' (N) What appears to the ignorant as phenomenal being, from the standpoint of Truth, is nothing but pure *Brahman*. * *KaU* II. 6, ' . . . heedless, deluded with the delusion of wealth; thinking "This is the world! There is no other!" ' (H) * *MuU* I. 1. 3. * *MāU* (GK) IV. 43-44 (see Nikhilananda commentary). * *MāU* (GK) IV. 56, 'As long as a person clings to the belief in causality, *samsāra* will continue to expand for him. But when this attachment to causality wears away, *samsāra* becomes non-existent.' (N) *Samsāra*, projected by *avidyā*, is supported by the law of cause and effect. * *MāU* (GK) IV. 58 (*māyā* is the name given to something that does not really exist, but which is perceived on account of false knowledge). (N) * *MāU* (GK) IV. 59, 'The illusory sprout is born of illusory seed. This illusory sprout is neither permanent nor destructible. The same applies to *jīvas*.' (N) * *ChU* VI. 15. 3,

'... that being is the seed; all else is but His expression.' (N) * *BrU* IV. 3. 14, 'Everyone sees his sport but him no one sees.' (N) Sport: consisting of modifications of the mind in the form of phenomenal things. * *BrU* IV. 4. 19, '... there is in it no diversity' (one sees diversity owing to ignorance). * *SvU* I. 10, '*Prakṛti* is perishable. Hara [destroyer of ignorance] is immortal and imperishable. The non-dual Supreme Self rules both *prakṛti* and the individual soul. Through constant meditation on Him, by union with Him, by the knowledge of identity with Him, one attains, in the end, cessation of illusion of phenomena.' (N) * *SvU* IV. 10 (on account of *māyā*, *Brahman* itself appears as the universe and its diverse objects). (N) * *Maitrī* 6-3, 'There are assuredly, two forms of *Brahma*: the formed and the formless. Now, that which is the formed is unreal; that which is the formless is real.' (H) as *prakṛti*: *SvU* I. 10, 'What is perishable [illusion] is Primary Matter [*prakṛti*]... more and more there is finally cessation from every illusion (*māyā-nivṛtti*).' (H) * *SvU* IV. 10, 'Now, one should know that Nature (*Prakṛti*) is illusion (*māyā*) and that the mighty Lord is the illusion maker (*māyin*).' (H) * *SvU* IV. 10, 'Know, then, that *prakṛti* is *māyā* and that the Great God is the Lord of *māyā*.' (N) * *SvU* VI. 10, 'May the non-dual Lord, who, by the power of His *māyā*, covered Himself like a spider, with threads drawn from primal matter (*pradhāna*) merge us in *Brahman*!' (N) * *Maitrī* III. 2 (because of "confusedness" he (*ātman*) is overcome by Nature's (*prakṛti*) qualities (*guṇa*)). (H)

as *śakti* (power of manifestation; power of the Lord): *MuU* II. 1. 3, 'From It are born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and earth, which is the support of all.' (N) Born: projected through the power of *māyā*. * *AiU* I. 1. 1, '... one without a second,' explained by Rāmānuja as transforming power [*śakti*, or *māyā*] inherent in *Brahman*. * *ChU* III. 14. 1, '... all this the world is verily *Brahman*.' (N) * *SvU* IV. 1 (H). * *SvU* IV. 9, '... *Brahman* projects the universe through the power of Its *māyā*. Again, in that universe *Brahman* as the *jīva* is entangled through *māyā*.' (N) * *SvU* IV. 10, '... this whole world the illusion-maker (*māyin*) projects out of this [*Brahma*]....' (H) * *SvU* VI. 5, 'The Great Lord is the beginning, the cause [of *avidyā*] which unites [the soul with the body]....' (N) * *SvU* VI. 8, '... the Vedas speak of His exalted power [*māyāśakti*], which is innate and capable of producing diverse effects, and also of His omniscience and might.' (N) * *SvU* VI. 10, 'May the non-dual Lord, who, by the power of his *māyā*, covered Himself, like a spider, with threads drawn from primal matter, merge us in *Brahman*!' (N) * *SvU* VI. 12, 'The one controller of the inactive many, who make the one seed manifold....' (H) *Māyā* is the seed or source of *prakṛti*. The apparent activity of the *jīva* is the result of *māyā*.

as symbol or educative illusion: *KaU* I. 2. 5, 'Fools dwelling in darkness, but thinking themselves wise and erudite, go round and round, by various tortuous paths, like the blind led by the blind.' (N) * *KaU* I. 2. 6. * *TaiU* I. 4. 1 (H). * *TaiU* I. 4. 2 (H). * *TaiU* II. 1 (H). * *TaiU* III. 1-6 (H). * *ChU* IV. 1. 1 to IV. 16. 5 (H). Conversational instructions. * *BrU* II. 4. 7-9, 'As the notes of a drum, a conch-shell, or a lute have no existence in themselves

and can be perceived only when the instrument that produces them is played, so all objects and relations in the universe are known by him who knows *Ātman*.' (N) * *ŚvU* IV. 5, '... the she-goat red, white, and black (the three *guṇas*) — casts many young ones, which are like to her.' (N) All the effects of *māyā* are constituted of the three *guṇas*.

the idea of māyā : (explains multiformity as one) : *IU*. 7 (N). * *IU* 15, 'The door of Truth is covered by a golden disc' (N) * *KaU* V. 12, '... the wise who perceive Him as standing in oneself,' (H). * *PrU* IV. 5 (duality is the result of ignorance). * *TaiU* II. 6, 'Non-existent (*a-sat*) himself does one become if he knows that *Brahma* is non-existent. If one knows that *Brahma* exists, such a one thereby knows himself as existent. This, indeed, is its bodily self, as of the former.' (H) * *BrU* II. 4. 14, 'For where there is duality, as it were, there sees another, etc.' *As it were* shows that duality, which refers to multiplicity in the world, is unreal, or an *appearance*. * *BrU* IV. 4. 19, 'Only by the mind is it to be perceived. In it there is no diversity. He goes from death to death who sees in It, as it were, diversity.' (N)

NOTES

¹ The Supreme Spirit is invoked at the commencement and the termination of the study of the Vedas and other scriptures, for the removal of all faults committed intentionally, unintentionally, carelessly, or through excitement, oversight, or non-observance of proper rules.

² Not the ego or the self-conscious self, *Ātman* is a universal consciousness that accompanies the contents of all consciousness and endures when there are no contents. It is the self identified with the whole of reality — the individual wearing of *Brahman*.

³ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (2 vols. ; London : Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), Vol. I, pp. 25, 28.

⁴ Philosophical systems.

⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the passages from the *R̥g Veda* used in this work are taken from the following translations (translator's name will appear in parentheses after passage notation) : R. T. Griffith, tr., *The Hymns of the R̥gveda* (2 vols. ; 3rd ed. ; Benares : E. J. Lazarus & Co., 1920-1926) ; E. J. Thomas, tr., *Vedic Hymns* (Wisdom of the East ; London : John Murray, 1923) ; A. A. Macdonell, tr., *Hymns from the R̥gveda* (London : Oxford University Press, 1922).

Brackets will be used within quotations to indicate explanatory interpolations by the author of this work.

Single quotation marks will be used in quoting from the scriptures, inclusive of the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapāda. Double quotation marks will be used to enclose other quotations in this work.

⁶ One of the four and the most ancient of the Vedas, viz., *R̥g Veda*, *Yajur Veda*, *Sāma Veda*, and *Atharva Veda*. Dr. Radhakrishnan places the Vedic period between 2,500 B.C. and 600 B.C., the period during which the Āryans having come down into India from Central Asia, settled their new homeland and gradually expanded and developed their Āryan culture and civilization. This, he maintains, can hardly be called a philosophical age. Yet it is the age of philosophical overtones and "its culminating doctrines, those expounded by the major Upaniṣads, have determined the tone, if not the precise patterns of Indian philosophical development ever since." From : Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton : University Press, 1957), p. xv.

Other Indologists consider the Vedas to have been collated as far back as 5,000 B.C. Vyāsa, the compiler, is reputed to have been alive at the time of the battle of Kurukshetra, placed by various historians between 2,400 B.C. and 1,200 B.C. Then there are those who believe the Vedas to have been eternal, and some think them to be of divine origin.

⁷ *RV*, X. 90. 2 (Thomas).

⁸ Differs from ordinary knowledge which is the product of the intellect. *Vidyā* is a supersensuous and supramental experience, an insight into the

interrelatedness of the facts of experience and their significance in the context of the eternal or cosmic whole. *Vidyā* is an awareness of the nature of the Real.

⁹ The principle of non-duality is not confined to the Advaita Vedānta. There are dualistic philosophies that posit such a principle, usually in the sense of "multiplicity in unity" (explained in Chaps. I and II, *et passim*).

¹⁰ Except Cārvāka.

¹¹ *Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, and *Vedānta*. Termed orthodox because they explain their doctrines upon the authority of the *Vedas*.

¹² See Addenda.

¹³ The "Celestial Bird," the sun.

¹⁴ *RV*, I. 164. 46 (Griffith).

¹⁵ *RV*, X. 90. 2 (Thomas).

¹⁶ Hymns of the *Rg Veda*, especially the latter ones constitute the actual beginning of Indian philosophy (RMSB, p. xvi).

¹⁷ The most prominent God of the *Rg Veda*, sometimes termed the King of the Gods.

¹⁸ *RV*, X. 54. 2.

¹⁹ *RV*, I. 2. 7 (Griffith).

²⁰ *RV*, VI. 8. 12 (Griffith).

²¹ *RV*, III. 53. 8 (Griffith).

²² *RV*, VI. 47. 18 (Griffith).

²³ See his extreme ideas on non-dualism and *māyā*, *infra*. Intro.

²⁴ *RV*, X. 121. 1-2 (Thomas).

²⁵ RMSB, p. 4.

²⁶ *RV*, II. 12. 5 (Macdonell).

²⁷ *RV*, X. 121. 5 (Thomas).

28

HYMN OF CREATION

1. Non-being then existed not nor being ;
There was no air, nor sky that is beyond it.
What was concealed ? Wherein ? In whose protection ?
And was there deep unfathomable water ?
2. Death then existed not nor life immortal ;
Of neither night nor day was any token.
By its inherent force the One breathed windless ;
No other being than that beyond existed.
3. Darkness there was at first by darkness hidden ;
Without distinctive marks, this all was water.
That which, becoming, by the void was covered,
That One by force of heat came into being.
4. Desire entered the One in the beginning ;
It was the earliest seed, of thought the product.

The sages searching in their hearts with wisdom,
Found out the bond of being in non-being.

5. Their ray extended light across the darkness :
But was the One above or was it under ?
Creative force was there, and fertile power :
Below was energy, above was impulse.
6. Who knows for certain ? Who shall here declare it ?
Whence was it born, and whence came this creation ?
The gods were born after this world's creation :
Then who can know from whence it has risen ?
7. None knoweth whence creation has arisen ;
And whether he has or has not produced it ;
He who surveys it in the highest heaven,
He only knows, or haply he may not know.

RV, X. 129 (Macdonell).

²⁹ Especially verse 6.

³⁰ See Chapters I and II, *et passim*, of this work.

³¹ Unless otherwise noted, passages quoted from the Upaniṣads are taken from the following translations : *The Upaniṣads*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (3 vols. ; New York : Harper & Bros., 1949, 1952, and 1957) ; *The Ten Principal Upaniṣads*, trans. Shree Purohit Swami and W. B. Yeats (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1937) ; *The Principal Upaniṣads*, trans., annot. S. Radhakrishnan (New York : Harper & Bros., 1953) ; *The Vedānta-Sūtras with Śaṅkarācārya's Śribhāṣya*, ed. Max Muller, trans. George Thibaut (Sacred Books of the East, XLVII ; Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1904).

³² The concluding portions of later Vedas represent an attempt to develop a new philosophy upon an old theological background. Their central idea is the affirmation of the identity between the *ātman* and the *Brahman* — the self and the cosmos. They are the basis for the Vedānta philosophy. There are more than 200 Upaniṣads, although the traditional number is 108. Of these, the principal ten are used in this work, viz., *Īśa*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Mundaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Taittirīya*, *Aitareya*, *Chāndogya*, and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.

³³ *MuU*, I. 1. 3 (Swami and Yeats).

³⁴ *KaU*, II. 1. 5 (Swami and Yeats).

³⁵ *RMSB*, p. 38.

³⁶ *Tai Br*, III. 12. 9 (Nikhilananda, *UNc*, I, p. 52).

³⁷ *Śa Br*, X. 6. 2 (Nikhilananda).

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *UNc*, Vol. I, p. 52.

⁴⁰ Synonymous with *māyā*, the mysterious veil that is responsible for the perception of multiplicity in the relative world. Usually used in connection with the individual rather than cosmic, inasmuch as *avidyā* is destroyed by knowledge. However, *avidyā*, *ajñāna*, and *māyā* are used interchangeably by Vedāntins.

⁴¹ This idea prevails throughout the Upaniṣads. See *KaU*, II. 1. 10; *ŚvU*, IV. 10; *MuU*, I. 1. 3.

⁴² Primordial nature; the material substratum of the universe. See Sāṅkhya school, *infra*, Intro.

⁴³ IV. 10. 1. (Nikhilananda) Swami Nikhilananda remarks on this passage, re: "parts of his being," that in reality *Brahman* is without parts, but parts lower (material forms) and higher (life and consciousness) are superimposed upon it through *māyā*. UNc, Vol. II, pp. 113, 114.

⁴⁴ *Sūtras*: Orderly, logically developed statements presenting briefly but pointedly, the doctrines of each of the six systems of orthodox Indian philosophy.

⁴⁵ UNc, Vol. II, Śrī Śāṅkarācārya's introduction to the *ŚvU*, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁶ Before 600 B.C. First recorded non-dualist of India.

⁴⁷ The Advaita Vedānta of Śāṅkarācārya.

⁴⁸ I. iv. 10 (Nikhilananda).

⁴⁹ *BrU*, I. 4. 10 (Nikhilananda).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, IV. 4. 19.

⁵¹ I. 3. 28 (Nikhilananda).

⁵² UNc, Vol. I, p. 53.

⁵³ *Cā.*, 200 B.C. to A.D. 200, representing the liberal section of Buddhism as opposed to the Hīnayāna or orthodox section. Mahāyāna embodies primitive beliefs as well as presenting metaphysical and epistemological systems such as the *Śūnyavāda* and *Vijñānavāda*. *Infra.*, Chap. III.

⁵⁴ Author of the *Mādhyamīkākārikās* (commentaries on the Mādhyamika doctrine of relativity or nihilism).

⁵⁵ Śāṅkara maintains that the world is neither real nor unreal, and for this he has been accused of being a crypto-Buddhist. See especially, Chapter III of this work, *et passim*.

⁵⁶ In the metaphysical sense.

⁵⁷ Born 560 B.C.

⁵⁸ RMSB, p. 272.

⁵⁹ See *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, iii. 66 (Thomas): *The Life of Buddha*, trans. Edward J. Thomas (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1956). This passage of the *SN* reads: "all this body is not mine, not this am I, not mine is the soul," and the *Dhammapada* XX. 7, "all the elements of being are non-self." The *DP* passage is from the *Dhammapada*, trans. S. Radhakrishnan (London: Oxford University Press, 1954).

⁶⁰ *ŚB*, II. 2. 31 (Thibaut).

⁶¹ *SN*, translated in: *The Book of Kindred Sayings: Saṃyuttanikāya*, trans. Caroline Augusta Foley Rhys Davids, assisted by Sumangala Thera (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. II; London: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 256.

⁶² There is no whole entity. What appears as a self is merely a grouping of the five *skandas*: form, sensation, perceptions, impressions, consciousness.

⁶³ Also spelled *khaṇḍhas*.

On ignorance depends karma;

On karma depends consciousness;

On consciousness depend name and form ;
 On name and form depend the six organs of sense ;
 On the six organs of sense depends contact ;
 On contact depends sensation ;
 On sensation depends desire ;
 On desire depends attachment ;
 On attachment depends existence ;
 On existence depends birth ;
 On birth depend old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair. Thus does this entire aggregation of misery arise. SN, XXII. 90 (Warren).

From : *Buddhism in Translations*, trans. Henry Clarke Warren (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1922), p. 166.

⁶⁵ VM, XVII, WBT, p. 168.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, XVIII, p. 132.

⁶⁷ P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 244.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

⁷⁰ *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, ITI, p. 243.

⁷¹ All quotations from the commentaries of Gauḍapāda on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* are taken from, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, ed., trans., annot. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya (Calcutta : University Press, 1943).

⁷² *Ca.*, 8th Century A.D. The first Upaniṣadic philosopher of the Vedānta. He is reported to have been the teacher of the teacher of Śaṅkara.

⁷³ Nikhilananda says of the *Kārikā*: "The *Kārikā*, so far as is known at the present time is the first systematic treatment of the Advaita or non-dualistic Vedānta. In it Gauḍapāda has established non-dualism on a philosophical basis. He deals with the subject matter purely on rational grounds independent of scriptural revelation . . . the *Kārikā* deals exclusively with philosophy. The one theme running through it is the reality of the non-dual and birthless *Ātman*. The profundity of the *Kārikā* easily gives it the status of an Upaniṣad." UNc, Vol. II, p. 206.

⁷⁴ Not referring to "dependent" origination.

⁷⁵ Verse 3.

⁷⁶ See *ĀSB*, intro. p. cxxii.

⁷⁷ *Advaya* (Sanskrit) — one of the names of Buddha.

⁷⁸ *ĀŚ*, verse 4.

⁷⁹ The same as the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*; also known as the *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā*, and traditionally it is called *Āgamaśāstra*.

⁸⁰ In Bk. V. 71 of the *ĀŚ* he says, 'no *jīva* [self] of any kind takes birth nor is there any possibility of it. It is the highest truth in which nothing originates.'

⁸¹ *ĀŚ*, Bk. I, in which Gauḍapāda takes up the subject of the Self, and through dialectic posits all reality in the non-dual *Brahman*, e.g., verse 26: 'Om [the Absolute] is said to be the lower as well as the higher *Brahman*. Om is without any antecedent and unchanging, and it has nothing other than itself, nor has it inside or outside.'

Verse 27: 'Om is the beginning, middle and end of all.'

Verse 29: 'He and no other person is a sage [*muni*] who knows Om, which has no measure, and yet has an unlimited measure, and which is the cessation of duality, and which is bliss.'

⁸² This section of the *BrU* considers reality in relation to the waking and dream states. The passage cited reads: 'There are no [real] chariots in that [dream] state, nor animals to be yoked to them, nor roads. There are no pleasures in that state... there are no pools in that state... but he creates the pools, reservoirs, and rivers. He indeed is the agent.' (Nikhilananda)

⁸³ *ĀS*, II. 5: 'The wise say that the two states, dream and waking are one, on account of the identity of things (in those two states)... though in fact the objects of waking experience appear as real, still they are unreal.'

⁸⁴ *ĀSB*, p. cxxxii.

⁸⁵ *ĀS*, II. 1. 'The wise say that all things in a dream are unreal, for they are within owing to the fact that they are enclosed.' IV. 33: 'All things in dream are false as they are seen within the body; for how can objects be seen in this confined space (of the body)?' ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, II. 2.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, V. 4. ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, IV. 9. ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, IV. 61. ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, III. 31.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, III. 32. See also, IV. 72, 79, 99. ⁹² *Ibid.*, II. 19.

⁹³ In the opinion of P. T. Raju, Gauḍapāda, in denying the existence of the world is also denying *māyā*. Raju says: "Through the theory of *Māyā* Vedānta establishes the non-dual *Brahman* as the sole Reality; but in Gauḍapāda this can be at best a provisional statement in order to explain the relationship between the relative and the Absolute, and since Gauḍapāda denies a relationship of any sort in the Absolute, he must therefore, from the standpoint of the highest truth deny *Māyā* also; for the highest truth for Gauḍapāda is that there is neither disappearance nor origination, neither difference nor non-difference, and in this view there can be no *Māyā*." ITI, p. 154.

⁹⁴ Shortened form of Śaṅkarācārya. The philosophy of Śaṅkara permeates this work on a comparative basis. See preface.

⁹⁵ Used interchangeably with *māyā* and *ajñāna*. *Māyā* generally signifies the cosmic illusion on account of which *Brahman* appears as the Creator of the universe. It accounts for the creation in some schools of thought. *Avidyā* is the individual *māyā* that causes the *Ātman* to appear as the *jīva* or the individual self. *Ajñāna* is the ignorance that causes the Absolute to appear as many. *Ajñāna* is also used in the sense of error or of erroneous perception. However, even with these fine differences in meaning all three terms are in practice used interchangeably.

⁹⁶ Passages from the Sāṅkhya literature are taken from: *The Sāṅkhya-kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa*, trans. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1935); *The Tattva-Kaumudī on the Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, trans. Ganganatha Jha (2nd ed. rev.; Poona: The Oriental Book Agency, 1934); *The Sāṅkhya Philosophy*, trans. Nandalal Sinha (Sacred Books of the Hindus, XI; Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1915), reprinted in RMSB.

⁹⁷ *Snk*, XVI. (Jha)

⁹⁸ See *SnPS*, I. 61.

⁹⁹ By Īśvara Kṛṣṇa (3rd Century, A.D.).

¹⁰⁰ *Snk*, XIII. (Jha)

¹⁰¹ *Snk*, XVIII. (Sastri)

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ "Thou art that (*Tat tvam asi*)" in Advaita refers to the Self as *Brahman*, but in Sāṅkhya it is the perfect individual self existing at the time of dissolution of material being that is the object denoted by the word "That."

¹⁰⁴ *The Bhagavad-gītā* (religious classic of India that points up the Upaniṣadic philosophy) appears to reconcile this plurality with unity, the Lord Kṛṣṇa declaring 'never was there a time when I [the Supreme] was not, nor thou, nor these lords of men, nor will there ever be a time hereafter when we shall cease to be,' II. 12, tr. S. Radhakrishnan (New York : Harper & Bros., 1948).

¹⁰⁵ See *SnPs*, I. 154, and Bhāṣya of Vijñāna Bhikṣu. (Sinha) RMSB, p. 426.

¹⁰⁶ *SnPS*, I. 19. (Sinha)

¹⁰⁷ I. e., when *Prakṛti* reverts to non-action due to its separation from *Puruṣa*.

¹⁰⁸ *Snk*, 48. (Jha)

¹⁰⁹ *SnPS*, I. 79. (Sinha)

¹¹⁰ *Snk*, VIII. (Jha)

¹¹¹ Śāṅkara contends that the cause of the world must be a conscious principle, but he does not advance the argument that matter which is insensient cannot produce mind or consciousness.

¹¹² *SB*, I. 2. (Thibaut)

¹¹³ In his introduction to the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* Śāṅkarācārya points up this contention that *Brahman* is the intelligent Principle, citing *AiU*, III. 1. 3, describing *Brahman* as the self of all beings, and the incorporeal *prajñātman* or Pure Consciousness guiding them; he remarks, "In the present Upaniṣad also the question will be asked : 'Which one is the Self (III. i. 1) ?' and then it will be said, 'Consciousness (*Prajñānam*) is *Brahman* (III. i. 3).'" UNc, Vol. III, p. 6.

Nikhilananda remarks in Vol. I of the same series, that "the very conception of *Ātman* in the Upaniṣads implies the first Principle of things must above all be sought in man's inmost self . . . and the core of Yājñavalkya's teaching in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is that *Brahman* or *Ātman* is the knowing subject within us." P. 42.

¹¹⁴ The composite of which constitutes the Universal Soul.

¹¹⁵ PhI, p. 243, *infra*, footnote 154.

¹¹⁶ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (2 vols. ; London : Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1948 and 1951), Vol. II, p. 632.

¹¹⁷ Quotations of Rāmānuja taken from the *Vedānta-Sūtras with Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya*, ed. Max Muller, trans. George Thibaut (Sacred Books of the East, XLVIII : Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1904).

¹¹⁸ Born ca., A.D. 1027

¹¹⁹ *MaiU*, VI. 17 (Unc, p. 31). See also, *BrU*, IV. 5. 15, and *KaU*, II. 3. 9, 'His form is not an object of vision, no one beholds Him with the eye.' (Nikhilananda)

¹²⁰ *BrU*, IV. 4. 22. (Nikhilananda)

¹²¹ *SB*, III. 2. 17. (Thibaut)

¹²² *BrU*, III. 8. 7. (Nikhilananda)

¹²³ *ChU*, VI. 15. 3. (Swami-Yeats)

¹²⁴ A number of these hymns may be found in : *Śāṅkarācārya's Ātmabodha : Self Knowledge*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (Madras, India : Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1947), appendix.

¹²⁵ UNc, Vol. I, p. 49.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* (discussion of Brahman)

¹²⁷ IV. 9. (Swami-Yeats)

¹²⁸ RSB, I. i. 1. (Thibaut)

¹²⁹ Elsewhere in the *ŚrīBhāṣya*, Rāmānuja explains the term "effect": "By a thing being an effect, we mean, its being due to a substance passing over

into some other state; and from this point of view the self also is an effect . . . " (II. iii. 18)

¹³⁰ I. I. 5.

¹³¹ RSB, I. i. 1 (ca., p. 78ff).

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*, II. iii. 46.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, I. i. 1.

¹³⁵ Śaṅkarans interpret "That art thou" to mean the oneness of the Self and Brahman.

¹³⁶ RSB, I. i. 1. See also, II. iii. 18: the sentient and non-sentient beings in all their states constitute the body of the Lord (Brahman) while he continues their Self.

¹³⁷ *Supra*, fn. 3.

¹³⁸ Radhakrishnan says of māyā in this meaning: "If we confine our attention to the empirical world and employ the dialectic of logic we get the conception of a perfect personality, *Īśvara* (*Saguṇa Brahman*) who has the power of self-expression. This power or energy is called māyā. This energy becomes transformed into . . . the unmanifested matter, from which all existence issues. It is the object through which the supreme subject *Īśvara* develops the universe." IPh, Vol. II, p. 574.

¹³⁹ See note 2.

¹⁴⁰ Discussed in RSB, I. iv. 23.

¹⁴¹ That is, as Rāmānuja understands them to teach māyā.

¹⁴² See *TaiU*, III. 2. 1; III. 3. 1; III. 4. 1; III. 5. 1; III. 6. 1 (Swami and Yeats)

¹⁴³ See verses 1. 5; 2. 1; 3. 1; 3. 1; 5. 1; 6. 1; 7. 1; 26. 1.

¹⁴⁴ UNo, Vol. I, p. 81.

¹⁴⁵ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1929), Chap. III.

¹⁴⁶ Trans. C. H. Tawney, ed., annot. N. M. Penzer (10 vols.; London: Charles J. Sawyer, Ltd., 1926 and 1927).

¹⁴⁷ Vol. VI, p. 30.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁴⁹ The creative power.

¹⁵⁰ Re-incarnation.

¹⁵¹ Even the white spiders were dissatisfied with their state (of *avidyā*).

¹⁵² SKSS, Vol. VI, pp. 31 and 32.

¹⁵³ S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 318.

¹⁵⁴ Quoted passages in this chapter will be taken from: Śrī Aurobindo, *The Life Divine* ("Śrī Aurobindo International University Center Collection, Vol. III"; Pondicherry: Śrī Aurobindo Ashram Press, 1955); and a work explanatory of Integralism, by Haridas Chaudhuri, *The Philosophy of Integralism, or the Metaphysical Synthesis Inherent in the Teaching of Śrī Aurobindo* (Calcutta: Śrī Aurobindo Pathamandir, 1954).

¹⁵⁵ Except materialism as in Cārvāka.

¹⁵⁶ Aurobindo Ghose, 1872-1950.

¹⁵⁷ Various described as "Integral Vedānta," "Integral Non-dualism," "Integral Idealism," or more popularly, merely "Integralism."

¹⁵⁸ *Nirguṇa*, unqualified non-dualism as in Śaṅkara; *Saguṇa*, qualified non-dualism as in Rāmānuja; and *Jīvātman*, an infinite plurality of spiritual selves, as in Sāṅkhya.

¹⁵⁹ PhI, p. iv.

¹⁶⁰ Referring to the insentient. There is an interesting chapter explaining Sri Aurobindo's theory of evolution in PhI, pp. 138-237.

¹⁶¹ Excerpt of a letter to the author from Haridas Chaudhuri.

¹⁶² LD, p. 137.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* The multiple symbol implies the multitudinous perspectives or modes of expression of the same truth.

¹⁶⁴ The power of the infinite existence to determine itself as Self, the Divine, and the Conscious Being — *Ātman*, *Īśvara*, and *Puruṣa*.

¹⁶⁵ Delight (*purna-ānanda*) is defined by Chaudhuri as inclusive of both the delight of immutable being and the delight of mutable becoming a variable self-expression. The delight of mutable becoming logically entails the determination of the infinite to manifest itself in the apparent contraries of its nature, just as playing or singing is an indication not of the lack of joy, but often the presence of creative joy in the player or singer. (From a letter to the author)

¹⁶⁶ PhI, p. 107.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* Chaudhuri explains Aurobindo's words "content of mystical latency" to mean: . . . not our countless impure experiences, but only the transcendent powers and the highest forms, or, in other words, the absolutes of all that we experience. For example, *Parabrahman* contains within itself absolute creative power, unobstructed dynamic truth-vision, infinite pure joy, absolute overflowing love, etc. *Avidyā* which spreads its darkness over the entire field of our experience is derived from the divine creative power which is full of infinite potency and infinite knowledge. Our pleasures and pains are the distorted reflections of the divine infinite joy on the dark screen of *avidyā*; our strength and weaknesses are imperfect impressions of the divine omnipotence; our truths and errors are shadows of the eternal verities self-disclosed to the divine truth-consciousness; and our virtues and vices are feeble attempts at imitation of divine perfection. (PhI, pp. 108-109)

¹⁷⁰ E. i., power of creation. The word for "creation" in Sanskrit means a loosing or "putting forth" of what is in the being.

¹⁷¹ LD, p. 383.

¹⁷² PhI, pp. 109-10.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁷⁶ LD, p. 376.

¹⁷⁷ In ancient Indian thought, knowledge meant a consciousness that possesses the highest Truth in direct perception and in self-experience; to become, to be the Highest that we know is the sign that we really have the Knowledge. See LD, p. 816.

¹⁷⁸ LD, p. 388.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

¹⁸¹ In the philosophy of Integralism, "Mind" is defined as the power of *Avidyā* (Ignorance), the power of Ignorance groping toward the light of knowledge. LD, p. 175.

¹⁸² LD, p. 383.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 395.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

¹⁸⁹ A philosophico-religious group that glorifies *Viṣṇu* as the supreme being who creates and maintains the world by means of his *śaktis* or powers.

¹⁹⁰ Teaches the supremacy of the female principle as power or *śakti*, which produces through *māyā*, the world, which through the same *śakti* is eventually sublimated.

¹⁹¹ Or *Śiva* (for the Śaivists)

¹⁹² LD, Chap. II.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

¹⁹⁴ *Supra*, p. 33 (higher and lower *māyā*).

¹⁹⁵ *Śakti*.

¹⁹⁶ LD, pp. 404-05.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 408.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ Not superficially as something that is conscious of itself and only superconscious to our limited level of awareness.

²⁰⁵ LD, p. 408.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ PhI, p. 124.

²⁰⁹ LD, p. 409.

²¹⁰ *Vāda*, doctrine or theory.

²¹¹ PhI, p. 124.

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ See introduction, section on philosophy of Rāmānuja. See also, note 320.

²¹⁴ See "poise of being" in next section.

²¹⁵ Dualism (as in Sāṅkhya).

²¹⁶ PhI, p. 125.

²¹⁷ See last section of this chapter for summary of *māyā*.

²¹⁸ Chaudhuri defines Divine Delight as the voluntary descent of the superconscious Spirit into the Inconscious for the sheer delight of a novel adventure, the adventure of self-manifestation in the contraries of nature.

PhI, p. 154.

²¹⁹ PhI, p. 215.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Sat*, existence; *cit*, consciousness; *ānanda*, bliss.

²²² PhI, p. 157.

²²³ In another passage of PhI, Chaudhuri explains: "It is quite possible that the inconscient energy which works at the basis of the material world is as Śrī Aurobindo suggests, the energy of consciousness acting in a state of somnambulism as it were. Śrī Aurobindo maintains that the superconscious Spirit voluntarily plunges into the dark waters of the Inconscious for the sheer delight of a novel adventure. This plunge into Inconscience is a miracle of the Spirit's purposive self-oblivion and exclusive concentration in a particular direction." p. 154.

²²⁴ PhI, p. 157.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

²²⁶ LD, p. 293.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

²²⁸ PhI, pp. 175-176.

²²⁹ Inconscious and subconscious are ontological concepts. Inconscious implies that even matter is a form of manifestation of the spirit, representing the presence and power of consciousness in a state of involution. The subconscious refers to the life force or the vital energy which is a higher grade of manifestation of the supreme Spirit.

²³⁰ See note 229.

²³¹ PhI, pp. 175-76.

²³² See note 218.

²³³ The Absolute is infinite delight (*purna-ānanda*), which includes both the delight of immutable Being and the delight of mutable becoming a variable self-expression.

²³⁴ LD, Chap. XXIII, *et passim*.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

- ²³⁶ *Ibid.* ²³⁷ *Ibid.*, Chap. XVIII, *et passim*.
- ²³⁸ Explained in next section, "The Ignorance and the Knowledge."
- ²³⁹ *Supra*, p. 32.
- ²⁴⁰ Or the Infinite Consciousness of Supermind (the first lower manifestation of the Absolute) that comprehends the truth of the many as One.
- ²⁴¹ Capitalized, as both Ignorance and Knowledge are shown to be powers of the Infinite Consciousness.
- ²⁴² Comparable to the Creator of the world, *Īśvara* or the lower *Brahman*.
- ²⁴³ PhI, pp. 179-80. ²⁴⁴ LD, p. 197. ²⁴⁵ PhI, p. 180.
- ²⁴⁶ LD, p. 198. ²⁴⁷ PhI, p. 180. ²⁴⁸ LD, p. 198.
- ²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 196. ²⁵⁰ PhI, p. 177. ²⁵¹ *Infra*, p. 65.
- ²⁵² LD, pp. 605-06. ²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 326. ²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 328.
- ²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 328-29. ²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1005. ²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 331.
- ²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 332. ²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 333. ²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 334. ²⁶² *Ibid.* ²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 335.
- ²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 336. ²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 340. ²⁶⁶ PhI, p. 122.
- ²⁶⁷ LD, p. 49. ²⁶⁸ PhI, p. 181. ²⁶⁹ LD, p. 190.
- ²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 199. ²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 204. ²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 203.
- ²⁷³ PhI, p. 366. ²⁷⁴ LD, p. 203. ²⁷⁵ PhI, p. 220.
- ²⁷⁶ LD, p. 814. ²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 829. ²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 818.
- ²⁷⁹ Born 1888.
- ²⁸⁰ *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan (2 vols.; London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), Vol. I, p. 20.
- ²⁸¹ RMSB, p. 610. ²⁸² PEW, p. 535.
- ²⁸³ IPh, Vol. I, p. 34. ²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35. ²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸⁶ IPh, Vol. II, p. 720. ²⁸⁷ IPh, Vol. I, p. 675.
- ²⁸⁸ *Ibid.* ²⁸⁹ *Ibid.* ²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹¹ P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 325.
- ²⁹² IPh, Vol. I, p. 151.
- ²⁹³ E. g., *ChU*, VIII. 3. 12 defines the self in four stages (1) the bodily self, (2) the empirical self, (3) the transcendental self, (4) the absolute self.
- ²⁹⁴ VIII. 7. 1. (Radhakrishnan) IPh, Vol. I, p. 152. See also, Radhakrishnan's translation and annotation of the *ChU*, VIII. 2-4, *The Principal Upaniṣads* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), pp. 501-02.
- ²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, VIII. 7. 3. See also, annotation to VIII. 12. 4.
- ²⁹⁶ IPh, Vol. I, p. 152. ²⁹⁷ See *BrU*, IV. 4. 3.
- ²⁹⁸ Waking, dream, deep sleep. ²⁹⁹ IPh, Vol. I, p. 155.
- ³⁰⁰ *ChU*, VIII. 12. ³⁰¹ IPh, Vol. I, p. 157.
- ³⁰² See *SB*, I. 2. 13; II. 2. 28. ³⁰³ IPh, Vol. I, p. 159.
- ³⁰⁴ *KaU*, II. 3. 12. ³⁰⁵ *BrU*, III. 7. 3.
- ³⁰⁶ *An Idealist View of Life* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), p. 101.
- ³⁰⁷ *SB*, II. 2. 26. ³⁰⁸ *ITI*, p. 334.
- ³⁰⁹ *IVL*, pp. 101-102.
- ³¹⁰ The three conditions of the self, waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, together with that which comprehends them all, are called respectively, the *Vīśva*, the *Taijasa*, the *Prājña*, and the *Turiya* states.

- ³¹¹ IPh, Vol. I, p. 162. ³¹² *Ibid.*
³¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163. ³¹⁴ *Ibid.*
³¹³ IPh, Vol. II, p. 713. ³¹⁵ IPh, Vol. I, p. 162. ³¹⁷ *Ibid.*
³¹⁶ *BrU*, II. 5. 15: 'Just as all the spokes are fixed in the nave and the fellow of a chariot wheel, so are all beings, all gods, all worlds, all organs, and all these creatures fixed in their Self.' (Nikhilananda).
³¹⁹ IPh, Vol. I, p. 166.
³²⁰ For Rāmānuja, God, selves, and matter are the Absolute and not God alone. He identifies God with the Absolute beyond which nothing exists; that is, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* is really the identity of two reals — substance and attribute, subject and predicate. To Rāmānuja *Brahman* is not only an Ultimate Self, but an eternal society of eternal selves.
³²¹ IPh, Vol. I, p. 166.
³²² See IPh, Vol. II, pp. 552-553. "... *Brahman* is the basis on which the objective world is imposed, while *Ātman* is the basis on which the subjective world is imposed." p. 553.
³²³ IPh, Vol. I, p. 170. ³²⁴ PEW, p. 274.
³²⁵ IPh, Vol. II, pp. 553-554. ³²⁶ See IPh, Vol. II, p. 552.
³²⁷ The subtle body as in the dream state.
³²⁸ The unity of all *taijāsas* or subtle souls. ³²⁹ IPh, I, p. 171.
³³⁰ Some Vedāntins use these terms in different order, often equating *Hiraṇyagarbha* with *Īśvara*. See Swami Nikhilananda's chapter on the discussion of *Brahman*, UNc, intro.; especially pp. 68-69.
³³¹ IPh, Vol. I, p. 172. ³³² *Ibid.*, p. 165.
³³³ *Ibid.*, p. 176. ³³⁴ *ChU*, VI. 13. (Radhakrishnan).
³³⁵ IPh, Vol. I, p. 179. ³³⁶ *Ibid.*
³³⁷ 'There is no measure of him whose glory verily is great.' *Yajur-Veda*. (Radhakrishnan).
³³⁸ IPh, Vol. I, p. 178.
³³⁹ *ChU*, III. 14. 1: 'All this (the world) is verily *Brahman*.' (Nikhilananda).
³⁴⁰ IPh, Vol. I, p. 184.
³⁴¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead (Birkenhead: Willmer Bros., 1952), p. 502.
³⁴² IPh, Vol. I, p. 184. ³⁴³ *Ibid.* ³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
³⁴⁵ *Ibid.* ³⁴⁶ IVL, p. 345.
³⁴⁷ Paraphrased from CIPh, p. 498. ³⁴⁸ CIPh, p. 498.
³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 499. ³⁵⁰ *Ibid.* ³⁵¹ *Ibid.*
³⁵² IPh, Vol. I, p. 185. ³⁵³ CIPh, p. 500.
³⁵⁴ Radhakrishnan believes in *Sarva-mukti*. See PEW, p. 535.
³⁵⁵ IPh, Vol. I, p. 183. ³⁵⁶ IVL, p. 343ff.
³⁵⁷ IPh, Vol. II, p. 569. ³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
³⁵⁹ IPh, Vol. I, p. 186. ³⁶⁰ ITI, p. 397.
³⁶¹ Discussed in ITI, p. 398ff. ³⁶² *SB*, II. i. 31.
³⁶³ The world has the real for its basis, for "not even the mirage can exist without a basis." *SBG*, XIII. 14.
³⁶⁴ *SB*, II. 3. 7: The entire world springs from *Īśvara*, *ākāśa* being produced first, and later on the other elements in due succession.

³⁶⁵ ŚĀtmN, xv.

³⁶⁶ This is not to be construed as pantheism, for pantheism implies an existence of an "other" for God to be immanent in. There is no "other" all being the One. In Vedantic teaching the phenomenal disappears at the level of *Brahman*.

³⁶⁷ 59. Also, see 101.

³⁶⁸ ŚĀtmN, p. 71.

³⁶⁹ *SvU*, IV. 10: Know then that *Prakṛti* is *māyā* and the wielder of *māyā* is the great Lord. This whole world is pervaded by beings that are parts of him.

³⁷⁰ ŚĀtmN, p. 88.

³⁷¹ ŚB, II. 2. 31.

³⁷² ŚĀtm, 7.

³⁷³ A term of Vedāntic philosophy denoting a limitation imposed upon the Self or upon *Brahman* through ignorance.

³⁷⁴ Verse 29.

³⁷⁵ CIPh, p. 636.

³⁷⁶ From a letter to author.

³⁷⁷ ŚĀtmN, p. 72.

³⁷⁸ IPh, Vol. II, p. 449.

³⁷⁹ Held by Rāmānuja, Prabhākara, Mīmāṃsākas, and Naiyāyikas, respectively.

³⁸⁰ *Parimala*, N S, pp. 26-27 (suggested by DM, p. 10).

³⁸¹ See note 62.

³⁸² *Mahāpadana Sutta* (Radhakrishnan) in IPh, Vol. I, p. 414.

See also *SN*, XXII. 90:

On ignorance depends *karma*;

On *karma* depends consciousness,

On consciousness depends name and form, etc.

from: H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. III; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), p. 166.

³⁸³ 4th Century, A.D. Clarence H. Hamilton, tr., *Wei Shih Er Shih Lun, or The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation-only* (American Oriental Series, XIII; New Haven; American Oriental Soc., 1938).

³⁸⁴ The three states of consciousness — waking, dream, deep sleep.

³⁸⁵ Translator's parenthesis, denoting more suitable translation of *viññapti-mātratā*, since "representation" suggests rather than denies external reality.

³⁸⁶ Verse 1.

³⁸⁷ Of the Hīnayāna School.

³⁸⁸ Of the Hīnayāna School.

³⁸⁹ Suggested reading: *DM*, pp. 34-35.

³⁹⁰ P. 188. (translated by Chaudhuri, *DM*, p. 36).

³⁹¹ III. 2. 4. (Radhakrishnan, IPh, Vol. I, p. 630).

³⁹² *SSSS*, III. 2. 6. (Radhakrishnan).

³⁹³ "The founder of the Mādhyamika school is generally identified with Nāgārjuna. Whether or not he was the actual founder of the school, there is no doubt that he was the first great exponent, and his famous work, the *Mādhyamikakārikās* with the commentary of Candrakīrti, is the most important of this school." ITI, p. 233.

³⁹⁴ *SSSS*, III. 1. 18.

³⁹⁵ IPh, Vol. I, p. 645.

³⁹⁶ *DM*, p. 42.

³⁹⁷ The Mādhyamikas do not dismiss all entities (*dharma*s) as unreal, though they look upon them as phenomenal and momentary, as evidenced in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, II, 173: "When we come rationally to examine things

we cannot ascertain the nature of anything ; hence all things must be declared inexplicable and devoid of any assignable nature of character."

³⁹⁸ See introduction of this work.

³⁹⁹ Chaps. I, VI, VII. *Mādhyaṃika-Śāstra of Nāgārjuna with Commentary by Candrakīrti*, tr. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (Leningrad : Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 1927). Reprinted in RMSB, p. 340.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, I. XIV.

There is, therefore, no cause-possessor,
Nor is there an effect without a cause ;
If altogether no effect arises,
(How then, can we distinguish)
Between the causes and non-causes ?

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. I.

⁴⁰² Of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of logical realism. This school represents the analytic type of philosophy, and upholds common sense and science, while other systems of Indian thought deal with the universe as a whole. (IPh, Vol. II, p. 29). The *Sāṃkhya-Kārikās* also support *anyathākhyātivāda*.

⁴⁰³ See *Nyāyamañjari*, pp. 448-459. Suggested by Radhakrishnan, IPh, Vol. II, p. 70.

⁴⁰⁴ *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, IV. 2. 35 : taken from *Gautama's Nyāyasūtras with Vatsyayana's Bhāṣya*, tr. Gaganatha Jha (Poona : Oriental Book Agency, 1939). Reprinted in RMSB.

⁴⁰⁵ *SaṃK*, IX. (Jha) From *The Tatva-kaumudī : Vācaspati Miśra's Commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, tr. Gaganatha Jha (Poona : The Oriental Book Agency, 1934). Reprinted in RMSB, p. 428.

⁴⁰⁶ *NSV*, IV. 2. 35.

⁴⁰⁷ IPh, Vol. II, p. 134.

⁴⁰⁸ The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, or earlier interpretative investigation of the Vedas, relating to conduct. The Uttara Mīmāṃsā or later investigation of the Vedas, relating to knowledge, is more commonly known as Vedānta, "end of the Vedas."

⁴⁰⁹ Gaganatha Jha, tr. (Calcutta : Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909). Reprinted in RMSB, pp. 487-505.

⁴¹⁰ *KBS*, *Abhāva* 1 (translator's commentary, RMSB, p. 488).

⁴¹¹ The Mīmāṃsākas make great use of this theory to establish the uncreatedness and eternal validity of the Vedas.

⁴¹² 7th Century. Of the Mīmāṃsā school, followers of the interpretations of Prabhākara.

⁴¹³ Anil Kumar Ray Chaudhuri, *The Doctrine of Māyā* (Calcutta : Das Gupta & Co., Ltd., 1950), p. 14.

⁴¹⁴ *PrM*, II. (Jha).

⁴¹⁵ Therefore, Prabhākara's view is, that the object, the subject and the knowledge of the object, are manifested in every act of knowledge. See Radhakrishnan's criticism, IPh, Vol. II, 398ff.

⁴¹⁶ *DM*, p. 15.

⁴¹⁷ See note 411.

⁴¹⁸ *SSSS*, VI. 206.

⁴¹⁹ *Siddhāntabindu*, *Nyāyartnavali*, suggested by Radhakrishnan, IPh, Vol. II, p. 409, fn.

⁴²⁰ IPh, Vol. II, p. 410.

⁴²¹ DM, p. 15.

⁴²² I. I. I; SBE, p. 119.

⁴²³ RSB, I. I. I: SBE, p. 122.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁸ Karman: an imperfection of the finite self.

⁴²⁹ PEW, pp. 307-08. (P.N. Srinivasa Chari on Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita).

⁴³⁰ See Chap. II, defense of Śāṅkara on the world.

⁴³¹ *ŚĀtm*, 7.

⁴³² *ŚĀtmN*, p. 165. Nikhilananda explains that all things in the phenomenal world are endowed with five characteristics: existence, cognizability (that which makes one aware of the existence of a thing), attraction, form and name. Of these, the first three corresponding to *Sat*, *Chit*, and *Ānanda* (Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss) belong to *Brahman*, which is the basis of everything, and the other two, to the relative world.

⁴³³ *SB*, I. I. I. SBE, p. 4. See also, *SB*, III. 3. 9.

⁴³⁴ IPh, Vol. II, p. 506.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

⁴³⁶ *BG*, II. 16. 17. (Nikhilananda).

⁴³⁷ *BrU*, IV. 4. 19. (Shastri).

⁴³⁸ *ŚĀtm*, verse 13.

⁴³⁹ 'Only by the mind this idea of multiplicity is to be obtained; there is no multiplicity here whatsoever; he goes from death to death who sees any multiplicity here.' *KaU*, II. 1. 11. (Shastri).

⁴⁴⁰ *BrU*, I. 3. 28. (Nikhilananda).

⁴⁴¹ *ŚvU*, III. 16. (Nikhilananda).

⁴⁴² See note 188.

⁴⁴³ In *ChU*, VIII. 14. 1, we read: 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names the phenomenal world; that within which these forms and names are contained is *Brahman*.'

⁴⁴⁴ *SB*, I. iv. 3. (Thibaut).

⁴⁴⁵ Modern particle mechanics has been unable isolate and posit the atom as a material entity. The atom is generally held by science to be a mental construct for the explanation of phenomenal event.

⁴⁴⁶ *ŚĀtm*, verse 63.

⁴⁴⁷ *SB*, I. i. 2. (Thibaut).

⁴⁴⁸ *ŚĀtm*, verse 8. Commentary: Names and Forms associated with various bangles and bracelets, which appear to distinguish them from gold, are changeable and therefore unreal, and when the names and forms undergo change the gold remains as is. (Nikhilananda).

⁴⁴⁹ *RMSB*, p. 507.

⁴⁵⁰ Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty. The inability of science to isolate and to measure the electron as an entity in relation to other entities with any appreciable degree of certainty.

⁴⁵¹ *SB*, II. i. 14. (Thibaut).

⁴⁵² *SB*, I. iv. 3. (Thibaut).

⁴⁵³ III. ii. 8. (Hume).

⁴⁵⁴ *ChU*, VIII. xii. 3. (Hume).

⁴⁵⁵ *VmV*, XXI.



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
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